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ABSTRACT
Emotion-based learning has emerged as a concept referring to a specific class of 
learning in uncertain situations that is facilitated by a substantial input from the emotion 
system. The precise nature of this input, however, remains a controversial and well- 
studied topic. The present thesis builds on existing emotion-based learning research and 
investigates several understudied and novel research questions in both experimental and 
clinical domains. In Chapter 1, a literature review outlines the evolution of research on 
emotion-based learning, its neuropsychological correlates and focuses on one of the most 
popular tasks used to measure the concept: the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The IGT is an 
experimental task developed in order to simulate real world complex decision-making. In 
it, participants make choices from decks of cards that vary in both frequency and 
magnitude of reward (gain) and punishment (loss). Advantageous decision-making 
involves foregoing immediate gains with higher long-term losses for lower immediate 
gains and lower long-term losses. Research has indicated considerable variability in the 
extent to which healthy controls produce evidence of advantageous learning on the IGT. 
Chapter 2 showed that placing time constraints on the critical decision-making period in 
the IGT systematically disrupted the performance of healthy participants. Chapters 3 and 
4 introduced a novel variant contingency shifting IGT in which the reward and 
punishment contingencies were systematically altered following initial exposure to the 
task. Research was undertaken with a large sample, using a repeated exposure design and 
by measuring the autonomic skin conductance correlates of contingency shifting IGT 
performance. Chapter 5 extended the investigation to the dimensional spectrum of
depression and schizophrenia by applying the task to participants scoring high and low on 
measures of psychosis proneness and depression. Results showed that individuals with 
high psychotic and depressive features displayed poor flexible emotion-based learning 
performance. Chapter 6 showed that patients with schizophrenia exhibit impaired 
performance compared to controls, while Chapter 7 showed that depressed patients also 
underperformed compared to controls, in both the initial and contingency shifting phase 
of the variant IGT. Overall, the findings of the present thesis offer insights into the nature 
of flexible emotion-based learning, as measured with the contingency shifting IGT, and 
its impairment, across healthy volunteers, individuals at higher risk of developing 
psychosis or depression and patients with schizophrenia and depression.
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Chapter 1
Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past 30 years, research interest in the topic of emotion has increased 
considerably (LeDoux, 1996; Rolls, 2005). One of the main reasons behind this scholarly 
growth is the acknowledgment that emotion plays a central role in our lives and that our 
behaviour is controlled, to a large extent, by affect (Damasio, 1994). Of the different 
accounts proposed to study emotion, neuroscience has been one of the most fruitful 
(Panksepp, 1998). Neuroscience research has been mainly concerned with the 
identification of different emotional systems, at the neural level, in the attempt to identify 
the structures involved in eliciting and controlling emotional responses (Calder,
Lawrence & Young, 2001).
In the early 1990’s it was proposed that emotion might play an important role in 
underpinning complex human behaviours and support complex cognitive functions 
(Damasio, 1994). The research regarding the influence of emotion over complex 
behaviour started with clinical observations conducted with brain injury patients with 
orbitofrontal damage; these patients often showed a picture of preserved intelligence 
paired with a considerable difficulty in making advantageous choices in personal- and 
social-life settings (Elsinger & Damasio, 1985).
Similar to people with orbitofrontal injury, people with mental illness show 
difficulties in real life decision-making often leading to social and occupational 
dysfunction. Neuropsychiatric investigations have suggested that frontal lobe 
abnormalities are implicated in many psychiatric conditions especially in enduring or 
recurrent mental health problems such as schizophrenia and depression (Antonova,
1
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Sharma, Morris & Kumari, 2004; Brunet-Gouet & Decety, 2006; Fitzgerald, Oxley, 
Laird, Kulkami, Egan & Daskalakis, 2006).
The research presented in this thesis seeks to investigate the role of emotion in 
decision-making by considering several under-developed research questions. In its six 
experimental chapters, this work will investigate emotion-based learning and the 
relevance of this concept for experimental and clinical research. The first empirical 
chapter will examine the effects of time constraints on the emotion-based learning. The 
following chapter will introduce a paradigm to measure emotion-based learning 
flexibility. The third experimental chapter will investigate the physiological correlates of 
flexible emotion-based learning. Finally, the last three chapters will examine flexible 
emotion-based learning in depression and schizophrenia from a sub-clinical and clinical 
perspective. The series of investigations proposed will measure emotion-based learning 
with behavioural, subjective and physiological methods. Before moving to the 
experimental chapters, the following sections will outline the concept of emotion-based 
learning and review the relevant research conducted around the research questions 
addressed by this thesis.
Emotion-based learning
Emotion-based learning is a term that refers to a specific class of learning in 
which learning in uncertain situations is achieved via a substantial contribution of the 
emotion system (Damasio, 1996; LeDoux, 1996, 2000; Turnbull, Berry & Bowman, 
2003). The system appears to provide knowledge about the outcome of decisions on the 
basis of previous experience of the emotional consequences of interaction with particular 
stimuli (Damasio, 1996; Tranel & Damasio, 1994; Turnbull, Evans, Kemish, Park &
2
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Bowman 2006). Bowman and Turnbull (2004) suggested the emotion-learning system to 
be an aggregate of learning principles, such that they provide information about the often 
long and complex reinforcement history with which the individual has had with an object. 
The addition of emotion is claimed to be particularly helpful in uncertain conditions 
where individuals are required to make rapid decisions in the absence of a clear 
understanding of the situation, or when advantageous outcomes of a decision do not 
result in an immediate gain (Damasio, 1996; LeDoux, 1996). Emotion-based support for 
decision-making can be crucial in many real life situations such as choosing a career, 
deciding whether to stop or continue at the yellow traffic light, invest savings, start a new 
business and select a friend or a partner. In uncertain scenarios, the emotion-based 
learning system can provide a shorter path, compared to traditional strategies relying on 
cost and benefit, and individuals can reach a decision by considering the emotional 
correlates attached to the situation. In other words, emotion-based learning processes 
achieve quick and efficient decisions using emotion-based heuristics.
Interest in the relationship between emotion-based learning and decision-making 
began with some challenging cases of brain injury that, despite showing intact intellect, 
presented marked inability to make beneficial choices in social and personal context. The 
formulation of the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH; Damasio, 1994) and the more 
general concept of emotion-based learning (EBL) have deep roots in the clinical 
presentation of the first neurological patients with orbitofrontal damage. For this reason it 
appears important to take a retrospective look to how the study of the ‘emotional brain’ 
began (MacLean, 1949).
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Neurological Investigation o f  Emotion-based Learning
On the 13th of September 1848, Phineas Gage, a railway worker, inadvertently 
blew a iron bar through the left side of his frontal skull presenting neuropsychology with 
a timeless case of intriguing neurological deficit; that of impaired social cognition 
(Adolphs, 1999; Goldberg, 2001). Despite the severity of the prefrontal cortex injury, 
Gage had a quick recovery and in less the two months he was well enough to leave the 
hospital (Macmillan, 2000).
The first clinical records of Gage after his discharge from the hospital were 
remarkable; the patient did not show any loss in crucial functions such as language, 
memory, attention or reasoning. However, it soon become evident that Gage had lost his 
original personality and with it the ability to interact purposefully with the environment. 
Formerly a responsible and reliable person in both personal and professional life, Gage 
become, after the injury, incapable of considering consequences of his actions as well as 
little concern about the consequences of his behaviour. An account of his physician 
described Gage as: “a fitful and irreverent man, indulging in the grossest profanity, 
manifesting little deference for his fellows, obstinate, impatient, irreverent devising many 
plans for future operation quickly dismissed...” (Damasio, 1994, p.8).
More than a century after Gage’s death, Damasio and colleagues reconstructed the 
site of the brain damage from the fractures found in the skull and showed that Gage’s 
brain would have sustained a substantial damage in the ventral part of the orbitofrontal 
cortex (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda & Damasio, 1994). Phineas Gage’s case 
suggested a substantial contribution of the prefrontal cortex to personality and emotional
4
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processing and also indicates that these functions are dissociated from general intellect 
(Rolls, 2005).
In the years following Gage’s accident, frontal lobes incision, also called 
lobotomy, were initially performed across the world in order to treat severe and enduring 
mental illness (Macmillan, 1996; Tierney, 2000). Frontal neurosurgery involved drilling a 
hole in the skull and inserting a wire knife into the brain in order to sever the matter 
connecting the frontal lobes with the rest of the brain (Sabbatini, 1997). According to 
Hoffman (1949), “these patients are not only no longer distressed by their mental 
conflicts but also seem to have little capacity for any emotional experiences pleasurable 
or otherwise” (p.238).
By the late 20th century a contribution of the frontal lobes to social cognition and 
emotion processing was widely acknowledged by the scientific community although 
exact localization of the function was yet to be achieved (Rankin, 2006). The 
improvement in neuroscience scanning techniques in conjunction with the development 
of research interest in this area produced outstanding advancement in the understanding 
of the neurological substrate of emotion and social cognition. Before reviewing the 
studies that paved the way for the formulation of the SMH, it is appropriate to provide an 
anatomical account of the frontal lobes.
The prefrontal cortex
Frontal lobes constitute the third of the human cortex located in front of the 
central fissure, separating it from the parietal lobes, and above the lateral fissure, 
separating the frontal cortex from the temporal lobes (Luria, 1966). Three different 
regions, subserving different functions, can be distinguished within the frontal lobes: the
5
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motor cortex which encompass most of the precentral gyrus located immediately in front 
of the central sulcus; the premotor cortex extending in front of the motor cortex including 
parts of the precentral, middle frontal and superior gyiri; and the prefrontal region 
constituting the anterior part of the frontal lobes (Damasio, 1995).The prefrontal cortex is 
the critical region implicated in processing environmental stimulation in order to achieve 
complex behaviour. For its relevance to the studies presented in this thesis the current 
section will concentrate on the prefrontal regions implicated in decision-making.
According to Krawczyk (2002), there are four main regions contributing to the 
decision-making process at the cortical level: the orbitofrontal (OFC) and ventromedial 
(VMPFC) areas, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the anterior and ventral 
cingulate. The OFC can be described as the part of the prefrontal region that is located on 
the roof of the orbit and covers the ventral surface of the frontal lobes (Ongur & Price, 
2000). A further distinction within the OFC is also often made when referring to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), defined as the inner-most medial areas of the 
ventral frontal lobes. This distinction is supported by an increasing number of studies that 
find functional dissociation between the ventromedial and ventrolateral areas (see Elliott, 
Dolan and Frith, 2000, for a review). Functionally, the OFC and the ventromedial 
prefrontal regions can be viewed as an integration centre for emotional content, an area 
involved in processing the reward value of environmental stimuli, a central area in the 
decision-making process, as well as an area processing peripheral signals from the body 
(Damasio, 1994). Moreover, this area seems to be involved in adapting to rapid changes 
in reward contingencies and suppressing responses to stimuli that are no longer 
rewarding. This function of the OFC appears to be critical especially in unclear
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situations, while deciding under time pressure or when different options need to be 
evaluated (Krawczyk, 2002). The OFC, through its connection with sub-cortical regions, 
is also responsible for inhibiting motor responses and adjusting behaviour when social 
contingencies change (Cummings, 1995).
Most of the knowledge about impaired decision-making process comes from 
research conducted with OFC brain injured populations. Orbitofrontal patients, unlike 
DLPFC patients, demonstrate an important social impairment in every day life although 
they preserve verbal memory of social and moral principles (Saver & Damasio, 1991). 
The pioneering work o f Damasio and colleagues shows how debilitating and profound is 
the disability that is incurred with such damage and highlights the selective nature of the 
deficit caused (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994; Damasio, 1995; Eslinger 
& Damasio, 1985). Selective OFC damage can affect different functions ranging from 
social behaviour in everyday context to the ability to predict reward and punishment. A 
study from Goel, Grafman, Tajik, Gana and Danto (1998) found that, in a financial 
planning task, OFC patients spent an abnormally long time deliberating and not enough 
time generating solutions and future plans. Patients with OFC damage seem also to have 
problems in reward processing; several neuroimaging studies have shown activation in 
the orbitofrontal cortex, caudate and insula during steaks of wins and losses, suggesting 
the importance of these regions for reward sensitivity (e.g., Elliott, Friston, & Dolan, 
2000).
In a study strongly related to non-human primate work (see Cavada, Company, 
Tejedor, Cruz-Rizzolo & Reinoso-Suarez, 2000 for a review), Drewe (1975) investigated 
binary choice behaviour in frontal lobe patients; results indicate that damage to the OFC
7
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caused difficulties in withholding responses. A similar finding has been achieved in a 
study aiming to investigate the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in learning.
Rolls and colleagues found patients with VMPFC lesions to be impaired in performing a 
binary reward reversal choice task, displaying a particular insensibility to shifting and 
modification of the reward schedules (Rolls, Homak, Wade & McGrath, 1994).
The role of risk taking behaviour and impulsivity of OFC patients has been 
extensively investigated in a series of studies by Miller (e.g. Miller, 1985; 1992). Results 
indicated that patients with frontal lobe excision made more predictions based on 
insufficient information than patients with temporal lobe excision and normal controls. 
Given the difficulties in understanding risk probability and reward schedules that OFC 
patients showed, Rogers et al. (1999) investigated several classifications of brain damage 
employing a decision-making task in which participants were required to gamble on a 
task with known reward chances. In this task, participants were asked to find a token 
hidden in one coloured box among many of different colours. Each coloured box was 
presented with a probability of finding the token (e.g., 25%). The task required to select a 
box and bet some virtual points on the choice. Patients were therefore explicitly presented 
with the possibility to obtain higher reward by selecting from the more rewarding 
gambling options. OFC patients, compared to other prefrontal patients, performed worst 
(Rogers,et al., 1999). This study provided evidence that OFC damage leads to 
disadvantageous choices even under circumstances where the probabilities of success are 
explicitly available.
Like the OFC, the DLPFC appears to sub-serve unique functions relevant to 
decision-making. The DLPFC occupies the upper and side regions of the frontal lobes,
Chapter 1
roughly corresponding to Brodmann areas 9 and 46. Most of the studies have investigated 
the DLPFC area in relation to the functionality of the working memory (Goldman-Rakic, 
1992). Functions related to the working memory are of obvious contribution to decision­
making as they are essential for maintaining a focus on goal hierarchies, monitoring and 
assess the status of competing options and possibly storing affective information relevant 
to attributes. The DLPFC is also supporting the decision-making by disambiguating 
similar choices and evaluate the overall value of an option by estimating the summary of 
its attributes (Mellers & Biagini, 1994). Also, it seems that the DLPFC plays a crucial 
role in the integration process of information; such processes would include developing 
overall impressions of options based on the comparisons of various attributes, as well as 
evaluating the overall goodness. An example of such process could be a situation 
involving the purchase of a bike. The choice will be possibly addressed by considering 
the physical proprieties of the vehicles, memories of past experience with the similar 
objects, emotionally driven subjective impression, as well as knowledge of costs and 
future financial implications of the purchase. When deliberating about that an integration 
process is required in order to make the final choice, this process has high implication for 
the working memory and relies, in the final stage, on the integration functions of the 
DLPFC (Waltz et al., 1999).
Last of the three main areas thought to be mostly implicated in the decision­
making process is the anterior cingulate (AC). The AC is situated in the frontal part of the 
cingulated cortex, extending as a collar around the corpus callosum. The AC appears to 
be involved in decisions that are highly ambiguous, in mental situations proposing a 
conflicting options and high likelihood of making an error (Botvinick, Nystom, Fissell,
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Carter & Cohen, 1999; Carter, Braver, Barch, Botvinick, Noll & Cohen, 1998). AC has 
also been found to be implicated in anticipatory activation in gambling related decision­
making (Critchley, Mathias & Dolan, 2001). Overall, the AC appears to be involved in a 
number of relevant decision-making processes, providing monitoring and mediation 
functions to conflictual or multiple choice situations. Krawczyk (2002) has suggested that 
AC functions are similar to a signal amplifier; the AC can top strength in case certain 
features of an option are not taken in account properly during the early stages of the 
decision processes. AC, also, seems to be involved in monitoring the outcome 
information and detecting the possible need for a behavioural adjustment.
Emotion and Decision-making: The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
Evidence from the clinical presentation of individuals with OFC damage has 
produced a consensus around the debilitating aspect of damage to this area with particular 
emphasis on poor decision-making ability. In order to explain the reason for decision­
making deficits following OFC damage, Damasio proposed the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis (SMH) (Bechara, 2004; Damasio, 1994; Dunn, Dalgleish, Lawrence et al.,
2006). Through a series of experiments conducted at Iowa University, Damasio and co­
workers identified a crucial area responsible of effective decision-making: namely the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC). The SMH postulates that “somatic marker” 
biasing signals from the body are represented and regulated in the emotion circuitry of 
the brain, specifically in the VMPFC, to help regulate decision-making in situations of 
complexity and uncertainty (e.g., Bechara, Tranel & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 1994; 
1996). In other words, visceral responses to events in the environment are processed by 
the brain and used to “mark” (positively or negatively) the consequence of actions. In this
10
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frame the VMPFC functions to elicit visceral responses that reflect the anticipated value 
of the choices (Naqui, Tranel & Bechara, 2006). The contribution of somatic markers, as 
advanced in the formulation of the SMH, applies only to specific types of decision­
making, in particular those situations where the meaning of the event is indeterminate and 
the consequences of the behaviour uncertain. Examples of situations where somatic 
markers might aid the decision-making process are, according to Damasio, social 
interactions, decision about personal and financial life and all those situations in which 
the consequence of the behaviour have emotional value (Damasio, 1994). Such situations 
are those where rules that govern the behaviour are not explicit, but yet require some 
form of on-line deliberation. In order to be efficient an organism is required to 
understand the environment contingencies using a particular form of reasoning that does 
not rationally weight positive and negative consequences but intuitively select the most 
appropriate behaviour upon the emotional consequences attached to early events (Naqui 
et al., 2006).
According to the formulation of the SMH, the re-occurrence of previously 
experienced situations does not require a novel association between bodily states and 
class of stimuli. It is claimed that when a situation re-occurs the VMPFC can reactivate 
the already generated association. This process can be elicited in two ways: via the body 
loop, which regenerate the original somatic signal thus sending information to the 
somatosensory cortex or alternatively via the as as-ifbody loop, which rather that re­
creating the signal in the body sends the appropriate triggers from the VMPFC to the 
somatosensory cortex (Tranel, Bechara & Damasio, 1999) (see Figure 1). In order to 
maintain the association between somatic markers and stimuli, it is proposed that the
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VMPFC is able to store the associations formed and then reactivate them in case the same 
situation is presented or generalise the association to similar situations (Tranel et al., 
1994).
VMPFC
nsula
Amygdala
Brainstem Nuclei
VMPFC
Amygdala
SMC
Insula
Brainstem Nuclei
1
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r
L Sensory and neurotrasm itter 
nuclei (e.g. substantia nigra, 
raphe nucleus).
Body t o  Effector structures (e.g. 
«Su Hypothalamus, autonomic 
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Body Loop ‘As if ' Loop
Figure 1: Neural architecture implicated in the SMH. A schematic representation of the 
body loop is presented on the left hand side while the ‘as i f  body loop is illustrated on 
the right. VMPFC: Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, SMC: Somatosensory Cortex.
According to Tranel, somatic markers can operate either consciously or 
unconsciously. Overt or conscious somatic markers provide the organism with an
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incentive or deterrent, while covert or unconscious somatic markers facilitate appetitive 
or avoidance behaviour (Tranel et al., 2000).
The influence of somatic markers on the quality of decision-making might not 
always be a determinant to successfully accomplish a task. It has been proposed that 
somatic markers are particularly important in the early stages of decision-making 
whereas later stages can be more dependent on overt reasoning and executive function 
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Anderson, 1998; Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst & Bechara,
2007). It is likely that overt reasoning using explicit memory is mediated by the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The interplay between VMPFC and DLPFC 
would allow consolidating memory and guiding long term decision-making performance 
(Bechara etal., 1998).
Criticisms o f the Somatic Marker Hypothesis
Despite being almost 20 years since it was originally formulated, and having 
accumulated a large volume of research support, the SMH still attracts criticism (e.g., 
Heims et al., 2004; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Ongur & Price, 2000; Tomb, Hauser, 
Deldin & Caramazza, 2002). While the deficit noted in people with OFC lesions is not 
under debate, the theory formulated by Damasio and co-workers does not provide a 
problem-free account on why VM damage might lead to such catastrophic decision­
making outcome (Dunn et al., 2006). Perhaps the strongest problem to the theory is the 
fact that other explanations are possible for the decision-making deficit in people with 
VM damage.
The claim that peripheral feedback is necessary for advantageous decision­
making has been partially disconfirmed by several research accounts. As for the James-
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Lange theory, the SMH could be criticised in the same way as all theories of peripheral 
feedback. The James-Lange theory holds the view that bodily states, such as changes in 
heart rate or in the skeletal muscles, generate the feeling of the emotion (Lang, 1994). 
According to this view an emotion is experienced as a result of three consecutive 
processes: a physical reaction to a stimulus, sensing the physical reaction and finally the 
elicitation of a congruent emotion in response to the peripheral feedback. Such a theory 
was difficult to investigate and as it is based on “introspection”. Also it was unspecified 
why particular events (e.g., see a tiger) are specifically associated with certain action 
(e.g., run away).
The relationship between emotion and peripheral activity has been investigated, 
since the first formulation of the theory, in a variety of studies all concluding that 
emotions can be generated in the absence of peripheral activity (Chwalisz, Diener & 
Gallagher, 1988; Ferguson & Katkin, 1996). The parallelism between theories of 
peripheral activity and the SMH is clear and indeed research evidence able to describe the 
decision-making deficit in VM patients using different account creates partial 
falsification argument. For example, North and O’Carroll (2001) compared decision­
making performance in people with and without spinal injury. The rationale of the study 
was to compare two populations with a different physiological means of conveying body 
signals. In patients with spinal cord damage, the emotional signal could not travel on the 
fast route, the spinal cord, but had to reach the brain via the endocrine system. The 
authors found that there was no difference in decision-making performance, as measured 
by the Iowa Gambling Task, between the two groups. In a similar study conducted with 
patients with pure autonomic failure (a degenerative disease of the peripheral nervous
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system), it was found that decision-making performance was also not impaired (Heims, 
Critchley, Dolan, Mathias & Cipolotti, 2004). Bechara (2004) explained these findings 
suggesting that emotional learning is not critically tied to on-going experience of 
autonomic arousal state and that acquisition of autonomic failure later in life may protect 
against maladaptive behaviour.
Another potential problematic account for the SMH arose from a theory of 
emotion advanced by Rolls (1999, 2000, 2005). This theory proposed that the OFC can 
predict the rewarding and punishing values of environmental stimuli based on the 
emotion association experienced in similar situation. According to this theory, emotion- 
based learning is achieved via a learnt history of exposure to reward and punishing 
stimuli in the environment associated with emotions. In this way, emotions become 
“states elicited by rewards and punishers” (Rolls, 2005, p.l 1). The link between decision­
making performance, the association stimulus valence and emotions, and OFC proposed 
by Rolls is supported by several research investigations (Fellows & Farah, 2003; Rolls, 
Homak, Wade & McGrath, 1994; Rolls, 2005).
Another criticism of the neural underpinnings of the SMH is the lack of consensus 
in relation to the brain location proposed as the centre of emotional decision-making, 
namely the VMPFC. More lateralized OFC lesions than the ones proposed by Damasio 
and colleagues have been associated with similar decision-making deficits (Rolls et al., 
1994).
A further criticism is that the SMH proposes a decision-making strategy that is 
inefficient. It requires a vast amount of processing in order to be learnt at the cortical
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level; it might be that other, simpler functions, could account for the deficit demonstrated 
by VM patients (Rolls, 2000).
Finally, almost all the research accumulated to investigate emotion-based 
decision-making has used a single task, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Although this is 
not a criticism per se, due to the value of consistency in measurement, support for the 
SMH currently lacks concurrent validity with other tasks. Also, a range of different 
methodological issues have been proposed as important elements affecting the 
measurement of the concept of emotion-based learning as described by Damasio. Due to 
the vastness of the topic and the centrality of the issue to the current work, the following 
section will be dedicated to reviewing the studies employing the IGT.
The Iowa Gambling Task
The IGT is an experimental paradigm developed in order to simulate real world 
complex decision-making situations. Its use has been mainly related to the development 
and consolidation of the SMH, although recently it has become an accepted means to 
measure complex decision-making. Bechara et al. (1994) devised the task to measure 
decision-making ability in people with acquired OFC brain injury. The overall format of 
the experiment resembles a real gambling situation where the experimental participant is 
required to gamble virtual money on a card game. The key feature of the task is that 
participants have to forego short-term benefit for long-term profit.
In the standard version of the IGT, participants sit in front of four real decks of 
card labelled A, B, C, and D. The player is initially given a loan of facsimile play money 
($2000 in Bechara et al.’s 1994 original version). The participant is also instructed that 
the goal of the game is to win as much money as possible or, if impossible, to avoid
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losing money. Play consists in turning cards, one at time, from any of the four decks, 
until the experimenter says stop. Participants are told that every card choice will result in 
a gain of a certain amount of money and, every so often, a card choice will result in a 
gain and a loss. All wins and losses are summed or detracted from the initial loan amount 
and, in the original version using play money, the participant complete the transaction.
No other instructions concerning the value of the wins and losses in any deck or about the 
reward/punishment schedule embedded in the decks are given at the outset. Participants 
are only provided with a hint concerning the nature of the decks making them aware of 
the fact that some decks are worst than others and in order to do well they might need to 
stay away from the worst decks (See Appendix 1 for full Bechara et al.1999 instructions).
The IGT requires participants to select from one of the four concurrently available 
decks of identical physical appearance for 100 trials. As specified in the instruction to the 
participants, each card selection leads to a variable financial reward that sometimes is 
combined with a financial penalty. Schedules of monetary gain and loss are pre-fixed in 
the task and are not performance dependent. In this respect, all participants are exposed to 
the same environmental contingencies.
In the original version of the task (Bechara et al., 1994) each selection from decks 
A and B resulted in a $100 gain, while each selection from decks C and D resulted in a 
$50 gain. According to the schedule of monetary losses, every so often a penalty is also 
given. Deck A delivers a loss in five out of ten trials ranging from $150 to $350. On deck 
B a loss of $1250 is given once every ten trials. On deck C, five out of ten trials are 
involving a loss ranging from $25 to $75. On deck D, one choice out of ten delivers a loss 
of $250. According to the monetary reward and punishment schedule of the task the high
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immediate reward decks (A and B) give greater punishments, leading to a net loss of 
$250 every ten trials, whereas the low immediate reward decks (C and D) give smaller 
punishments, leading to a net gain of $250 in every ten trials (see Table 1). Given that 
participants will incur in frequent punishments and a net loss if they choose more often 
from decks A and B while a more frequent selections of decks C and D will lead to a 
financial gain.
Deck Reward Punishment Net Profit 
(over 10 trials)
A $100 $150 to $350 -$250
(10/10 trials) (5/10 trials)
B $100 $1250 -$250
(10/10 trials) (1/10 trials)
C $50 $25 to $75 + $250
(10/10 trials) (5/10 trials)
D $50 $250 + $250
(10/10 trials) (1/10 trials)
Table 1: Schedules of rewards, punishment and net balance for bad (A and B) and good 
(C and D) decks from a representative Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994).
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Learning profiles on the IGT
Participants’ selections during the 100 IGT trials are conventionally plotted in 
learning profile graphs. For every 20 selections the mean net score is calculated by 
subtracting disadvantageous from advantageous selections [(C+D)-(A+B)]. A net score 
above zero is indicative of advantageous selections, while a net score below zero implies 
disadvantageous selections.
Over the course of the 100 card choices, neurologically normal participants tend 
to select more cards from the advantageous decks (C and D) than from the 
disadvantageous decks (A and B), compared to patients with VM lesions (Bechara et al., 
1994; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996; Bechara et al., 1999). Neurologically 
unimpaired participants, typically, start sampling more cards from the bad decks, due to 
their immediate higher reward, but as the game progress this preference tends to reverse 
in favour of the good decks. Neurologically unimpaired participants tend to have a shift 
in the deck’s preference relatively early in the game (typically around the 30th trial) and 
maintain this preference until the end. As a result of this shift in preference the plot of 
neurologically unimpaired participants is similar to a learning curve growing from 
negative to positive (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Learning profiles across each of the five, twenty trial-blocks of the IGT for VM 
patients (empty circles) and normal controls (filled triangles) (Reproduced from Bechara, 
Tranel and Damasio, 2000b).
In contrast, the performance of VMPFC patients plotted with the same method 
shows significant preference for disadvantageous decks compared to neurologically 
unimpaired group with no evidence of learning during the task (see Figure 2). Several 
investigations confirmed the specific deficit in this task for people with VMPFC lesion 
even when re-exposed to the IGT after a month (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994; 2000b). 
Physiological correlates o f IGT performance
Physiological studies on VMPFC patients playing the IGT have provided key 
support for the influence of somatic markers on decision-making. In the early nineties, 
Damasio, Damasio and Tranel (1990) analysed the autonomic arousal of several OFC 
patients by measuring skin conductance responses (SCRs) during the presentation of 
emotional (e.g., injuries) and neutral pictures (e.g., flowers). It was found that medial
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OFC damaged patients showed depressed SCRs to emotional pictures compared to other 
brain injury populations and to normal controls.
Few years after, Bechara et al. (1996) measured autonomic activity in seven 
patients with VMPFC damage and twelve controls while playing the IGT. The authors 
measured ‘anticipatory’ (described as the electrodermal response in the time period prior 
to making a card selection from any given deck) and ‘consequence’ responses (described 
as the electrodermal response in the time period following the choice) (Bechara et al., 
1996, p. 221). It was found that both groups initially showed autonomic activation as a 
consequence of wins and losses, although after a short period of time the control group 
started to develop anticipatory SCRs before choosing from bad decks. The authors noted 
that the lack of anticipatory autonomic activation in VM patients was correlating with 
impaired IGT performance. The interpretation given by the authors was that the lack of 
anticipatory SCRs production in VM patients was evidence that physiological correlates 
of insensitivity to future outcomes are responsible of the decision-making deficits (Tranel 
et al., 2000). Although various studies seem to suggest the existence of a link between 
advantageous performance on the IGT and anticipatory marker signals the interpretation 
of why this is happening is still largely speculative.
The IGT has been used in a number of experimental investigations nevertheless 
only a small sub-set has recorded physiological activation associated with the task. Most 
studies, as noted by Dunn et al. (2006), measuring SCR did replicate the finding of 
greater anticipatory SCR to disadvantageous decks, relative to advantageous (e.g., 
Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Campbell, Stout & Finn, 2004; Crone, Somsen, van Beek & 
van der Molen, 2004; Hinson, Jameson & Whitney, 2002; Suzuki, Hirota, Takasawa &
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Shigemasu, 2003; Tomb et al., 2002). Further, some studies did slightly alter the original 
task or the recording methodology but nevertheless found comparable results suggesting 
that modification of the task might not impact largely on findings. Crone et al. (2004a), 
for example, used a children adapted version of the IGT with adults (collect apples to 
feed a hungry donkey). Suzuki et al. (2003) employed a shorter, 80-trial version of the 
IGT that required verbal feedback. In this study the anticipatory recording window was of 
10 s, compared to the 5 s duration chosen by Bechara et al. (1999). Regardless of the 
methodological differences both Crone et al (2004a) and Suzuki et al (2003) showed that 
a proportion of the controls participants did not show the claimed higher level of arousal 
prior to the selection of disadvantageous decks in the early phases of the IGT. The lack of 
consistent performance both at the behavioural and at the physiological level in some 
control participants suggests the existence of a level of variability in healthy individuals. 
Variability in ‘normal group ’ IGT performance
While subsequent investigations with the IGT have considerably improved the 
understanding of neuropsychological correlates of decision-making, it has become 
increasingly evident that a high percentage of control participants underperforms on the 
task. Bechara and Damasio (2002) first noted that not all control participants performed 
advantageously on the IGT. As for other neuropsychological tests, a degree of variability 
between control participants is expected (Strauss, Sherman & Spreen, 2006); in the case 
of the IGT, Bechara and Damasio (2002) found that as much as a third of the control 
participants had a similar, impaired, performance to VM patients. Although the 
underperforming third of the control group had a performance similar to VM patients, it 
was noted that they still generated appropriate anticipatory SCRs (Bechara, Damasio &
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Damasio, 2000). Bechara et al. (2000b) suggested that the underperforming control 
participants might be thrill seekers or potential gamblers. This consideration implicitly 
suggested that individual differences may play a role in influencing IGT performance. As 
noticed by Dunn et al. (2006) the variability in IGT control participants is not a direct 
problem for the SMH but there might be a need to develop independent and objective 
performance criteria so that studies can be directly compared (for example, having a 
number of good decks selections higher than chance).
Sample composition and demographic variables, like gender and age, have also 
been proposed to influence IGT performance. Reavis and Overman (2001) found a 
superiority of males on the IGT compared to females. More recently, Glicksohn, Naor- 
Ziv and Leshem (2007) reported a percentage equal to 46% of a student sample (age 
range 19-26) performing under chance levels (i.e., mean net score below 0) on the IGT.
In attempting to explain the finding, the authors proposed that the role of impulsivity 
could affect performance. Finding showed that impulsivity, as assessed by two 
independent measures, the Barratt impulsiveness scale (Barratt, Stanford, Kent & 
Felthous, 1997) and the Impulsiveness Questionnaire (Eysenck, Pearson, Easting & 
Allsopp, 1985), did not correlate with IGT performance. In discussing the results the 
authors suggested that the decisive role of other factors might have influenced the low 
performance of such a large proportion of the sample and invited future studies to draw 
attention to the decisive role of individual differences (Glicksohn et al., 2007; p. 203).
Davis, Patte, Tweed and Curtis (2007) in a similar study found similar percentage 
of non-learner on the IGT (in this case defined as the participants with a learning profile 
visually similar to VM patients leaning profiles as in Bechara et al. (1999)). Differently
23
Chapter 1
from Glicksohn et al. (2007), the authors of this study found that impulsivity predicted 
the IGT performance of the non-learners. In another recent study Caroselli et al. (2006) 
investigated IGT performance in a large sample of university students (mean age 21.7 
(4.6).These authors found that, unlike the controls used by Bechara et al. (1994; 1996; 
1999; 2000a), a substantial proportion of young adult participants tended to display a 
learning profile similar to those of VM patients. Analysis conducted on the participants’ 
pattern of selection across the 100 trials indicated that IGT performance is primarily 
governed by the frequency of positive outcomes on a trial-by-trial basis rather than by a 
longer term prospect of winning accumulation.
Taken together, the studies reviewed in this section suggest a high degree of 
variability in IGT control participants’ performance with sometimes as many as two 
thirds of the sample displaying preference for the disadvantageous decks. Results from 
clinical populations presenting impaired performance compared to control participants 
have been used to support various claims regarding the nature of different deficits 
(Bechara et al., 1996; Cavedini, Riboldi, D’Annucci, Belotti, Cisma & Bellodi, 2002; 
Clark et al., 2001; Sevy et al., 2007). Although studies showing variability in control 
participants’ performance do not per se contradict the clinical findings, they might 
recommend caution in the interpretation of the data. Future studies should take the 
variation in participants’ performance in more serious account and study what might 
influence it. Several factors have been advanced to have an influence on the IGT 
performance and potentially be able to contribute to the explanation of variability. Of 
those the cognitive penetrability of the IGT schedule have been largely debated.
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Cognitive penetrability and subjective experience
Awareness about the schedule of wins and losses embedded in the IGT decks is 
central to the claim that the task can only be successfully completed through recourse to 
emotion-based learning process mediated by somatic marker signals. Empirical support 
for this claim was sought in an experiment by Bechara et al. (1997) in which VM patients 
and controls were asked a verbal question about the nature of the decks (i.e., “Tell me all 
you know about what is going on in the game”).
It was found that neurologically normal participants indicated a preference for 
disadvantageous decks in the first few trials without showing any anticipatory autonomic 
response. After experiencing few losses, control participants started to develop 
anticipatory SCRs for disadvantageous decks but they were still unable to describe the 
schedule of reward and punishment. This stage was described few years later by Bechara 
et al. as the ‘pre-hunch phase’ (2000a, p.300). After having accomplished roughly two 
thirds of the 100 trials, control participants begun to be able to identify disadvantageous 
decks as the more risky and advantageous decks as the most safe and long term winning. 
This stage, called the ‘hunch phase’, was markedly associated with behavioural 
preference for good decks (i.e. average mean net score above zero) and steady 
anticipatory SCRs activation in case of disadvantageous selections. Finally, Bechara et al. 
described the last quarter of the game as the ‘conceptual’ phase where neurologically 
normal participants were able to describe accurately which deck was good and which one 
was bad (Bechara et al., 2000a, p.300). Participants who reached the conceptual phase 
where able to describe A and B as bad decks resulting in net money loss and C and D as 
the decks that should be preferred in order to do well at the task. On the contrary, VM
25
Chapter 1
patients failed to achieve the hunch phase, although around half of the patients could 
produce statement similar to the one of control participant who reached the conceptual 
phase. Despite some awareness on the nature of the decks was reached by VM patients 
this knowledge did not impact on their performance or elicited anticipatory SCRs prior 
disadvantageous selections.
According to Damasio, the IGT is a very distinctive paradigm by which 
participants discriminate choice by feeling; in healthy individuals, it is claimed, non- 
conscious somatic biases guide reasoning and decision-making behaviour before 
conscious knowledge does, and without the help of such biases, overt knowledge may be 
insufficient to ensure advantageous behaviour (Tranel et al., 1999). In this respect the 
task should not be intended as a probabilistic reasoning task but as a task aimed to test 
learning assisted by unconscious emotional signal.
In order to support the claim that emotion biasing signals aiding learning are not 
conscious, is essential that the task does not allow penetrability of the schedules of 
reward and punishment by the participants. Bechara et al. based the assumption of the 
impenetrability of the task on a simple broad question asked at the end of the task 
(Bechara et al., 1997). Maia and McClelland (2004) challenged the validity of the method 
used by Bechara et al. (1997) arguing that a post-experiment single broad, open-ended 
question, such as “Tell me all you know about what is going on in this game”, is not a 
rigorous method to assess conscious awareness of the task contingencies and this should 
not be considered as a sufficiently sensitive method to exclude participants’ awareness 
during the task (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002).
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In order to investigate the role of awareness in the task, Maia and McClelland
(2004) presented healthy participants playing the Bechara et al. (2000a) version of IGT 
with a specific set of questions after the first 20 trials and subsequently after every 10.
The methodology employed required participants to rate on a slider scale the goodness or 
badness of each deck, tentatively evaluate the net profit or loss of ten consecutive 
selections for each deck, rate on a slider scale how much they felt in control of the game 
and indicate the most advantageous deck (Maia & McClelland, 2004, p. 16076). Maia and 
McClelland (2004) concluded that advantageous selections on IGT are guided by 
conscious knowledge given that participants’ rating of goodness and badness of the decks 
was directly related to the performance on the task.
The latter finding implies the possibility that performance on the IGT could be 
guided by conscious knowledge of the reward/punishment schedule and that SCRs are the 
consequences of this knowledge. If the IGT can be performed through access to 
conscious knowledge about the schedules embedded in the decks, it is therefore not 
possible to claim that successful completion of the task is entirely dependent of the 
generation on non-conscious somatic marker signals (Maia & McClelland, 2005).
The criticism expressed by Maia and McClelland (2004) was addressed by 
Bechara et al. (Bechara et al., 2005). Firstly, it was specified that “the central feature of 
the SMH hypothesis is not that non-conscious biases accomplish decisions in the absence 
of conscious knowledge, but rather that emotion-related signals assist cognitive process 
even when they are non-conscious” (p. 159). Second, anticipatory SCR responses began, 
in the original Bechara study (Bechara et al., 1997), in a phase in which Maia and 
McClelland called ‘minimal knowledge’. Therefore, the claim that anticipatory SCRs
27
Chapter 1
developed after conscious knowledge was acquired by participants was not shown. 
Finally, and most importantly for present purposes, the issue of reversal learning deficit 
was suggested by Maia and McClelland as a possible alternative explanation for the poor 
performance of VM patients. The issue of reversal learning revolves around the 
preference shift that advantageously performing participants typically undergo in the first 
third of the task where preference for the disadvantageous decks is progressively replaced 
by a marked preference for the advantageous. This account was countered by Bechara et 
al. (2005) who argued that a reversal learning deficit is not incompatible with the SMH. 
The emotional activation claimed by the SMH to assist learning in uncertain situations it 
is not hypothesised to be disentangled to other cognitive processes but rather have a 
biasing influence. In other words the lack of somatic marker would negatively influenced 
reversal learning, among other cognitive functions, as the emotion would not help to 
discontinue a behavioural pattern (i.e. selection of disadvantageous decks).
In a reply to Bechara et al. (2005), Maia and McClelland (2005) further stressed 
the argument of reversal learning providing support from other studies (e.g. Clark & 
Manes, 2004; Fellows & Farah 2005; Fellows & Farah 2003; Rolls, 1999) that have 
identified the VM cortex as a crucial area to performing reversal learning tasks. Maia and 
McClelland concluded that their findings, together with the neuropsychological evidence 
gathered with lesion studies, do not prove that the SMH is wrong but some of the results 
are at odds with its predictions (2005, p. 164).
In a related investigation on the role of subjective awareness in IGT performance, 
Bowman, Evans and Turnbull (2005) measured the subjective experience of healthy 
participants every 20 trials. Participants were asked to provide a rating for each deck of
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card in term of how good or bad they felt each deck was on a scale from zero (very bad) 
to 10 (very good) (Bowman et al., 2005, p.23). Results showed a substantial rise in the 
level of awareness (i.e., ratings of relative goodness/badness) between the first and the 
second block of 20 trials; the level of awareness remained stable for the remaining three 
blocks until the end of the task. As advanced from Maia and McClelland (2004), the 
findings of Bowman et al. (2005) seem to suggest that participants have greater 
awareness about the nature of the decks than proposed by Bechara et al. (1997; 2000a). In 
particular the pre-hunch phase, as described in Bechara et al. (2000a), appears, in the 
Bowman et al. (2005) study, to be confined at a very early stage of the game and the 
hunch phase occurring in the first rather than in the second third of the task.
Aside of the penetrability of the schedule of reinforcement being initially 
challenged by Maia and McClelland (2004) other alternative hypotheses were advanced 
in order to explain the VM patients poor performance on the IGT. The theory that 
reversal learning deficit in VM patient may be responsible of disadvantageous 
performance on the IGT gathered substantial interest in the research community. The 
following section will introduce the already-mentioned concept of reversal learning and 
review the research conducted on this topic in relation to the IGT and the SMH.
The IGT, reversal learning and set-shifting ability
The importance of being able to learn arbitrary relations is as crucial for humans 
as the ability to break those arbitrary rules in order to learn more advantageous ones. 
Reversal learning is the ability to shift from a contingency previously associated with 
reward but now associated with punishment, to a new contingency associated with 
reward (Robbins, 2007). In a changing environment the ability to perform quickly and
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efficiently reversal learning task can provide help to various fields such as economical 
decision (e.g., buying and selling shares), social interaction (e.g., being collaborative or 
conflictual) and health (e.g., smoking cessation).
Neuropsychological and lesion evidence suggest that one of the functions 
implemented in the OFC is stimulus-reinforcement association learning and the 
correction of these associations when environmental contingencies change (Rolls, 2005). 
Reversal and shift learning are two functions heavily involved in the so called executive 
functions that have been shown to have strong reliance of OFC structures (Fellow & 
Farah, 2003; Homak, O ’Doherty, Bramham, Rolls, Morris & Bullock, 2004; Iversen & 
Mishkin, 1970; Rolls et al., 1994). As previously seen in this chapter the ability to 
perform advantageously on the IGT seems to be strongly associated with structures of the 
OFC, in particular the VMPFC.
Early critics of the task were advanced on the basis that the IGT failure in patients 
with VM lesions could have been due to lack of reward sensitivity (O'Doherty, 
Kringelbach, Rolls, Homak & Andrews, 2001; Rolls et al., 1994). In order to dismiss this 
claim, Bechara et al. (2000a) exposed VMPFC patients and controls to the original and a 
variant form (called EFGH) of the IGT. In the EFGH variant task every E and G selection 
corresponded to $100 loss while every selection from deck F and H corresponded to a 
$50 loss. Every so often, using a similar schedule to the original IGT, money rewards 
were given in addition to the penalties. Deck E delivered a win of $1250 once every ten 
trials; deck F delivered wins ranging from $25 to $75 in five out of ten trials; deck G 
delivered wins in five out of ten trials ranging from $150 to $350; deck H delivered once 
every ten trials a win of $250. Over ten selections decks E and G yielded a net profit of
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$250 while F and H yielded a net loss of $250. In the EFGH version advantageous decks 
delivered immediate higher punishment but long term higher rewards. Even in this 
version of the task VMPFC patients showed marked disadvantageous performance 
demonstrating that impairment on IGT is unlikely to be dependent reward sensitivity.
Reversal learning has more recently been re-advanced as an alternative 
mechanism to explain impaired performance in the IGT due to overlapping of the OFC 
areas described as necessary to perform both reversal learning and IGT (Fellows, 2007). 
A crucial aspect of the IGT is that participants have to perform a response reversal, 
shifting their preference from decks that are initially rewarding but long term 
disadvantageous, to decks that are immediately less rewarding but long term 
advantageous.
A number of studies have shown that patients with ventral prefrontal cortex 
damage have a substantial difficulty in reversal learning task (Fellows & Farah, 2003; 
Rolls et al., 1994). In order to test whether the impairment in IGT was directly dependent 
on reversal learning Fellows and Farah (2005) re-arranged the schedule of reinforcement 
of the first trials of the IGT such that there was no perceived advantage in selecting from 
the bad decks at the beginning of the game. When patients with VMPFC were exposed to 
this shuffled variant of the IGT they performed at comparable levels to controls.
This finding, although partially at odds with the SMH, did not provide an 
alternative account of what the signal is that triggers the change in the learning strategy 
(Bechara et al., 2005). The SMH claims that the “stop signal” that would trigger the shift 
from one contingency to another is an emotional signal: in other words the somatic 
marker (Damasio, 1994; 1996).
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The use of IGT has been administered often with the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Task (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948). The main reason for the combined use of the two 
tasks in neuropsychological investigations was to provide an understanding of how 
complex decision-making, as measured by the IGT, correlates with more classic 
measures of executive function and set-shifting (i.e., the ability to display flexibility in 
the face of changing schedules of reinforcement). Brand, Lubudda and Markowitsch
(2006) proposed the existence of an asymmetric relationship between IGT performance 
and standard executive function tests such as the WCST, Behavioural Assessment of the 
Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS) and Brixton Test (Brand et al., 2007; Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997; Milner, 1963; Rabbitt, 1997). Neuropsychological and neurolesion 
evidence suggested that damage or dysfunctions to ventromedial and anterior prefrontal 
regions is associated with impaired IGT but not WCST (Bechara et al., 1998; Bechara et 
al. 2001). Differently, focal damage or dysfunction to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
has been associated with impaired performance on WCST and IGT (Bechara et al., 1998; 
Bersani, Clemente, Gherardelli & Pancheri, 2004; Stratta, Arduini, Daneluzzo, Rinaldi, 
Genova & Rossi, 2004).
The existence of dissociation between the two tasks might suggest that the 
decision-making, as measured by the IGT, does not overlap completely with executive 
function and therefore the task is a specific measure of emotion-based learning. In an 
attempt to investigate this claim, Brand et al. (2007) studied IGT and executive function 
in a large sample of healthy subjects showing that the fist and the last part of IGT require 
participants to deploy different resources. Where the first part of the task requires a 
decision under ambiguity (i.e., where outcomes are not associated with a probability
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distribution), minimally dependent on executive function, the second part of the IGT 
requires a decision under risk (i.e., where likelihood of outcomes respond to a 
probability) known to draw more heavily on neural systems concerned with the 
processing of executive information (Brand, Fujiwara, Borsutzky, Kalbe, Kessler & 
Markowitsch, 2005; Brand, Kalbe, Labudda, Fujiwara, Kessler, & Markowitsch, 2005).
Although the latter part of the task seems to have a more pronounced influence on 
executive function, the IGT, as originally designed, does not require further shift or 
change in preferences. In fact when preference for the advantageous decks is established 
participants are not required to further adjust to other more advantageous contingencies. 
The IGT does not present, per se, a changing environment but an opaque and misleading 
set of contingencies. Executive function tests usually present marked components of shift 
and/or reversal learning. In the attempt to include those components in an emotion-based 
learning context, Turnbull et al. (2006) developed a modified version of the IGT that adds 
to the standard 100 trials (Phase 1), 3 signalled contingency shifts of 40 trials each, in 
which schedule of reinforcement are systematically modified (Phase 2). During the 
contingency modification phase formerly advantageous decks (C and D) become 
progressively disadvantageous, with deck C returning advantageous in the last shift. 
Similarly, formerly disadvantageous decks (A and B) become progressively 
advantageous with deck A returning disadvantageous in the last shift (see Figure 3).
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Deck Phase 1 Phase 2 
1 2 3
A - + + -
B - - + +
C + - - +
D + + - -
Figure 3: Advantageous (+) and disadvantageous (-) decks during Phase 1 and each of
the three shift phases of Phase 2 (adapted form Turnbull et al., 2006).
The rationale for the modification of the original task was to investigate how 
emotion-based learning history would impact on a changing environment and whether or 
not this form of learning would bias adaptation in patients with schizophrenia (Turnbull, 
Evans, Bunce, Carzolio & O ’Connor, 2005). Results showed dissociation between the 
performance in Phase 1 and Phase 2, suggesting that some aspects of decision-making, as 
measured by IGT, are dissociate from simple reversal learning. Shift, reversal learning 
investigations and modification of the task have been warranted by Dunn et al. (2006) as 
a valuable tool to further understand components involved in the IGT. Modification of 
the task and of the experimental environment can indeed shed some light on the factors 
that may influence decision-making. The following sections will review how this 
approach has been embraced by different researchers to study determinants of IGT 
performance.
Task design issues and instructions
The large number of research papers featuring the IGT (over 200 papers on the 
topic, as retrieved by Web of Science on the 20th of November 2008) is in itself an 
acknowledgement of the capacity of the task to measure specific decision-making
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components. Despite its widespread use, the IGT is not immune to design problems. Over 
the years the computerised version of the IGT (Bechara et al., 1998) attempted 
successfully to eliminate experimenter bias (i.e., prompting or cueing selection of 
particular decks) but even in its computerised form, the task still presents several 
potentially biasing features.
First, deck position is rarely counterbalanced meaning that selections from the 
participants could simply reflect position biases. In the Bechara computerized version of 
the task (Bechara et al., 1998) decks are presented form left-to-right labelled with the 
letters A, B, C and D with A and B being always the bad decks and C and D being always 
the good decks. Second, the schedule of rewards in the original version of the task (e.g., 
Bechara et al., 1994) is easily predictable, meaning that participants in order to do well 
have to attend only to the punishment component (Maia & McClelland, 2005). Third, the 
classification of advantageous and disadvantageous decks is questionable because 
participants are judging without previous experience of the decks’ relative goodness or 
badness. In the first few trials, in fact, the so-called disadvantageous decks appear to be 
rewarding by delivering higher immediate payoffs. The IGT classifies advantageous and 
disadvantageous decks a-priori without considering at what stage of learning the 
participant is. Fourth, in the Bechara et al. (1994) original task participants can only 
select 80 times from each deck raising the possibility that options available in the last 20 
trials might be reduced. This feature could eventually provide inaccurate evidence of 
learning by the fact that choosing from a particular deck is not possible in the remaining 
trials.
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Notwithstanding these critical task design issues, the provision of different task 
instructions could affect the comparability across IGT studies. It was Schmitt et al. 
(1999) that first considered the issue of lack of consistency in IGT participants’ 
performance by advancing the potential confounding role of task instructions. Schmitt et 
al. (1999) evaluated IGT performance in a group of psychopathic individuals in order to 
assess whether this group would fail to become risk aversive. Finding showed that IGT 
performance was poor in male offenders and correlate highly with anxiety. In discussing 
the findings, the authors advanced that the original instruction, as given in Bechara et al. 
(1994), could be a potential source of bias for the performance. In fact, the detailed 
instruction, as provided in Bechara et al. (1994,1999 and 2000a) can provide participants 
with hints about the nature of the task. Participants were told:
“The computer does not make you lose money at random. However, there is no 
way for you to figure out when the computer will make you lose. All I can say is 
that you may find yourself losing money on all of the decks, but some decks will 
make you lose more than others. You can win if you stay away from the worst 
decks” (Bechara et al., 1999, p.5474).
Femie and Tunney (2005) argued that including this “hint” in the instructions gave 
participants a considerable advantage on task performance if compared to the instruction 
without hint. To test this hypothesis, Femie and Tunney (2005) exposed control 
participants to two experimental conditions with and without the hint sentence included 
in Bechara et al.’s (1999; 2000a) original instmctions. The experimental manipulation 
consisted of excluding the following sentence from the original set of instructions for the 
“no hint” experimental group:
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“All I can say is that some decks are worse than others. You may find all of 
them bad, but some are worse than others. No matter how much you find 
yourself losing you can still win if you stay away from the worst decks”.
Results showed how the presence of this hint in the instructions positively influenced 
subsequent performance on the IGT (Femie & Tunney, 2005, p. 100).
The quality and detail of the instructions given is widely known to influence 
performance in experimental tasks. For instance, causal learning can be influenced by 
subtle instructions changes (Buehner & May, 2004) and detailed instruction improves 
performance above the level of contingency-governed behaviour in self-control tasks 
(e.g., Kudadjie-Gyamfi & Rachlin, 2002). The fact that differences in instructions could 
influence IGT performance is particularly controversial in light of the claim made by the 
SMH that learning is driven by somatic markers and not by explicit knowledge 
participants’ hold concerning the nature of the task.
In the experiments presented in this thesis, a novel computerized version of the 
IGT is used. Instructions presented are minimal in order to avoid the confounding aspect 
of providing knowledge about the nature of the decks prior to the beginning of the task. 
For this reason the hint statement was not used throughout all the experiments. 
Emotion-based learning and mental health
Psychiatric disorders present a wide range of difficulties in social cognition often 
associated with marked decision-making problems (Aleman, David & Medford 2006; 
Yudofsky & Hales, 1997). In the last ten years research has developed a pronounced 
interest in the investigation of the neural substrate of the decision-making deficit in 
psychiatric patients (Cavedini et al., 2002a; Clark, Iversen & Goodwin, 2001; Martino,
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Bucay, Butman & Allegri, 2007; Must, Szabo, Bodi, Szasz, Janka & Keri, 2006). 
Prefrontal cortex functional and structural abnormalities have increasingly gathered 
evidence as primary candidate to explain the decision-making behaviour in psychiatric 
patients. The interest in this area arose following a number of studies identifying an 
association between VMPFC brain injury patients and impairment in emotion-based 
decision-making as measured by the IGT (Bechara et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 2000a,b).
The clinical applications of the IGT with psychiatric populations have received 
considerable interest lately and seem to point in the direction of a generalized impairment 
across different disorders. Although findings are far from consistent, with some 
psychiatric conditions yielding particularly inconclusive results with specific groups of 
participants (e.g., individuals with schizophrenia), investigations in this area seem 
important for understanding the contribution of emotions over cognitive processes. The 
latter part of this chapter will review findings in relation to clinical applications of the 
IGT to mental health disorders with a particular stress on schizophrenia and depression. 
IGT and psychopathology
To some extent, almost all of the spectrums of psychiatric disorders present a 
deficiency in decision-making ability (Ovsiew, 1999; Yudofsky & Hales, 1997). The 
similarities between the clinical presentation of VM patients and several psychiatric 
disorders initiated the interest for emotion-based learning in psychopathology. Up until 
now, the IGT has been widely used to assess decision-making in psychiatric conditions 
such as obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (e.g., Nielen, Veltman, de Jong, Mulder, 
den Boer & Nielen, 2002), eating disorder (e.g., Cavedini, Bassi, Ubbiali, Casolari, 
Giordani & Zorzi, 2004), substance abuse (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2002), pathological
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gambling (e.g. Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, D’Annucci & Bellodi, 2002b), personality 
disorders (e.g., Haaland & Landro, 2007), mania (e.g., Clark et al., 2001), schizophrenia 
(e.g., Beringer, Wasserman, Zanibbi, Charbonneau, Mangels & Beninger, 2003) and 
depression (e.g,. Must et al., 2006).
Of the clinical groups studied, schizophrenia is certainly the disorder that presents 
the highest and the most controversial number of studies (Sevy et al., 2007). Depression, 
despite a high incidence in the general population and its known relation to poor 
decision-making and insensitivity to reward, is one of the least researched mental health 
problems in the frame of emotion-based learning. For this reason the current work 
proposes to explore flexible emotion-based learning in depression and schizophrenia. The 
following two sections will review research conducted on depression and schizophrenia 
using the IGT.
Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia is a mental illness with substantial short and long­
term consequences for individuals, their families, the health service and society. The 
incidence is estimated around 1% during the life course although the highest incidence is 
in people in their early twenty (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2002, p.l). 
Symptoms of schizophrenia are usually divided into positive, including hallucinations 
and delusions, and negative symptoms, such as social withdrawal, lack of drive, 
emotional apathy, self-neglect and poverty of speech. Frith (2004) suggested that 
difficulties in social cognition should be considered a core deficit of psychosis; patients 
affected by schizophrenia present, in fact, wide difficulties in emotional processing, 
social interaction and decision-making (Green, Penn, Bentall, Carpenter, Gaebel, Gur et 
al., 2008).
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The interest on emotion-based learning in schizophrenia has been driven by 
neuropsychological studies showing OFC patients presenting deficit in social cognition 
(Bechara et al., 1996; Damasio, 1994). Abnormalities in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) and in the OFC have already been extensively documented in schizophrenia 
(Bertollo, Cowen & Levy, 1996; Convit, Wolf, de Leon, Patalinjug, Kandil, Caraos, 
Scherer, Saint Louis & Cancro, 2001; Crespo-Facorro, Kim, Andreasen, O'Leary & 
Magnotta, 2000; Weinberger & Berman, 1996). Neurofunctional and neuroanatomical 
evidence taken together with the social cognition deficit seen in OFC and in 
schizophrenic patients suggested that psychotic symptomatology could be related to a 
deficit in emotion-based learning. Due to its extensive neuropsychological background 
the IGT became the most used task to investigate emotion-based learning in 
schizophrenia. Although some research evidence seems to point in the direction of an 
impairment of emotion-based learning in schizophrenia, findings gathered with the IGT 
have been largely controversial and inconclusive.
Several studies showed people with schizophrenia performing poorly on IGT 
compared to healthy individuals. One of the first studies in this respect was conducted by 
Beninger et al. (2003) in the attempt to characterise the effect of typical and atypical 
antipsychotic medications on emotion-based decision-making. Results showed that 
patients on atypical (e.g., Risperidone), but not on typical antipsychotic (e.g., 
Chlopromazine) performed worse than healthy controls on the IGT. Ritter et al., (2004) 
compared the IGT performance of a mixed group of schizophrenic and schizoaffective 
disorder with a group of age, gender and education matched healthy controls and found 
that patients were selecting more cards from the disadvantageous decks than healthy
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controls. In a pilot study designed to explore the decision-making ability in different 
subtypes of schizophrenia, Bark et al., (2005) compared the IGT performance of a group 
of catatonic patients with a paranoid group and a healthy control group. Impaired IGT 
performance (i.e. total mean net score below zero) was found only in the catatonic group 
with the paranoia group performing at controls level. In order to clarify the relationship 
between schizophrenic symptomatology and frontal areas, such as VMPFC, DLPFC and 
OFC, Shurman et al. (2005) assessed, with a battery of neuropsychological tests, a group 
of stabilized schizophrenic outpatients. Results showed patients with schizophrenia 
having a poorer performance on the IGT compared to controls. The authors noted that 
while the performance of schizophrenic patients on the IGT appears similar to that of 
patients with OFC lesions in several respects, some features of schizophrenia patients’ 
performance on this task might not wholly resemble the OFC pattern (Shurman et al., 
2005, p. 221). This finding led the authors to hypothesise that the specificity of the 
decision-making impairment in schizophrenia could be due to specific psychotic 
symptoms. In support of a decision-making deficit in schizophrenia, Kester et al., (2006) 
found adolescent with an early onset of schizophrenia performing worst at the IGT than 
age and education matched controls. More recently, in two similar studies Martino et al
(2007) and Lee et al (2007) found that patients with schizophrenia displayed a preference 
towards disadvantageous decks with a marked low profile in learning accentuated in the 
last two blocks.
Despite the above evidence seeming to suggest an impairing role of schizophrenic 
symptomatology on IGT performance, several similar studies yielded contrasting results. 
Wilder et al. (1998) found a similar learning profile, in term of number of advantageous
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and disadvantageous cards chosen, between control participants and schizophrenics. In a 
study designed to compare frontal cortex dysfunctions in OCD and schizophrenia, 
Cavallaro et al. (2003) found OCD patients’ performance on the IGT to be significantly 
worse than the performance of controls and schizophrenic patients. No difference was 
found between control participants’ performance and schizophrenia patients. Evans et al.,
(2005) found that not only performance but also subjective awareness of the decks’ 
contingencies was comparable between patients with schizophrenia and controls. 
Similarly, Turnbull et al., (2006) found comparable performance on the IGT between 
schizophrenic patients, divided by positive and negative symptoms, and control 
participants. The role of positive and negative symptomatology became relevant during 
the set-shifting modification introduced after the first 100 trials when the contingencies 
were progressively altered. It was found that during the set-shifting phase patients with 
schizophrenia who scored high on measures of negative symptomatology performed 
worst than those who scored high on measures of positive symptomatology. This finding 
led the authors to consider that some specific sub-set of symptoms might influence 
emotion-based learning ability. The flexible emotion-based learning paradigm, despite 
the promising results, has been used only in one clinical study (i.e., Turnbull et al., 2006). 
Apart from symtomatological characterization, other aspects have been hypothesized to 
have an influence on IGT performance. Rodrigiuez-Sanchez et al., (2005) investigated 
the role of illness duration and drug treatment on emotion-based learning in a group of 
first episode schizophrenia. A comparison with the control participants’ performance 
found first episode schizophrenics perform equally well. The authors conclude that the
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extent of the illness duration and prolonged exposure to antipsychotic medication might 
produce a negative effect on emotion-based learning.
The extent of the inconclusive findings regarding the investigations conducted on 
schizophrenia using the IGT were reviewed by Sevy et al. (2007). The authors noted that 
IGT performance in schizophrenia may be related to other OFC deficits typically 
observed in schizophrenia such as working and declarative memory, attention and 
executive function. The authors also proposed that deficits in IGT performance could be 
due to the co-occurrence of substance abuse disorders (Sevy et al., 2007). Empirical data 
presented in the same review showed no difference in performance between patients with 
schizophrenia with and without concurrent cannabis use disorder; a significant difference 
in IGT performance was, on the contrary, present between the two clinical groups and a 
control group.
More recently, two studies attempted to correlate IGT performance of 
schizophrenic patients with structural abnormalities in the frontal lobes (Premkumar, 
Fannon, Kuipers, Simmons, Frangou, & Kumari, 2008; Nakamura, Nestor, Levitt, Cohen, 
Kawashima, Shenton & McCarley, 2008). Premkumar et al. (2008) compared OFC gray 
matter volume to IGT performance in patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls. 
Results showed patients with schizophrenia performed significantly poor on the IGT, 
with a general positive correlation between OFC gray matter volume and IGT 
performance. Similarly, Nakamura et al. (2008) examined IGT performance in a sample 
of schizophrenics and matched control participants both of whom received MRI scanning 
for OFC gray matter volume. In this case, the authors found a similar disadvantageous
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performance on the IGT of the schizophrenic group but no association with OFC gray 
matter volume.
The effect of medication and substance intake represent an important variable to 
factor in any explanatory model of decision-making. Schizophrenics are heavily 
medicated for long periods of time and this long exposure to neuro-chemicals could have 
a strong effect per se on behaviour, brain functionality and morphology. By showing no 
impairment in IGT in first episode psychotic patients the study of Rodrigiez-Sanchez et 
al., (2005) seems to point in the direction of a contribution of drugs in influencing 
performance of schizophrenic patients. On the other hand, Kester et al., (2006) found 
adolescents with early onset of schizophrenia, as well as first episode patients little or no 
medicated, performed worst than healthy controls. Although the deficit of early onset 
schizophrenia could be explained by psychotic symptoms, the incidence of impulsivity, 
which is higher in young adults, could be claimed as a critical difference between the two 
studies (Glickson et al., 2006).
In the large majority of the studies reviewed, schizophrenia has been clustered as 
a discrete clinical entity. This conceptualization of the disorder has been largely 
questioned lately and alternative accounts of its phenotype have been proposed (Johns & 
van Os, 2001; Peralta, de Leon & Cuesta, 1992). The fact that psychotic features seem to 
distribute along a continuum in the normal population is not a novel idea (Claridge,
1997). A large body of epidemiological studies has shown how features such as delusion 
and hallucination occur in seemingly healthy individuals and not only in full blown 
schizophrenia (Peters, Joseph & Garety, 2004; Tien, 1991). The dimensionality of 
symptoms and the realization that current diagnostic labels might not be accurate enough
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to characterize homogeneously a cluster is an element worth considering in emotion- 
based learning research in schizophrenia.
In summary, the findings of IGT performance in schizophrenia have been mixed 
and largely inconclusive. Various studies in this area have tried to control for potentially 
confounding factors such as medication, co-morbid diagnosis, clinical presentation and 
heterogeneous group formation but the extent and the possible causes of the emotion- 
based learning deficit in schizophrenia are still unclear.
Depression. Depression refers to a wide range of mental health problems 
characterized by the absence of positive affect (loss of interest and enjoyment in ordinary 
things and experiences), low mood and a range of associate emotional, cognitive, 
physical and behavioural symptoms (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2004, 
p. 13). The lifetime estimated prevalence of depression in the UK ranges between 21 to 98 
individuals in every thousand (Meltzer, Gill, Petticrew & Hinds, 1995).
Depressive symptoms have been associated with a variety of cortical and sub- 
cortical structures such as the amygdala, the ventral anterior cingulated cortex, the 
orbital, ventro, ventrolateral and dorsomedial portions of the prefrontal cortex (Drevets, 
2000). Humans with orbital cortex lesions perseverate in behaviours that are 
unreinforced and exhibit difficulty in shifting cognitive strategies in response to changing 
task demands (Rolls, 1995; Bechara et al., 1998). The wide emotional and behavioural 
disturbance and the proposed cortical areas implicated in depressive symptoms suggested 
that emotion-based learning aspects could be implicated in the depressive 
symptomatology.
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The first IGT application to mood disorders was by Clark et al., (2001) aiming to 
investigate decision-making process and the associated ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
functionality in acutely maniac inpatients. The hypothesis to be tested in this study was 
the relation between elevated mood and IGT performance. The study showed that maniac 
patients did chose significantly more from the disadvantageous decks demonstrating a 
performance similarity with VMPFC patients.
On the other end of the spectrum Dalgleish, Yiend, Bramham, et al. (2004) 
explored IGT performance in neurosurgery patients receiving stereotactic subcaudate 
tractotomy as a treatment for depression. Stereotactic subcaudate tractotomy is a surgical 
procedure performed for the alleviation of intractable affective disorders. It involves the 
destruction of bifrontal pathways located beneath and in front of the head of the caudate 
nucleus (Kartsounis, Poynton, Bridges & Bartlett, 1991). The hypothesis behind their 
investigation was that the neurosurgery would lead to depression recovery by reducing 
sensitivity to negative information. Four small groups of patients were recruited: a 
psychosurgery group no longer depressed, a psychosurgery group still depressed, a group 
of recovered depressed patients treated with neuroleptic and a group of healthy subjects. 
Results showed that the group of patient recovered from depression after psychosurgery 
exhibit the worse performance compared to the other three groups. The findings suggest 
the relevance of prefrontal areas in characterizing sensitivity to negative feedback and 
underline the centrality of prefrontal cortex to assist emotion-based decision-making. The 
authors also argue that the sensitivity to negative feedback, notoriously amplified in 
depression, is the key ability in order to perform advantageously on the IGT. In support 
of this claim there is a substantially similar performance of control participants,
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depressed patients recovered with medication and depressed patients with unsuccessful 
stereotactic subcaudate tractotomy.
In two recent studies, Must et al. (2006, 2007) investigated IGT performance in 
patients with major depressive disorder (MDD). In the first study 30 MDD patients were 
tested with the standard (ABCD) and the reversed (EFGH) version of IGT (Must et al.,
2006). The layout of the EFGH task is similar to the ABCD but inverts wins and losses. 
Every card selection at the EFGH version results in a money loss (either $50 or $100) and 
sometime a combination of punishment and reward is delivered. Magnitude and schedule 
of cards is the same as in the ABCD version (Bechara et al., 2000a). MDD patients, 
compared to controls, showed an impaired performance in the ABCD task but not in the 
EFGH task suggesting increased sensitivity to reward leading to disadvantageous 
choices. The results were highly unexpected in light of the idea that depressive symptoms 
are related to over-sensitivity to punishment and low sensitivity to reward (Dalgleish et 
al., 2004). The authors hypothesize that the increased sensitivity to positive reward could 
bias the perception of the high but infrequent punishment in the ABCD version of the 
task.
A second study conducted by Must et al. (2007) investigated genetic contributions 
to sub-optimal decision-making in depression with the same two versions of the IGT (i.e., 
ABCD and EFGH). One hundred and twenty four (124) MDD patients were genotyped 
for the 5-HTTLPR polymorphism and grouped according to three specific gene variations 
(allele) namely ss, Is and 11. The polymorphism was chosen for its relation with 
depression and anxiety as a possible regulator of serotonin transponder deficit implicated 
in MDD (Gonda, Juhasz, Laszik, Rihmer & Bagdy, 2005). Result showed that patients
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with variant 11 achieved higher level of performance in the ABCD task compared with 
patients with genotype ss. This suggests that the 11 variant might be related to a better 
sensitivity to punishment. No association was found instead between the genotype chosen 
and the EFGH task. As for the study conducted by Dalgleish et al. (2004), Must et al’s 
(2006) findings seems to suggest that impaired performance on the IGT might be due to 
specific subset of features within the diagnosis of depression.
Recently, a study by Smoski et al. (2008) investigated emotion-based learning 
with the IGT in a group of depressed patients. Smoski et al. (2008) found that depressed 
patients performed at comparable levels to healthy participants on the IGT, providing an 
account of sensitivity to negative feedback in depression. The authors also noted that both 
good and bad decks deliver losses during the IGT; if depressed patients have an 
advantageous performance on the task this implies that depressed patients can 
discriminate effectively between punishments of different entities and prefer the less 
punishing options. This could be slightly controversial if contextualized in the frame of 
depression that notoriously shows difficulties in evaluating the magnitude of punishment 
(Henriques, Glowacki & Davidson, 1994).
The limited number of studies suggests a link between the ineffective decision­
making strategy, altered sensitivity to negative consequences and a possible VMPFC 
functional abnormality in depression. The evidence, however, does not seem to converge 
fully. The reviewed findings are far from conclusive, in light of the different research 
questions explored, the partially unaccounted role of medication history and type, and the 
different patient groups used. It is remarkable that despite the great emotional disturbance 
experienced and the executive functions deficit shown in the literature, some depressed
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patients seem to show normal performance on a challenging task such as the IGT (Rogers 
et al., 2004). In this respect, investigation of components of the task more related to 
executive functions, such as flexibility, would characterise more accurately the extent to 
which depression and its features can influence IGT performance.
The role of subjective experience would also be an important addition to emotion- 
based learning research in depression; degree of awareness and personal perception of the 
task it is likely to be different in depressed patients compared to controls due to the 
illness specific cognitive distortions (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). This would 
characterise if  the bias in depressed people towards rewards and punishment is implicit or 
explicit and how this potential bias might fit into emotion-based learning paradigm. 
Summary
This review has summarized the relevant aspects of emotion-based learning and 
contextualized the concept in the frame of neuroscience, experimental psychology and 
psychopathology. The interest in emotional influence over cognitive process started more 
than a century ago when the first accounts of patients with prefrontal lobe damage were 
recorded. Those patients presented a challenging and peculiar profile of intact intellect 
but a marked deficit to interact effectively with the social environment. Damasio and 
colleagues, in order to explain this deficit conducted a series of investigation aimed to 
characterize the influence of specific brain lesions on decision-making. As a mean of 
assessing decision-making the IGT was first introduced by Bechara et al. (1994) and 
since used to assess emotion-based decision-making ability. A large number of studies 
featuring the IGT have been published in the last 20 years investigating emotion-based 
learning in various subject populations spanning from patients with schizophrenia (Sevy 
et al., 2007) to Israeli traffic offenders (Lev, Hershkovitz, & Yechiam, 2008).
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The role of somatic markers is largely debated and several arguments have been 
brought forward since its original formulation providing at odds evidence. Factors 
implicated in IGT successful performance are still largely unclear due to the high 
proportion of healthy participants failing to reach advantageous learning profile. 
Moreover, this review has touched upon experimental manipulation of the IGT (e.g., 
instructions, time constraints) that are able to disrupt normal participants’ performance 
and suggests that emotion-based learning needs certain preconditions in order to operate 
correctly. Lastly, the role of emotion-based learning in schizophrenia and depression has 
been reviewed. In schizophrenia, the paradigm has been extensively studied and yielded 
inconsistent results, while the investigation of emotion-based learning in depression is 
still in its early days.
The Current Thesis
The present research aims to investigate some issues in relation to emotion-based 
learning throughout a series of experiments addressing research questions spanning from 
experimental to clinical psychology. Experiment 1 will explore the role of decision-phase 
time constraints on emotion-based learning and the bearing of environmental constraint 
on IGT performance. Chapter 3 will introduce a set-shifting modification of the IGT and 
characterise the relation between standard emotion-based learning paradigm and 
flexibility o f emotion-based learning. Chapter 4 will examine the autonomic correlates of 
the set-shifting modification of the IGT. Chapter 5 will then move gradually to the 
investigation of emotion-based learning in depression and schizophrenia presenting
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results from two studies conducted on sub-clinical populations presenting schizotypal and 
depressive features. The final two empirical chapters will investigate flexibility of 
emotion-based learning in two clinical samples of depressed and schizophrenic patients.
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Chapter 2
Decision-phase time constraints and emotion based learning 
A significant number of investigations have reliably shown that learning on the 
IGT is impaired in people with specific brain lesions and with certain psychiatric 
disorders (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994; Ritter et al., 2004; Sevy et al., 2007). Although 
findings with clinical populations seem to depict a clear picture, exactly what constitutes 
“ unimpaired” learning remains to be determined (Dunn et al., 2006, p. 251). For 
instance, variability in IGT performance has been observed with some subgroups of 
healthy control populations failing to show preference for the advantageous decks at the 
end of the task (e.g., Caroselli, Hiscock, Scheibel, & Ingram, 2006; Glicksohn et al., 
2007; Lehto & Elorinne, 2003). Bechara et al. (2001, 2002) used a mean net score cut-off 
of 10 to differentiate learners from non-learners, based on normal distribution plots of 
normal controls and VM lesioned patients. Crone et al. (2004a) distinguished control 
participants by three levels of performance: bad, moderate and good. This subdivision 
was achieved by dividing the distribution of total mean net scores into three numerically 
similar subgroups. The mean number of advantageous selections was 35 for the bad, 48 
for the moderate and 58 for good group, respectively. These and other findings showing 
variability in control group performance on the IGT make interpretation of IGT data 
difficult because a normative or baseline control group profile is necessary in order to 
evaluate the performance of experimental (i.e., patient) groups (Dunn et al., 2006, pp. 
251-252). Therefore, it is important that further research be conducted into the factors 
that might influence advantageous performance in IGT control groups.
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One possible way of examining variability in IGT performance would be to 
manipulate methodological features of the task in order to selectively disrupt 
advantageous choice making. According to this logic, if the manipulation successfully 
disrupts learning, as evidenced by a diminished preference for the advantageous decks, 
then a profile of unimpaired learning should be observed when the manipulations are 
absent or removed. This may then permit an analysis of the conditions needed to establish 
unimpaired learning in control groups, and help make the interpretation of data from IGT 
studies with clinical populations more reliable (Dunn et al., 2006).
An important consideration when comparing learning profiles across different 
studies is the differing ways in which the IGT has been administered. Across the years, 
different versions of the task have been developed. A major improvement with respect to 
the original table-top procedure has been the computerized version. The manual versus 
the computerized version of the IGT, in some respects, represents quite a different design. 
One of the main different aspects is that the time available during the choice phase in the 
two versions is considerably different; in the manual version, the choice has to be made 
by pointing to or picking cards from the decks, while in the computerized version only a 
mouse click is required. Response time, therefore, is on a different scale if left unlimited 
for the two tasks and is more difficult to implement, track and subject to bias when a non­
automated format is used. In addition, facsimile money was used in the manual version of 
the IGT and participants were allowed more time to make selections (Bowman, Evans & 
Turnbull, 2005). When Bechara and colleagues moved to a computerized administration 
of the task (Bechara et al., 1999) they chose to enforce a 6 s time delay between card
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selections (i.e., inter trial interval) in order to resemble the choice time in the original 
manual version of the procedure.
In a recent paper, Bowman, Evans and Turnbull (2005) investigated the role of 
decision time delays in the manual and the computerised version of the IGT. They 
adopted a time-constraint of 6 s, which was based on the average inter-trial interval (ITI) 
developed by Bechara et al. (1999) to record skin conductance responses during the 
automated IGT. The study design consisted of three experimental conditions: a time- 
unlimited manual procedure, a time-unlimited computerized procedure and a time-limited 
computerized procedure with enforced delay. In the time unlimited manual condition 
participants were allowed to select cards freely throughout the duration of the 100 card 
selections. In the time unlimited computerised condition participants were allowed to 
select cards freely by clicking on the image of one of the four decks displayed on a 
computer monitor. The time limited computerised procedure was equal to the time- 
unlimited computerised condition apart from the fact that participants were forced to wait 
6 seconds between card selections. In this respect the enforced time constraint was not 
implemented in the critical choice phase, but during the ITI. Once the ITI had elapsed, no 
time constraint was present during the critical decision making period. It is perhaps 
unsurprising then that learning rates did not differ significantly either between IGT 
administration formats or when a 6-s ITI was used (i.e., during the automated task).
Bowman et al. (2005) speculated that an enforced delay of 6 s might evoke 
feelings of frustration, with participants eager to make their card choices as quickly as 
possible in order to access the outcomes of their choices. Such unintended frustration 
might impact upon the IGT because it purportedly recruits emotion-based resources
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(Damasio, 1996; Dunn et al., 2006; Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, Carzolio, & O ’Connor, 
2005). As a result, the possible disruptive effects of time-constraints may be inferred 
from the subjective experience ratings the participants gave of the relative “ goodness” 
and “ badness” of the decks. However, Bowman et al. (2005) found no significant 
differences in the subjective ratings of each group suggesting that the 6-s ITI did not 
evoke feelings of frustration.
It is important that, if the cognitive components of the task are of interest, to 
examine the potentially disruptive effects of shorter time constraints during the crucial 
decision-making phase on IGT performance. A number of real-world situations have vital 
time constraints associated with them, most notably in the interpersonal world, when one 
often has only a few seconds to judge whether to make a joke, express sympathy at a loss, 
or respond to an aggressive challenge. In sum, there is much merit in considering the role 
of time-limitations on the IGT in shorter time durations, and focusing on such time 
restrictions primarily at the crucial decision-making phase of the task.
The present study, sought to systematically investigate the effect of different time 
constraints implemented during the decision-making period using an automated IGT 
format. Two-s and 4-s decision-phase time constraints were selected and learning rates 
compared with those of control group participants not exposed to any time-constraint. In 
addition to measuring behavioural performance, subjective experience was also recorded 
(e.g., Bowman et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2005) in order to examine the effects of time 
constraints on awareness during the IGT. It is predicted that that the two time constraints 
groups would show impaired learning in the IGT, relative to the control group, and that
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participants’ subjective awareness of the “ good” and “ bad”  decks would be 
unimpaired.
Experiment 1 
Method
Participants
Seventy five participants, 23 male and 52 female, were recruited from the subject 
pool of the Department of Psychology at Swansea University. Following completion of 
the study, participants were compensated with £5. Each participant was randomly 
allocated into one of three groups: 2-s time constraint (n=25), 4-s time constraint (n=25) 
and a control group with no time constraint (n=25).
Materials and procedure
Upon arrival at the laboratory participants were provided with the information 
sheet and asked to read it. Participants were, subsequently, given the opportunity to 
question the experimenter about any aspect of the experiment and finally asked to read 
and signed the consent form. Once the signed consent form was obtained participants 
were asked to sit in front of the laboratory computer. The laboratory computer was a 
Pentium 4 desktop PC loaded with Windows XP, which was arranged on a desk with a 
chair placed in front of a 17” LCD colour monitor.
One of the three experimental conditions {no time constraint, 2 seconds time 
constraint and 4 seconds time constraint) was loaded on the machine and participants 
were asked to read the instructions. All three groups received general instruction about
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the task based on Bechara et al. (2000b). Instruction provided to the control no time 
constraint group were as follow:
In a moment, the computer will present four decks o f cards labelled A, B, C, and D. 
Your task is to select one card at a time, by clicking on the card with the computer 
mouse, from  any deck you choose.
Each time you select a card, the computer will tell you that you have won some 
money. The amount o f  money won will be immediately added to the total, which will 
be displayed in the bottom right-hand side o f the screen.
Occasionally, however, when you select a card, the computer will tell you that you 
have won some money but that you have also lost some money. The amount o f  
money lost will be immediately deducted from your total.
Your task is to try and earn as much money as possible, and i f  you can’t win, to 
avoid losing as much money as possible.
You will be given a loan o f £1000 credit to begin the task. It is important that you 
try and behave as i f  this were a real card game and try to win as much money as 
possible (and lose as little as possible). Treat the £1000 credit o f  play money, and 
all money won/lost during the task, as i f  it were your own real money.
No matter how much you fin d  yourself losing, you can still win. Pay attention to the 
wins/losses.
Every so often, the computer will ask you to give each deck o f  cards a score, based 
on how good or bad you feel they are. Please use the slider scale to rate each o f the 
decks. The computer will show you how to do this.
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The computer will not tell you when the task will end, so please keep playing until 
the tasks ends.
I f  you have any questions, please read through the instructions again to see i f  they 
answer your questions. I f  they do not, then ask the experimenter to explain. 
Remember, your task is to try and earn as much money as possible, and i f  you can’t 
win, to avoid losing as much money as possible, and be sure to give each deck o f  
cards a score based on how good or bad you feel they are.
Good luck!
The instruction given to 2-s and 4-s time constraint groups differed from those of 
the control group in that the speed of responding was emphasised (i.e. “your task is to 
select one card at time as fast as you can...”). Clarification about the task was provided 
by the experimenter if requested by a participant.
A computerized standard version of the IGT was employed for the no time 
constraint condition as described from Bechara, Damasio and Damasio (2000a). Four 
decks of cards of the same physical appearance and colour (see Figure 4) were 
concurrently presented on the screen. Participants were asked to keep playing until the 
message “please report to the experimenter” was displayed on the screen.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the experimental conditions.
No time constraint
In the no time constraint condition participants where simply asked to choose 
cards in order to maximize their winnings. No mention was made of any time constraint. 
Participants could take as long or as short as they liked to make selections.
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Two seconds time constraint condition
In the 2 seconds time constraint condition participants where instructed as in the 
no time constraint condition but forced to choose a card within two seconds.
Four seconds time constraint condition
In the 4 seconds time constraint condition participants where instructed as in the 
no time constraint condition but forced to choose a card within four seconds.
In both time constraint conditions, if a choice was not made in the time available, 
a message, “time out, please be fa s te r ' appeared on the screen for 5 seconds. The number 
of trials with a time out was recorded but not counted as part o f the total number of trials 
of the IGT. For each condition, the task finished after 100 choice-trials had occurred.
A B C D
£100 added to your total!
£1550
Figure 4: Screen shot o f the Iowa Gambling Task computerized version developed at 
Swansea University.
Apart for the time constraints described above, the task employed standard IGT 
features (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000a). Participants were asked to select cards form four
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concurrently available decks (labelled A, B, C and D). At the beginning, a loan of £1000 
of virtual money was given and displayed at the bottom right of the screen. Every win or 
loss was summed to or subtracted by the total amount of the loan always present on the 
screen. As in the original version of the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) deck A and deck B 
were disadvantageous while deck C and D were advantageous. The computer programme 
randomly determined which two of the decks were to be the advantageous and 
disadvantageous, respectively for each participant. That is, unlike previous studies (e.g., 
Bechara et al., 1994; Bowman et al., 2005; Suzuki et al., 2003), the spatial location of the 
advantageous and disadvantageous was not restricted to the left (e.g., A & B) or right 
(e.g., C & D) of the screen. Randomly determining advantageous and disadvantageous 
decks at the outset of the task for every participant rules out location preference as a 
potential factor governing performance.
Frequency of reward and punishment differed for each deck. Participants always 
won £100 if they selected a card from deck A or B and always won £50 if they select a 
card from deck C or D. The amount of losses was comprised between £150 and £350 for 
deck A; £1250 for deck B; between £25 and £75 for deck C; and £250 for deck D (see 
Figure 5). In case of gain, a sentence stating “You won X” appeared on the computer 
screen and the amount of money won was added to the total. In case of win and loss, the 
message presented was “You won X but you lost Y”. Overall high immediate reward 
decks (A and B) resulted in a higher magnitude of punishment leading to a net loss of 
£250 every ten trials, whereas the low immediate reward decks (C and D) resulted in a 
lower magnitude of punishment leading to a net gain of £250 every ten trials.
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Subjective experience ratings: An additional feature to investigate subjective 
experience was embedded in the task (Bowman et al., 2005). Every twenty selections the 
game was interrupted and participants were asked to provide subjective experience of 
“goodness” and “badness” of each deck (A, B, C, D). Ratings were made using a slider- 
scale from 0 to 10 (where 0 = very bad and 10 = very good).
Decision time: Decision time was also recorded for every trial during the entire 
task. Decision time was defined as the time (measured in seconds) elapsing from the 
onset of the cards until a choice was made.
Figure 5: Schedule of wins (on the card value) and losses (in the circle) occurring every 
10 cards in the four decks for all the conditions.
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Results
Participants’ mean age was 21.66 (SD=3) and mean number of years spent in 
education was 15.72 (SD=2.17). No significant difference was found between the three 
groups for the above-mentioned characteristics (allp  >.05).
1GT Mean Net Score
As in Bechara et al. (1994), the hundred IGT selections were sub-divided into five
blocks of 20 trials. The mean net score was calculated for each block by subtracting 
disadvantageous selections from advantageous selections [(C+D)-(A-B)]. A net score 
above zero is indicative of advantageous selections, while a net score below zero implies 
disadvantageous selections. Figure 6 shows the IGT mean net scores for the control, 2- 
second and 4-second groups. A mixed factor 3 (group) x 5 (block) ANOVA showed a 
main effect for block, F{4, 288) = 27.03,/? < .001. All three groups showed a general 
increase in advantageous selections across trial blocks. There was also a significant main 
effect for group, F{2, 72) = 3.83,/? < .05. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests revealed that the 
control group made significantly more advantageous selections than the 2-second group 
(p < .05), but that the control did not differ significantly from the 4-second group and that 
the 4-second group did not differ significantly from the 2-second group. The trial block 
by group interaction was not significant, F(8, 288) = 1.18,/? > .05.
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Figure 6: Mean net score for each of the three groups across the five blocks of 20 trials. 
2sec: two second time constraint; 4sec: four second time constraint; cont: no time 
constraint.
IGT and Subjective Ratings
In this case a mean net subjective rating was calculated by subtracting the ratings 
of the disadvantageous decks (A and B) from the ratings of advantageous decks (C and 
D). The mean subjective ratings for each group across blocks are shown in Figure 7. A 
mixed factor 3 (group) x 5 (block) ANOVA showed a main effect for trial block, F{4, 
288) = 8.01,/? < .001. For the three groups, subjective ratings showed a substantial 
increase from the first to the second blocks of trials. The main effect for group and the 
group by trial block interaction were not significant, however.
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Figure 7: Mean subjective experience ratings for each of the three groups across the five 
blocks of 20 trials. 2sec: two second time constraint; 4sec: four second time constraint; 
cont: no time constraint.
IGT and decision Time
Figure 8 shows the mean reaction time for each experimental group across the 
five trial blocks. A mixed factor 3 (group) x 5 (block) ANOVA found a significant main 
effect for trial block, F{4, 288) = 5.62,/? < .001, a significant main effect for group, F(2, 
72) = 12.60,/? < .001 and a significant trial block by group interaction, F(4, 288) = 3.22, 
p  < .01. Bonferroni-adjusted post hoc tests found that the control group had significantly 
longer reaction times when compared to the 2-second group across the first three trial
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blocks (p < -01), and the 4-second group across the first two trial blocks (p < .01).
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Figure 8: Mean decision-time in seconds for each of the three groups across the five 
blocks of 20 trials. 2sec: two second time constraint; 4sec: four second time constraint; 
cont: no time constraint.
Figure 9 shows the total number of ‘timeouts’ for all participants in the 2-second 
and 4-second groups. A 2 (group) x 5 (block) ANOVA showed a main effect for group, 
F (l, 48) = \ l A 2 , p  < .001, while the main effect for block and the block by group 
interaction were not significant. Contrast analysis found that the 2-second group had 
significantly more timeouts than the 4-second group in blocks 1, 2 and 4 (p < .01).
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Figure 9: The number of trial time-outs for the 2-second and 4-second groups across the 
five blocks of 20 trials.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of 2 and 4 s time 
constraints on emotion-based learning during the critical decision-making period in the 
IGT. Results showed that learning was significantly disrupted in the time constraints 
conditions if compared with a control group given no time-constraints. All groups 
initially showed the typical pattern of decision-making below chance but gradually 
shifted to advantageous above chance levels as the task progressed. This is consistent 
with previous research conducted with normal populations (i.e., university students; 
Balodis, MacDonald & Olmstead, 2006; Bowman & Turnbull, 2003; Femie & Tunney, 
2005; Glicksohn et al., 2007). The performance of the three groups showed an increase in 
the number o f advantageous selections across trials and although a common pattern of
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learning was displayed by all participants, control group did perform significantly better 
than the 2-s time constraint group. The present findings are the first to show a significant 
disruptive effect of decision-phase time constraints on learning during the IGT, with less 
advantageous choices being made while performing the task under the 2-s time 
constraints suggesting time as a critical factor impacting on emotion based learning.
Subjective experience ratings also showed a significant increase across blocks, for 
all groups. However, participants’ ratings of which decks were “ good” or “ bad” did not 
appear to be disrupted by the implementation of time-constraints during the critical 
decision making period. That is, participants from all three groups showed comparable 
recruitment of emotion-based resources in discriminating the advantageous decks at 
above chance levels from the first block of trials onwards. This suggests that participants 
had better awareness of the affective status (or emotion-biasing signals), of the reward 
and punishment schedule contained within the IGT than may previously have been 
thought (cf., Bechara et al., 1997, 2000a; see Bowman et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2005; 
Maia & McClelland, 2004).
The present findings appear also to be relevant to the issue of the “ cognitive 
impenetrability”  (Dunn et al., 2006, pp. 245- 249) of the IGT schedules claimed by 
Bechara and co-workers. The creators of the task claimed that advantageous performance 
on the IGT is entirely dependent on the guidance of emotional signal rather than a 
rational decision-making process based on the calculation of the schedule of rewards and 
punishments (Damasio, Adolphs & Damasio, 2003). Subjective experience results from 
this experiment show that participants can access emotion-based knowledge of the 
“ goodness” and “ badness” of the decks at a surprisingly early stage in the task,
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provided that participants are required merely to interrogate their feelings about an object 
(deck) rather than provide a fully-fledged descriptive account of the basis of the task 
(Evans et al., 2005; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Turnbull, Berry, & Bowman, 2003). 
Whether or not the subjective experience ratings measured in the present study can be 
said to accurately reflect the penetrability of the IGT reward and punishment schedules is, 
of course, a contested issue that must await the outcome of further research, as well as a 
greater conceptual clarity about the nature of conscious awareness.
The present findings also include the first reported analyses of reaction time data 
during IGT performance, and show both significant main effects and interactions of trial 
block and participant group. As one might expect, the control group took significantly 
longer to make choices compared to the two time constraint groups, but it is remarkable 
to notice that the reaction times of all three groups remained below 2-s across all blocks 
of trials. Also, perhaps unsurprisingly, there were a significantly greater number of “ time 
outs” in the 2-s time constraint group compared with the 4-s group, notably in the first 
and second blocks of trials.
Taken together, decision phase reaction time and time-out data indicate that time 
constraints initially disrupt advantageous performance, but such constraints are not 
disruptive when imposed between decision-making phases (Bowman et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, while decision-phase time constraints do produce a decrement in both 
speed and “ accuracy” , participants still showed some adaptability to the 
reward/punishment schedules.
Overall, the findings demonstrate important effects of time constraints on 
emotion-based learning in the IGT when these constraints are targeted at the crucial
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decision-making phase, and also suggest that the reward/punishment schedules of the 
IGT are to some extent cognitively penetrable. The methodological features of the 
present study, such as the randomised positions of the good and bad decks and the use of 
subjective experience ratings and reaction time data, may be important considerations for 
future research in helping to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
“ unimpaired” IGT control group performance. This is clearly a central issue when 
investigating a construct such as emotion-based learning that shows substantial 
variability across the population, and is increasingly understood to be important for the 
way in which humans make complex decisions in uncertain circumstance.
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Chapter 3
The contingency shifting variant IGT: Flexibility and emotion-based
learning
The findings of Chapter 2 clearly illustrate that the performance of healthy control 
participants on the IGT may be systematically disrupted by placing time constraints on 
the critical decision-making period. Performance was seen to vary as a function of the 
duration of time constraint that groups of participants were exposed to. It was argued that 
this systematic disruption of learning may provide a novel means of studying the factors 
responsible for variability in control group performance.
It maybe argued, however, that an exhaustive analysis of variability in IGT 
performance is both difficult and unnecessary. The myriad of influences exerted over 
human performance in experimental settings is both widely accepted and extensively 
studied (McGuigan, 1993), and an investigation with the IGT certainly has considerable 
merit. At this stage in the research, however, an alternative approach was adopted that 
involved developing a novel variant IGT as a means of further illustrating the range of 
factors that may be responsible for variability. In so doing, an empirical analysis of 
performance on a novel IGT was deemed appropriate. The remaining empirical chapter 
sought to undertake this investigation.
The original version of the IGT, as used in Chapter 2, typically consists of 100 
card selections conventionally divided into five blocks of 20 trials, and involves 
participants making choices from four concurrently available decks of cards for monetary 
gain/loss. Two of the decks (labelled A & B) result in immediate high gain per choice 
(e.g., £100), but produce regular losses, leading to a cumulative long-term loss (i.e., 
termed “the disadvantageous choice”). The remaining two decks (labelled C & D)
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typically result in lower immediate rewards, (e.g., £50), but also generate fewer losses, 
resulting in a cumulative long-term gain (i.e., termed “the advantageous choice”). A 
defining feature of IGT performance is the gradual adjustment to the affective 
consequences of reward and punishment. Participants initially tend to prefer cards from 
the disadvantageous decks and, around halfway through the task, a shift in the selection 
strategy is usually observed in favour of the advantageous decks (see Dunn et al., 2006).
In the original IGT, fixed or variable rewards are presented on every trial and 
fixed or variable punishments are presented intermittently. Advantageous decision­
making, then, involves foregoing immediate gains associated with higher long-term 
losses for lower immediate gains and lower long-term losses. The role of reward and 
punishment in the IGT has been studied since the original introduction of the task with 
schedule and magnitude modification of the original procedure. In a variant of the 
original task, called the EFGH version, Bechara et al. (2000a) arranged the schedules 
such that the advantageous decks presented high immediate punishment but overall 
higher rewards, while the disadvantageous decks presented low immediate punishment 
but overall lower rewards. In this variant task advantageous decks (i.e. E and F) deliver 
high immediate money loss (i.e. $-100) but overall higher winnings. Conversely, the 
disadvantageous decks delivered immediate low money loss (i.e. $-50) but lower 
magnitude winnings. In this respect, sampling cards from decks E and F would lead to a 
mean net gain of $250 over 10 trials while ten selections from decks G and H would 
result in a net loss of $250. Patients with VMPFC damage showed preference for the 
disadvantageous decks on both the standard and variant IGT (Bechara et al., 2000a). 
However, patients with major depressive disorder show impaired learning on the original,
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but not the variant IGT (Must et al., 2006), while typically-developing children and 
healthy adults show a clear developmental trend towards preferring the advantageous 
decks on both versions of the task (e.g., Crone & Van der Molen, 2004; Crone, Bunge, 
Latenstein, & Van der Molen, 2005; Davis et al., 2007).
In recent years there has been interest in the extent to which performance on the 
standard IGT might rely on reversal learning ability. This argument is based on the claim 
that for some decks, such as deck B that presents one high magnitude punishment every 
10 trials, initial selections result in high temporary rewards, followed by punishment after 
several selections (See figure 5 chapter 2 for schedule of the task). Therefore initial 
selections from deck B can be appraised, in the early stages of the task, as advantageous 
but would need to be reassessed once the low frequency high money losses will occur. In 
light of this reassessment of preference along the task several authors have suggested that 
performance on the IGT may rest on reversal learning abilities (e.g. Fellows & Farah, 
2003; Homak et al., 2004; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Rolls, 2000).
Several studies have investigated the issue of reversal learning performance and 
its influence on decision-making, particularly in individual with brain injury but findings 
have often been inconclusive. Fellows and Farah (2003) showed that VMPFC damage, 
but not dorsolateral prefrontal cortex damage, results in impaired reversal learning 
ability. This claim rest on the finding of an investigation conducted with standard reversal 
learning task (Fellows & Farah, 2003). During this task, participants were dealt two 
cards at a time from two different coloured decks. One deck always delivered rewarding 
cards while the other delivered equal magnitude losing cards (i.e., win $50, lose $50). 
After 8 consecutive winning selections, contingencies were switched so that the
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previously good deck delivered losses and the previously bad deck delivered wins. 
Participants’ performance was rated for number of errors and for the number of trials 
necessary to complete the task. The task ended after the successful completion of five 
contingency switches. Fellows and Farah’s (2003) results showed that patients with 
VMPFC damage, but not dorsolateral prefrontal cortex damage or controls, were 
impaired in this task, providing further support to the crucial role of VMPFC to 
accomplish reversal learning tasks.
Following the study employing the standard reversal learning task (Fellows & 
Farah 2003) Fellows and Farah (2005) developed a “shuffled” variant IGT to explore the 
issue of reversal learning in relation to the IGT. The shuffled variant IGT task used the 
same 4 decks layout but the card order was changed so that the losses associated with the 
disadvantageous decks were experienced on the first few trials (i.e., 1-10). The early 
occurrence of money losses would, in the author’s view, eliminate the need for reversal 
learning as disadvantageous decks would be perceived as such from an early stage of the 
task and therefore the “advantageousness” of the decks would not need to be reassessed 
(Fellows & Farah, 2005). Results showed that the learning profile of VMPFC patients 
was indistinguishable from that of controls. In explaining these atypical findings, Fellows 
and Farah (2005) suggested that a deficit in reversal learning ability may be involved in 
IGT performance because “cards are presented in a fixed order that induces an initial 
preference for the ultimately riskier decks that must then be overcome as losses begin to 
accrue” (Fellows & Farah, 2005, p. 58). When the card order was changed, as during the 
shuffled variant, and the need for reversal learning was hence removed or at the very least 
minimised, the performance of VMPFC patients approximated control levels.
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Recently, Brand et al., (2007) found that performance on specific executive 
function measures, such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST), which involves 
reversal learning, was correlated with performance on the last blocks of IGT trials only 
(see also Lehto & Elorinne, 2003; Mitchell, Colledge, Leonard, & Blair, 2002). 
Performance on the first block of the IGT trials did not correlate with either the WCST 
measure or other IGT blocks. Brand et al. (2007) suggested that two potentially separable 
mechanisms, decision-making under ambiguity and decision-making under risk, operate 
during the first and latter blocks of the IGT trials, respectively. Correlations with the 
WCST were only found in the later IGT trial blocks (when decisions are made under risk) 
because reversal learning, which is indexed by the WCST, was not implicated until later 
in the task after punishment has been experienced.
In the context of these complex, and at times ambiguous findings, there are 
several limitations in investigating reversal learning with the traditional IGT. Firstly, 
deck selection is not controlled by the investigator, so that it might take a few trials, or 
very many trials, before a participant encounters punishment on a particular deck. 
Secondly, as Fellows and Farah (2003) noted reversal learning claimed in the standard 
IGT is based on the effects of a single negative experience on a deck, rather than the 
cumulative effects of sustained selection. For deck B, for instance, the schedule allowed 
nine rewarding experiences followed by one punishment; a money loss, even if of high 
magnitude, can arguably be claimed to constitute reversal learning after nine wins. It is 
possible that the IGT performance is at least partially due to ‘aggregate learning’ over 
many trials, as evidenced by apparently normal performance with patients with both 
substantial working memory impairments (Bechara et al., 1998), and profound episodic
74
Chapter 3
memory impairment (Turnbull & Evans, 2006). Finally, the role of reversal learning in 
IGT performance has been investigated through correlations between the original IGT 
and either different tasks (e.g., reversal learning tasks; Fellows & Farah, 2003) or 
executive function tests (e.g., WCST; Brand et el., 2007) rather than tasks specifically 
designed to assess aggregate learning reversal.
Recently, Turnbull, Evans, Kemish, Park, and Bowman, (2006) employed a 
unique contingency-shifting modification of the IGT. During the contingency-shifting 
variant IGT, the reward and punishment contingencies were systematically altered 
following initial exposure to the standard 100 trials. In a non-automated study conducted 
with people with schizophrenia and healthy controls, Turnbull et al. introduced three 
successive, signaled “shift-periods” with modified contingencies such that the decks that 
were previously advantageous became disadvantageous, and vice versa. The contingency 
shift modification consisted of 120 trials to be completed after the standard 100 IGT 
trials. During the shift-phase the schedule of advantageous and disadvantageous cards 
were systematically changed so that decks with positive payout shifted to negative and 
vice versa. Results showed that healthy participants, after an initial disruption of learning 
levels, adapt to the changing environment. This typically was show by an improvement 
during the later trials of each shift-period. The learning profile of controls was 
comparable to those people with schizophrenia who scored high in positive symptoms, 
but not from those who scored high in negative symptoms.
These findings highlight potential difficulties in flexible emotion-based learning 
in schizophrenia, in particular in tasks that involves shifting or reversal learning (e.g., 
Pantelis, Barber, Barnes, Nelson, Owen, & Robbins, 1999). The contingency-shifting
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variant IGT, devised by Turnbull et al. (2006), offers considerable promise as a means of 
investigating the flexible use of emotion-based learning and further elucidating the role 
played by reversal learning in IGT performance. It is important to note that the use of the 
term ‘contingency-shifting’ refers to a progressive modification of the reward and 
punishment contingencies, and not to abilities described by similar, related terms such as 
‘set-shifting’ (e.g., Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 1996; Konishi, Nakajima, Uchida, 
Kameyama, Nakahara, Sekihara et al., 1998).
The present chapter sought to extend the findings of Turnbull et al. (2006) and to 
explore the potential o f the contingency-shifting variant IGT as a putative measure of 
reversal learning ability. To do so, the procedure used by Turnbull et al. was adapted in 
the following ways. First, Turnbull et al. used a non-automated version of the task and 
real-money rewards throughout. Although no significant differences have been observed 
between automated and non-automated formats (Bowman et al., 2005) or when real and 
hypothetical rewards have been used (Bowman & Turnbull, 2003), the variability of 
control group IGT performance (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006, pp. 251-252; Glicksohn et al.,
2007) across studies employing identical tasks suggests that a replication and extension 
of Turnbull et al.’s findings would be useful. Second, Turnbull et al. did not measure 
participants’ subjective experience ratings of the relative “goodness” and “badness” of 
the decks (Bowman et al., 2005). Recording subjective ratings allows for an examination 
of the effects of the shift-periods on emotion-based learning, and may permit an 
identification of when during the task the rules governing choices become explicit (Brand 
et al., 2006, 2007; Maia & McClelland, 2005). Finally, Turnbull et al. signalled each of 
the three shift-periods to participants, which may have influenced subsequent choices.
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Experiment 2 was undertaken to address these issues and to provide a detailed analysis of 
set-shifting IGT performance with a large cohort of participants.
Experiment 2 
Method
Participants
Two hundred and eight undergraduates (95 male, 113 female) from Swansea 
University participated in return for course credit. Ages ranged between 18 and 38 (M= 
21.38, SD = 4.11). An independent samples /-test revealed no significant difference in 
age between males and females, /(206) = -.518,/; = 0.605. Participants had a mean of 
14.94 (SD = 2.67) years of education.
Materials and Procedure
An automated version of the IGT, programmed in Visual Basic® 6.0, was 
employed. Participants received general instructions about the task that were based on 
Bechara et al. (2000a; see Appendix 1) and completed a total of 220 trials of the IGT in 
two phases: 100 trials of the original version of the task (Phase 1) followed by 120 trials 
of a contingency-shifting variant IGT involving three successive shifts of reward and 
punishment (Phase 2).
Phase 1: Original IGT. Participants were instructed to select cards from four 
concurrently available blue-coloured decks (labelled sequentially A, B, C and D). The 
computer programme randomly determined which two of the decks were to be 
‘advantageous’ and ‘disadvantageous’, respectively, for each participant (Femie & 
Tunney, 2006; Lin, Chiu, Lee, & Hsieh, 2007; Pecchinenda, Dretsch, & Chapman, 2006).
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That is, the spatial location of the advantageous and disadvantageous decks was not 
restricted to the left (i.e., A & B) or right (i.e., C & D) of the computer screen. Randomly 
determining advantageous and disadvantageous decks at the outset of the task for every 
participant excludes location preference as a potential factor governing performance. 
Once determined, the positions of the decks remained unchanged until the end of the task.
A loan of £1000 of virtual money was displayed at the bottom right of the screen 
and was updated immediately following choices with gains and/or losses. Participants 
always won £100 if they selected a card from the ‘disadvantageous’ decks and always 
won £50 if they selected a card from the ‘advantageous’ decks. The amount of losses 
varied between £150 and £350 for deck A; £1250 for deck B; between £25 and £75 for 
deck C; and £250 for deck D. In the case of gains, a sentence stating, “You won X! X 
added to your total” appeared on the screen and the amount of money won was added to 
the total. In the case of gains and loss, the message presented was “You lose £1250! 
£1250 has been deducted from your total”. This onscreen feedback was displayed for 5-s, 
before a 2-s ITI. Phase 1 ended after 100 trials.
Phase 2: Contingency-shifting IGT. Immediately after Phase 1 (i.e., without 
interruption and/or signaling), three contingency-shift phases, each consisting of two 
blocks of 20 trials, were introduced (Turnbull et al., 2006). The onset of each unsignalled 
shift phase involved a systematic modification of the reward and punishment 
contingencies of Phase 1 (participants’ positions within the decks continued into Phase 
2). During the three, 40-trial contingency-shift phases, the advantageous decks (C and D) 
were successively replaced by decks A and D (shift period 1), A and B (shift period 2), 
and B and C (shift period 3). Each contingency-shift period began immediately following
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the 100th (shift period 1), 140th (shift period 2) and 180th trial (shift period 3), 
respectively. Table 2 shows the net win/loss for each deck in each shift period. Phase 2 
consisted of a total of 120 trials.
A
Win/Loss
B
Win/Loss
C
Win/Loss
D
Win/Loss
Good
decks
Bad
decks
Phase 1 
Phase 2
£2000/£2500 £2000/£2500 £1000/£500 £1000/£500 C & D A& B
Shift 1 £1000/£500 £2000/£2500 £2000/£2500 £1000/£500 A & D B& C
Shift 2 £1000/£500 £1000/£500 £2000/£2500 £2000/£2500 A & B C&D
Shift 3 £2000/£2500 £1000/£500 £1000/£500 £2000/£2500 B & C A& D
Table 2: Net win/loss per 20 trials for each of the decks during Phase 1 and each of the 
three shift periods of Phase 2. The two advantageous (‘good’) and disadvantageous 
(‘bad’) decks in each phase/period are also shown.
Subjective experience ratings: After every 20 trials in both phases, participants 
were asked to provide subjective experience ratings in terms of how “good” or “bad” they 
felt each deck to be (Evans, Bowman & Turnbull, 2005). Ratings were made using a 
computer presented slider-scale from 0 to 10 (where 0 = very bad and 10 = very good).
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Results
Mean Net Score and Subjective Ratings
The mean net score was calculated by subtracting disadvantageous selections
from advantageous selections [(C+D)-(A+B)]. A net score above zero is indicative of 
advantageous selections, while a net score below zero implies disadvantageous 
selections. Figure 10 shows that there was a steady increase in learning for all 
participants over the five blocks of Phase 1. A repeated measures ANOVA showed that 
participants significantly improved across the five trial blocks, F(4, 828) = 44.38,p <  
.0001. Contrast analyses showed there were significant increases in learning from block 1 
to 2, F (l, 207) = 28.05,p  < .0001, from block 2 to 3, F (l, 207) = 10.98,/? = .001, from 
block 3 to 4, F (l, 207) = 7.25,/? = .008, but not from block 4 to 5, F (l, 207) = 2.62,/? =
.11. In the first contingency-shift period, Figure 10 shows that there was a substantial 
impairment in choice of advantageous decks; mean net score for the whole sample 
returned to slightly below chance levels compared to the final block of Phase 1. This 
would suggest the initial contingency shift was successful in disrupting the established 
contingency learning. In terms of performance within each discrete shift period, repeated 
measures t-tests showed that there was significant change in mean net score within the 
first, /(207) = -2.74,/? = .007, and the third, f(207) = -2.81.58,/? = .005, contingency-shift 
periods but only a approaching significance trend for the second, /(207) = -1.88,/? = .061.
A mean net subjective rating was calculated by subtracting the ratings of the 
disadvantageous decks from the subjective ratings of the advantageous decks. Figure 10 
shows that there was a large increase in subjective ratings after the first block in Phase 1. 
A repeated measures ANOVA showed that subjective ratings differed significantly across
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the five trial blocks, F(4, 828) = 25.17,p <  .0001. Contrast analyses showed there was a 
significant increase in subjective ratings from block 1 to 2, F (l, 207) = 60.50,/? < .0001, 
no significant change from block 2 to 3, F (l, 207) = 0.198,/? = .66, a significant decrease 
in subjective rating from block 3 to 4, F (l, 207) = 8.77,/? = .003, and a significant 
increase in subjective rating from block 4 to 5, F (l, 207) = 4.50,/? =.035. Figure 10 
further shows a trend of increasing subjective ratings between the first and the second 
block of each of the contingency-shift periods in Phase 2. Repeated measures t-tests did 
indeed show that there were significant increases in mean net subjective ratings within 
the first, t(207) = -5.32,/? < .0001, second, /(207) = -4.65,/? < .0001, and third, t(207) = - 
3.81,/? < .0001, contingency-shift periods. A Pearson product-moment correlation 
between the IGT mean net score and subjective experience ratings revealed a positive 
correlation in Phase 1 (r = .22,/? < .0001) and Phase 2 (r =.19,/? < .0001).
Stepwise multiple regression was conducted to investigate factors predicting 
Phase 2 performance. The dependent variable of the regression model was the total mean- 
net score of the contingency-shift phase. Predictors entered were: Phase 1 block 1, 2, 3, 4 
and 5 mean net score, block 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 mean net subjective rating, age, years of 
education and gender. Variables were included and excluded from the final model on the 
basis of significant values of partial correlation (p in .05 and p  out .10, respectively).
Only three predictors entered the model accounting for almost 28% of the shift 
performance (R2 = .277, F(3, 207) = 26.11,/? < .0001). The strongest predictor was block 
3 mean net score (standardised b = .39,/? < .0001), followed by block 4 mean net score 
(standardised b = -.2,/? = .007) and block 1 mean net score (standardised b = -.15,/? = 
.013). Although largely accounted for by block 3 and 4 mean net score, the regression
81
Chapter 3
findings showed that poor performance in block 1 predicts good performance during 
Phase 2. No other variables were found to significantly predict performance in Phase 2.
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Figure 10: Mean net score and subjective ratings for all participants for the five 20-trial 
blocks in Phase 1 and the six 20-trial blocks in Phase 2. Error bars represent two standard 
errors.
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Contingency-Shift Learning
The analyses presented above show clear evidence of improvements in learning 
across the original version of the task (Phase 1) and impairments in learning with the 
contingency shifts (Phase 2), most notably in the first contingency-shift period. Analyses 
with the whole sample, however, tend to mask substantial individual differences in 
learning performance across both the normal and shift phases. As the focus in the current 
study is the contingency-shift version of the IGT in normal participants, learning levels 
on each of the contingency-shift were further analyzed.
On the basis that Bechara and Damasio (2002) had previously suggested that a 
score of 10 or greater on the standard phase of the task characterised advantageous 
performance, therefore only those individuals who had achieved a mean net score equal 
to or greater than 10 in the normal IGT phase (N = 69) were included in subsequent 
analysis. In other words, the focus is on those participants who had shown some success 
in learning the original reinforcement contingencies. An inspection of contingency-shift 
performance for this sub-sample revealed substantial differences in performance. Thirty- 
nine of the participants had a total mean net score above 10 for the contingency-shift 
phase (M = 35.05, SD = 21.66: High Performers), while 26 participants had mean net 
scores below 0 for the contingency-shift phase (M = -13.04, SD = 13.85: Low 
Performers). Four participants who scored 0 or just above chance on the contingency- 
shift phase were not considered in subsequent analyses. An independent samples t-test 
revealed a highly significant difference in mean net score between these two groups, /(63) 
= 10.02,p <  .0001. Independent t-tests performed on High and Low Performers for age 
and education did not reveal any significant differences between the groups (p > .05);
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similarly a chi square test did not reveal a gender difference between the groups, % (2) = 
0.1 l ,p  > .05. Likewise, a repeated measures t-test did not reveal significant differences in 
subjective ratings between the High and Low Performer groups in any block of either 
Phase 1 or 2 (all p  > .05). Based on the clear differences in contingency-shift 
performance for the High Performers and Low Performers, these two groups were used in 
subsequent analyses of contingency-shift performance.
To further explore differences in deck selections between the two groups over the 
three shift periods, a mixed factor 3 (shift period) x 4 (deck) x 2 (group) analysis was 
conducted. Of most interest was a significant three-way interaction between group, shift 
period and deck, F(6, 378) = 12.63 ,p <  .0001. Figure 11 shows the pattern of deck 
selection for the two groups in each shift period. The two groups appear to display more 
differentiated selection of decks in shift periods 2 and 3, relative to shift period 1. Simple 
interactions indicated that there was no significant deck by group interaction in shift 
period 1, F(3, 189) = 2.13,p  = .098, however there were significant deck by group 
interactions for shift period 2, F(3, 189) = 17.98,/? < .0001, and shift period 3, F(3, 189)
= 17.21,/? <.0001.
To further explore deck selection differences within each shift period, Bonferroni- 
adjusted pairwise comparisons (using a threshold p  value of .004) were made across the 
two groups for each individual deck across each shift period. These showed that there 
were no significant differences between the groups in all deck selections in the first shift 
period (all p  > .05) or in deck C in shift period 3 (/? = .041), while there were significant 
differences across all other deck selections in shift periods 2 and 3 (all p < .001). Despite 
the lack of difference in deck selection in shift period 1, Figure 11 indicates that good
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performers tend to pick more from the deck that has remained ‘good’ from the normal 
phase of the task in the first shift period (Deck D), whereas there were clearly no 
differences between the groups for the deck that shifted from ‘bad’ to ‘good’ (Deck A). 
These findings also highlight that individual differences in shift ability are more apparent 
after the first shift period, and further show that differences in performance are relatively 
stable after the first shift period. The significant deck by group interactions in shift 
periods 2 and 3 shown in Figure 11 clearly highlight the differential response patterns 
across the groups that lead to good and poor contingency-shift performance. The poor 
performers in shift period 2 are characterised by increased responding to the deck that has 
changed from ‘good’ to ‘bad’ for that shift period (Deck D) relative to the deck that has 
stayed bad from shift period 1 (Deck C). This implies that poor performance is 
characterised by poor shift ability and/or a combination of response perseveration based 
on lack of sensitivity to negative feedback. This distinction across ‘bad’ decks disappears 
for the poor performers in shift period 3, however, as there are no significant differences 
in their selections from both ‘bad’ decks in this shift period (p > .05).
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Figure 11: Mean number of deck selections for the High and Low Performers across each 
of the three contingency-shift periods in Phase 2.
Index o f  Flexible Learning
As shown in Table 2, each contingency-shift period comprised two decks 
changing contingencies (from ‘bad’ to ‘good’, and vice versa) and two of the decks 
having the same contingency as the previous shift period. In order to examine differences
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in performance as a function of absolute and progressive contingency-shifts an index of 
flexible contingency-shift learning for each deck was calculated. This index o f flexible 
learning was calculated by dividing the cumulative number of selections of each deck by 
the total number of trials that the deck had a particular contingency immediately after a 
contingency shift. For example, in the first block of 20 trials in shift period 1, the number 
of selections of Deck A would be divided by 20 as this is the cumulative number of trials 
that this deck has been ‘good’ (i.e., it has changed from being ‘bad’ in the original phase 
of the IGT, to ‘good’ in the first shift block). In the same block of trials, the cumulative 
selections of Deck B would be divided by 120, as the contingency of this deck has not 
changed from the original phase of the IGT. The index of flexible learning thus provides 
a measure of deck selection weighted by the number of trials that a deck has had ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’ contingencies in effect. The weighted scores can range from 0 (no selection in 
any trials from that particular block) to 1 (deck selected on all trials with the same 
contingency).
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Figure 12: Weighted proportion (index of flexible learning) of deck selections for the 
high and low performing groups across each of the decks during Phase 1 and Phase 2.
Figure 12 shows the index of flexible learning for the high and low performing 
groups. A mixed factor 6 (block) x 4 (deck) x 2 (group) analysis showed a significant 
three way interaction, -F(15, 1410) = 21.33,p  < .0001. Figure 12 shows distinct patterns 
of weighted deck selections for each of the groups across the six blocks of trials. It is 
noticeable that differences in deck selections across the two groups are more substantial 
in the latter four blocks of trials, as noted earlier. Focusing on the Low Performers group, 
there is a differentiation across decks in terms of their disadvantageous selections. With 
Deck A, this group selected this deck relatively infrequently when the deck was ‘good’ in 
the first four blocks of trials, yet responded significantly more frequently when the deck
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shifted to ‘bad’ in the final two blocks, 7 (^1, 44) = 12.87, p = .001. With Deck B, there 
was a relatively undifferentiated pattern of responding across all blocks, with no 
significant differences in weighted deck selection across all blocks. With Deck C, there 
was a steadily declining rate of weighted deck selection across the six blocks. There was 
no significant increase or decrease in selection when this deck shifted to good in the final 
two blocks of the task. Finally, with Deck D, the Low Performers group had a similar 
pattern of weighted deck selection to the group that performed well in the first two blocks 
of trials. However, while they decreased their selections significantly from block 2 to 
block 3, F (l, 44) = 25.22,p  < .0001, when this deck turned ‘bad’, they subsequently 
increased selections from this deck from block 3 to 4, F (l, 44) = 22.83,p <  .0001, and 
maintained a relatively high rate of disadvantageous selections for the remaining blocks.
Discussion
The present findings offer novel insights into the question of flexible emotion- 
based learning on the contingency-shifting variant IGT, carried out with a sufficiently 
large sample size so that a range of possible relationships between important variables 
could be investigated. Participants showed comparable levels of learning to previous 
studies during Phase 1 (e.g., Bowman & Turnbull, 2004; Turnbull et al., 2006). Similarly, 
as in the previous study, the onset of the first contingency modification in Phase 2 
initially disrupted learning but soon recovered to earlier levels. The two subsequent shift 
periods resulted in similar decrements in learning. Overall, these findings replicate and 
extend those of Turnbull et al. (2006), but with a larger cohort of healthy participants, 
using an automated procedure in which the shift periods were unsignalled.
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This is the first time that a study has had sufficient sample size to investigate the 
key issue of variability in IGT performance with healthy participants, a concern that has 
been raised previously in relation to this literature (Dunn et al., 2006, pp. 251-252; 
Glicksohn et al., 2007). In this study, a number of analyses were performed to better 
understand the ways in which important themes co-vary, and influence flexible decision­
making. It is noticeable that there were substantial individual differences in performance 
on the contingency-shift phase, even with non-clinical participants. A relatively large 
number of participants who had clearly learned the reinforcement contingencies in the 
first IGT phase performed poorly in the contingency-shift phase of the task. This suggests 
that the task is robust to individual differences in performance, and thus may be useful in 
a range of clinical and non-clinical settings.
Focusing only on participants who had a mean net score equal to or greater than 
10 in the original IGT phase, participants were further divided into groups of High and 
Low Performers, based on their performance during the contingency-shifting phase. 
Analysis of the contingency-shift phase with these two groups of participants highlighted 
distinct patterns of deck selection across the contingency-shift periods. The results 
indicated that responses were more differentiated in the latter periods of the contingency- 
shift phase, relative to the first shift period. In addition, low performers tended to 
incorrectly choose decks that had shifted in reinforcement contingency, rather than 
simply choose decks that were ‘bad’ in the standard phase. This would suggest the task is 
sufficiently sensitive to measure reversal learning processes through an inability to shift 
reinforcement contingency as indicated by the patterns of response perseveration shown 
by Low Performers (Fellows & Farah, 2005).
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Given that the contingency-shifting variant IGT meets the necessary requirements 
for classification as a measure of reversal learning (i.e., systematic and repeated reversal 
of reinforcement contingencies), the finding of Experiment 2 do not appear to support the 
claim of Fellows and Farah (2003, 2005) that reversal-learning ability is implicated 
primarily during the initial IGT trial blocks. The regression model showed that 
performance during the third block of twenty-trials (i.e., more than halfway through the 
task) in Phase 1 only partially accounted for shift performance in Phase 2. This 
notwithstanding, it is perhaps difficult to directly compare across studies because Fellows 
and Farah’s claim rests on findings obtained with the shuffled variant IGT, in which the 
losses associated with each deck were moved to earlier in the first block of trials, and 
improvements in performance were measured by comparison with performance on the 
standard IGT and a separate reversal-learning task. Also, it is noteworthy that in the 
Fellows and Farah (2003) study, carry-over effects cannot be ruled out as tasks were 
administered in a fixed order and correlations were not conducted between overall, 
aggregate performance on the reversal learning task and the two versions of the IGT. 
Indeed, only “degree of improvement” (Fellows & Farah, 2005, p. 61) was estimated 
based on performance in the second IGT task (the shuffled variant IGT). Nevertheless, 
while further research is needed to determine the precise role, if any, played by reversal 
learning in the original IGT, the present findings suggest that the contingency-shifting 
variant IGT holds considerable promise as a means of investigating reversal learning.
The present study extended the analysis of subjective experience to the 
contingency-shifting variant IGT, and reveals greater roles for subjective awareness than 
might previously have been anticipated (Bechara et al., 1997, 2000a). The subjective
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experience ratings of the relative ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ of the decks were initially 
quite low (although still above-chance) during Phase 1, but by the second block of trials 
had increased and remained relatively stable. Consistent with previous findings, ratings 
remained higher than IGT performance across all blocks (Bowman et al., 2005; Evans et 
al., 2005), suggesting that all participants, both High Performers and Low Performers, 
had greater awareness of the reward/punishment schedules of the different decks than 
their behavioral performance implied (cf. Bechara et al., 2000a; but see Evans et al.,
2005; Maia and McClelland, 2005). This finding was replicated in Phase 2, with ratings 
progressively falling during the first block of each shift period, and then increasing by the 
second block, although the level at which ratings increased gradually declined during 
each shift period. This suggests that participants may come to rely less and less on 
intuitive/subjective sources of knowledge as they become more familiar with the 
parameters of the task. Indeed, it is likely that explicit cognitive strategies play a role in 
guiding card selections later in the task. Regardless of the precise nature of the 
relationship between cognitive or emotion-based strategies in IGT performance, the 
current findings clearly showed that behavioral IGT performance and subjective 
experience ratings were positively correlated in both phases for all participants (see 
Evans et al., 2005).
The result of Experiment 2 showed a high level of between-subject variability in 
participants’ performance. As outlined in the introductory section, this is not uncommon 
to observe (e.g., Caroselli, Hiscock, Scheibel & Ingram, 2006) and there are several 
factors have been advanced in order to account for this phenomena. The first factor 
concerns the task instructions used. Previous research with the original IGT has shown
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that the type of instructions used can have a systematic effect on learning (e.g., Balodis, 
MacDonald, & Olmstead, 2006; Femie & Tunney, 2005). The abbreviated instructions 
used, which were adapted from Bechara et al. (2000a; see the Appendix 1), may help to 
explain the finding that the mean net scores in Phase 1 were lower than those typically 
reported for previous studies presumably employing full task instructions (e.g., Bowman 
et al., 2005; Femie & Tunney, 2005). Also, the instruction used in Experiment 2 did not 
include mention of the contingency-shifting phases, which may explain the lower 
learning level of the present study compared with that of Turnbull et al. (2006) who 
explicitly instructed their participants about the upcoming shifts. It is important to note, 
however, that a limited number of studies provide copy of the actual instructions given 
prior to the onset of the IGT making comparisons with the present findings somehow 
difficult. An investigation of the effects of task instructions on contingency-shifting IGT 
performance is therefore warranted to test the hypothesis that the “variability in control 
group performance” (Dunn et al., 2006, pp. 251-252) may in fact be a function of 
instructional control.
The second factor concerns the age of the participants, which is known to 
influence IGT performance (e.g., Denburg, Tranel, & Bechara, 2005). The mean age of 
participants in the present study (21.3 years) is almost identical to that of Caroselli et al. 
(2006) (21.7 years) who also used a relatively large sample of university students (n 
= 141) and noted an overall preference for the disadvantageous decks on the original IGT. 
While some studies with older samples have also noted poor performance in some of the 
participants (e.g., Bechara et al., 2001), an important issue for future research is to
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determine to what extent the present findings were due to the relatively young age of the 
sample by extending the contingency-shifting IGT to an older sample.
The final factor to be considered in understanding the control group variability is 
the potential role of sex differences. More than half (54%) of the current sample were 
females, and males tend to outperform females on the original IGT (e.g., Overman, 2004; 
Reavis & Overman, 2001). Thus, it is possible, although unlikely, that the poor 
performance observed in the present study may have been influenced by the already- 
identified gender differences on the IGT since the results of the regression analysis failed 
to find an effect for gender.
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned factors, a possible limitation of Experiment 
2 was the absence of specific measures of executive functions, as well as basic reversal 
learning ability and intelligence. Previous research has shown that IGT performance is 
correlated with intelligence scores (Olson, Hooper, Collins, & Luciana, 2007), but the 
relationship with executive function measures, such as the WCST and the Brixton Test 
(Burgess & Shallice, 1997), remains inconclusive (Brand et al., 2007; Lawrence, 
Wooderson, Mataix-Cols, David, Speckens & Phillips, 2006; Lehto & Elorinne, 2003; 
Turnbull et al., 2006). There are several ways in which these findings map onto issues of 
relevance for experimental and clinical neuropsychology, especially because the 
contingency-shifting variant IGT focuses on the flexibility of emotion-based learning.
The central issue is that tasks which focus on such flexibility are likely to better capture 
the complex and fluctuating nature of real-world experience, and therefore meet the 
external validity claims originally suggested in relation to the original IGT (Bechara et
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al., 1994). As such, the contingency-shift version of the IGT offers potential for both 
experimental and clinical research settings.
Experiment 3
Experiment 2 introduced a contingency shifting variant modification to the 
standard Bechara et al., (1994) IGT. The changing of deck contingencies allowed to test a 
new form of learning reliant on fast adaptation and ability to relate to previous reward 
and punishment schedules.
The IGT has been conceptualized as a learning task in which participants 
progressively modify their behaviour in accordance to the exposure to reward and 
punishment resulting from card selections (Bechara et al., 2000a; Brand et al. 2006). As 
for other learning tasks, the plotting of card selections on the IGT generally produces a 
learning profile showing improvement of performance across the course of the task 
(Dunn et al., 2006). A rising learning pattern is noticeable for the majority of healthy 
participants; dissimilarly VM patients have been showing learning profiles displaying 
little or no improvement across the 100 IGT trials (Bechara et al., 2000b). Bechara et al., 
(1994) reported that the VM patient’s learning impairment is stable over time.
Subsequent re-test with the IGT on VM patients produced similarly “flat” learning 
profiles showing no evidence that any information has been retained form previous 
exposure to the task. It is also appreciable, from the data presented by Bechara et al 
(1994; 2000b), that time elapsed between the first and successive exposures has no 
bearing on the VM patients’ performance. Performance after one month, 24 hours and six
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months from the initial testing equally resulted in a below chance number of 
advantageous deck selections. In other words, the VM patients failed to show a 
significant improvement as a function of repeated testing (Bechara et al., 2000b, p. 299). 
On the contrary, performance of control participants was reported to improve over time, 
although data on the number of advantageous selections were never reported. The use of 
the term “improvement”, as in Bechara et al., (1994, p. 13), would suggest that control 
participants would progress in their learning during subsequent exposure to the task.
The retention of emotion-learnt information in control participants was firstly 
investigated indirectly by Femie & Tunney (2005) in a study aimed at clarifying the 
influence of instruction quality on IGT performance. In this study participants were 
presented twice with the same IGT version after a 48-hours interval. Participants were 
randomly allocated to 4 experimental groups: instructions with hint and facsimile money, 
instmctions without hint and facsimile money, instructions with hint and real money, 
instructions without hint and real money. Although every experimental group improved 
during the second exposure, level of improvement were different; the groups receiving 
the instruction hint were generally better than the groups that did not receive it. Apart 
from showing the influence of instruction quality on IGT, the study had the merit to 
provide the first learning profiles of controls participants after a second exposure to the 
task. These showed how learning during the second occasion started from a positive 
mean net score and that by the end of the task participants almost reached a ceiling effect 
(i.e., selecting only advantageous decks).
Bechara et al. (1994) firstly described how healthy controls without prior 
knowledge of the schedule of reward and punishment would initially sample
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predominantly from high immediate reward decks and progressively shift their preference 
towards the so called advantageous decks (i.e., low immediate reward but low 
punishment resulting in a net money gain). During the course of the game, control 
participants would gradually modify their selections and eventually gain some level of 
awareness of the nature of the decks (Bechara et al., 1997, 2000a; Damasio, 1994). 
Bechara et al. (2000a) have advanced that full awareness of the nature of the decks (i.e., 
the conceptual phase) is only reached in the last block of the task. Independent 
investigations have challenged this claim to the point that subjective awareness has been 
suggested to control, to a large extent, task performance from earlier stages (Bowman et 
al., 2005; Maia & McClelland, 2004). Notably the description of the “conceptual” phase 
as proposed by Bechara et al. (2000a) entails participants to acquire full knowledge of the 
task contingencies. If that would be the case for normal participants, what would be 
expected from the second exposure to the task would be a ceiling effect of performance 
where little or no learning occurs. Interestingly, this is not the case for the second 
exposure as showed by Femie and Tunney (2005) where substantial learning still occurs. 
The fact that more learning occurs during the second IGT exposure is indeed interesting 
and might have different explanations. One aspect recreating the need of learning could 
be the time elapsed between the first and the second exposure and the consequent loss of 
knowledge relative to the deck contingencies. A second explanation can be hypothesized 
in the unreached conceptual phase by some participants so that during the second 
exposure more learning can still occur. A third explanation can be advanced in support to 
the role of somatic markers; that is, if unconscious somatic markers guide to a large 
extent participants’ performance, overt knowledge and memories from the previous
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participation will produce a benefit only at the beginning of the second exposure. 
Although somatic marker stored in the VMPFC can be reactivated quickly via the “as if 
body loop” some degree of interaction with the environment would still be necessary in 
order to elicit some emotional response (Damasio, 1994; Tranel et al., 1999).
It therefore appears important to consider more carefully the role of emotion- 
based learning information retention and how specific component such as subjective 
awareness and implicit emotional biases contribute to the performance. The paradigm of 
successive exposure to the same task as used by Femie and Tunney (2005) could provide 
useful in this respect. In addition to the measure of subjective awareness the following 
investigation wants to explore participants’ ability to retain shifting components as 
assessed by the contingency shifting modification version of the task used in Experiment 
2 .
Method
Participants
Twenty students (8 male, 12 female) from Swansea University participated in 
return for course credits. Their ages ranged between 20 and 26 (mean: 22.6; SD=1.56). 
An independent t-test revealed no significant difference in age between males and 
females; f(l 8)=.227,/?=.823). Mean number of years spent in education was 15.11 
(SD=1.89).
Materials and Procedure
An automated version of the IGT, programmed in Visual Basic® 6.0, was 
employed for this experiment as in Experiment 2. Participants received general 
instructions about the task that were based on Experiment 2 and completed 2
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experimental sessions for a total of 440 IGT trials. Participants were asked to participate 
in an experiment divided into two sessions. During the first session, each participant was 
introduced to the nature of the experiment, played the IGT for the first time and booked 
for a second experimental session. The second experimental session was scheduled 
between a minimum of 48 and a maximum of 60 hours from the previous session (mean 
interval in hours was 52.6; SD=4.8). The purpose of the second experimental session was 
not disclosed and participants were not asked to memorise or pay particular attention to 
any specific information during the first session. Upon arrival at the lab for the second 
experimental session, participants were asked, similarly to the first session, to play a 
computer task. In both sessions the same instructions were presented on the computer 
screen and option for further clarification given.
As for Experiment 2, the IGT version used in Experiment 3 was divided in two 
phases: 100 trials of the standard version of the task (Phase 1) followed by 120 trials of a 
set-shifting variant IGT involving three successive shifts of the reinforcement 
contingencies (Phase 2). Details of Phase 1, Phase 2 and subjective experience ratings are 
described in the Method section of Experiment 2.
Results
Mean net score
Mean net score was calculated for the behavioural IGT performance measure by 
subtracting disadvantageous selections from advantageous selections [(C+D)-(A+B)]. A 
net score above zero is indicative of advantageous selections, while a net score below 
zero implies disadvantageous selections. Figure 13 shows that there was a steady increase
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in learning for all participants over the five blocks of Phase 1 and 2 for the first and the 
second exposure.
Phase 1
A 5 (block) x 2 (time) repeated measure ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 mean net 
score revealed a significant main effect of block F(4,76)=18.04,/?=.0001, a significant 
effect of time F(l, 19)=26.38,/?<.0001, but no interaction F(4,76)=18.04,/?<.0001 (Fig. 
13). Contrast analysis showed significant difference between the scores in block 1 and 2 
and between 4 and 5 for first exposure and between block 1 and 2, 2 and 3 and 4 and 5 
for the second exposure (Table 3).
Phase 2
A 6 (block) x 2 (time) repeated measure ANOVAs conducted on Phase 2 mean 
net scores revealed a significant main effect of block F(5, 95)= 11.19,/?<.0001, a 
significant effect of time F(l, 19)=64.58,/?<.0001, but no significant interaction F(5, 
95)=.26,p=.88 (Fig. 13). Contrast analysis showed significant difference between the 
first contingency shift of the first exposure and in all the contingency shifts of the second 
exposure (Tab. 3).
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20 i
Blocks of 20 Trials
Figure 13: Phase 1 and 2 mean net score and subjective rating for first (T l) and second 
exposure (T2).
Block First exposure net score 
contrast 
df (1,19)
Second exposure net score 
contrast 
df (1,19)
lvs2 F= 4.77 (p=.042) F=7.31 Cp=.014)
2vs3 N/S F= 16.69 p<.0001
3vs4 N/S N/S
4vs5 F= 4.22 (p= 05) F= 5.34 (p=.032)
6vs7 F= 6.01 (/?=.024) F= 11.78 0?=.003)
8vs9 N/S F= 11.76 (p= 003)
lO vsl1 N/S F= 8.69(p=008)
Table 3: Contrast analysis for mean net scores in consecutive blocks of phase 1 and 2.
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Subjective rating
Similar to the mean net score, a mean net subjective rating was calculated by 
subtracting disadvantageous from advantageous ratings [(C+D)-(A+B)]. A net score 
above zero is indicative of awareness regarding good and bad deck, while a net score 
below zero implies poor awareness about the nature of the decks. Figure 13 shows that 
there was a steady increase in awareness throughout the first and the second exposure for 
phase 1 while an improved trend within each shift can be seen in both phase 2.
Phase 1
A 5 (block) x 2 (time) repeated measure ANOVAs conducted on Phase 1 mean 
net subjective rating scores revealed a significant main effect of block, F(4,76)= 87.27 
p<0001, a significant effect of time, F (l, 19)=14.03, /?=.0001, but no significant 
interaction, F(4, 76)= 18.03,/?=.301 (Fig.13). Contrast analysis showed significant 
difference between block 2 and 3, 3 and 4 and 4 and 5 for the first exposure and between 
block 2 and 3 for the second exposure (Tab. 4).
Phase 2
A  6 (block) x 2 (time) repeated measure ANOVAs conducted on Phase 2 mean 
net subjective rating scores revealed a significant main effect of block, F(5, 95)= 4.16, 
/K.0001, a significant effect of time, F (l, 19)=25.8,/?<.0001, but no significant 
interaction, F(5, 95)=.99,/?=.43 (Fig. 13). Contrast analysis showed significant difference 
in the first shift of the first exposure and in the first and in the second shift of the second 
exposure (Table 4).
102
Chapter 3
Block First exposure subjective 
rating contrast 
df (1,19)
Second exposure subjective 
rating contrast 
df (1,19)
lvs2 N/S N/S
2vs3 F= 4.61 O=.045) F= 5.34(p=.032)
3vs4 F= 4.69(p=.043) N/S
4vs5 F= 4.78 (p=.041) N/S
6vs7 F= 12.26 (p= 002) F= 4.26 (p=051)
8vs9 N/S F= 4.34(/?=.05)
lOvsll N/S N/S
Table 4: Contrast analysis of mean net subjective rating scores in consecutive blocks of 
phase 1 and 2.
Improvement in shifting ability
In order to analyse readiness to shift and its relative improvement between the 
first and the second exposure, previously-good-now-bad selections were considered. 
Figure 14 shows the relative improvement in shift ability from the first to the second 
exposure to the task. Repeated measure t-tests revealed significant differences in the 
number of previously-good-now-bad selections between the first and second exposure in 
the first, t(19)=6.34,/?<.0001, second, t(19)=4.23,p<.0001, and third, t(19)=8.05, 
/?<.0001, shift.
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Shift 1 Shift 2 Shift 3
Figure 14: Mean number of selection from the previously-good-now-bad decks in the 
three contingency shifts during the first (T l) and the second (T2) exposure.
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 3 was to test retention of learning rates between 
subsequent exposures to the IGT. Participants showed significant improvement in 
advantageous card selections across the initial exposure to the task. Subsequent exposure, 
after a time interval, showed a degree of learning retention from the initial testing and a 
continuation o f the learning trend. That is the number of advantageous cards per block 
continues to improve, even if starting form a positive mean net score. In both sessions, 
the onset of the contingency shifting modification initially disrupted learning rates that 
gradually recover during the course of Phase 2. Analysis conducted on the contingency 
shifting modification showed that during the second exposure participants selected
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significantly less from decks that were previously good now bad displaying an enhanced 
shifting ability improved by practice.
The issue of practice in neuropsychological testing has for long been discussed as 
an aspect that can account for improvement in performance across subsequent exposures 
(McCaffrey, Ortega & Haase, 1993). The practice effect (i.e. improvement in 
performance due subsequent exposure to the same task) is particularly important to 
account for measures that need to be taken at different point in time to assess the 
effectiveness of interventions (Beglinger et al., 2005) or the long term impact of training 
(McCaffrey, Ortega, Orsillo, Nelles & Haase, 1992). The ability to make decision, as 
measured by the IGT, has traditionally been measured as a present/absent function (e.g. 
impaired/unimpaired) (Bechara et al., 1999). The limited number of studies conducted on 
subsequent exposure suggests that VM patients present a stable deficit in IGT 
performance regardless of the number of exposures whether putatively healthy 
participants present a degree of improvement between the first and the second 
performance (Bechara et al., 1994). Where the complete absence of learning from 
previous experience in VM patients suggests that there is no effect of practice, the result 
of Experiment 3 suggests that this is not the case for control participants. The high initial 
mean net score displayed in Experiment 3 showed a noticeable level of procedural 
retention whereby no re-acclimatisation to the task is needed and participants start the 
second IGT testing from the learning level achieved at the end of the first session.
The high level of performance seen in the fist block of the second exposure may 
provide partial support to Bechara et al.’s (2000a, 2000b) claim that by the end of the 
standard IGT participants have reached some awareness of the task contingencies. This is
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consistent, for the first exposure, with the observed levels of subjective awareness that 
present a similar pattern to the mean net score. Dissimilarly during the second exposure 
pattern of subjective ratings and mean net score start to diverge, with the mean net scores 
showing much higher values and steeper learning across blocks. This difference may 
suggest that even if the good and bad decks are mostly rated according to their actual 
reward and punishing schedule there is still some degree of ambiguity about the real 
valence of the decks. This is particularly interesting in light of the behavioural 
performance that shows a clear pattern of selection for the advantageous decks. 
Speculatively and according to Damasio (1994), it can be argued that if the behavioural 
selections have higher mean net score than the subjective rating, participants may still 
benefit from the emotional signal to achieve a higher level of performance. Another 
possible explanation to the lower level of subjective experience in the second 
presentation is the type of instructions given in the current experiment that did not 
contain the hint sentence, as identified by Femie and Tunney (2005). Less detailed 
instmctions might not provide enough explicit knowledge so that improvement in the 
level of awareness is more difficult even after subsequent exposure. Participants also did 
not know if  the task presented was the equal to the one they were presented in the first 
session. A final possible explanation for the lower levels of subjective awareness showed 
during the second exposure is the fact that the current experimental procedure used 
randomised allocation for decks. Therefore in the second testing occasion decks of cards 
may have had a different label and positioning on the screen with a potentially confusing 
effect on subjective rating.
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Experiment 3 constitutes the first attempt to study the role of past experience in 
flexible emotion-based learning. Throughout two exposures to the contingency shift 
variant IGT the current experiment demonstrate that emotion-based learning components 
can be improved. Participants that have played the IGT once demonstrate, during the 
second exposure to the task, much higher behavioural and subjective awareness scores. 
The improved levels of performance seen across subsequent exposures suggest that the 
IGT performance is affected by practice effect. As a consequence, a possible 
generalisation of these findings is that subsequent exposure to situation requiring EBL 
maximise the occurrence of adaptive behaviour. Bechara et al. (2000a) has shown that 
this improvement is not observed in people with VM damage, demonstrating that some 
cortical areas are responsible for EBL. It remains unclear whether the initial 
disadvantageous performance, as seen for some of the healthy participants in Experiment 
2, can improve after successive exposure to the task and how this improvement would 
relate to the neuroanatomical substrates.
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Chapter 4
Psychophysiological correlates o f  flexible emotion-based learning
In Chapter 3, a novel contingency shifting variant IGT, originally developed by 
Turnbull et al (2006), was adapted for an automated formant and extensively validated 
with a large sample of healthy controls. The findings make a novel contribution to the 
research literature and offer further insights into the nature of control group variability. 
Within the literature, one of the leading theoretical accounts, the SMH, postulates a key 
role for autonomic signals or markers in governing emotional decision-making (Bechara, 
2004). While there are several demonstrations of the autonomic correlates of the original 
IGT performance there are, as yet, no published studies conducted with the contingency 
shifting variant IGT. The objective, therefore, of Chapter 4 was to undertake the first 
investigation of the autonomic correlates of performance on the contingency shifting 
IGT.
Emotions can be considered as a collection of responses including subjective 
experience, behavioural expression and physiological activation (Hot, Saito, Mandai, 
Kobayashi & Sequeira, 2006). Theories aimed at predicting emotional influence on 
behaviour should therefore employ an array of measures in order to capture the 
complexity of the phenomena. Physiological correlates, and in particular the skin 
conductance response (SCR), have long been used as physiological markers of emotional 
activation (Bradley & Lang, 2002).
Skin conductance responses (SCRs), also known as galvanic skin responses, can 
be defined as transient modification of homeostatic levels of the skin’s sweat gland 
activity (Bouscein, 1992; Critchley, 2002; Dawson, Schell & Filion, 2000; Venables &
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Christie, 1980). Conceptually, variations in sweat production are linked to the activity of 
the parasympathetic nervous system. The sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous 
systems regulate peripheral or bodily reactions to the organism stimulation (Damasio, 
1999). The sympathetic system primarily facilitates motor action as a consequence of 
stimulation; for instance, the fight reaction in a threatening situation. The 
parasympathetic system regulates more “vegetative” functions. Arousal in these two 
systems is generally referred with the term of autonomic arousal and describes 
modification in hart rate, body temperature, blood pressure, gut motility and skin sweat 
(Critchley, 2002). Increased activity of vegetative functions is commonly referred to as 
autonomic arousal and such arousal is particularly characteristic of specific stereotyped 
behavioural repertoires (e.g., fight and flight responses; Critchley, 2002). Beside 
thermoregulation, smell and mechanical friction, sweat gland activity, alongside other 
autonomic reactions (i.e., piloerection, increased hart rate), serve as a sign of emotional 
expression (Darwin, 1998). In humans, the interplay between subjective and autonomic 
bodily feeling has long been thought to influence the individual experience of emotion 
(Damasio, 1994, 1999; James, 1894)
Although evidence for emotional activation is often recorded via bodily arousal, 
the trigger to the measured somatic state is mediated via the brain (Critchley, 2005; Phan, 
Wager, Taylor & Liberzon, 2004; Price, 1999). The exact nature of the specific 
contributions of cortical and sub-cortical structures in mediating various somatic states is, 
however, still largely unclear (Anders, Lotze, Erb, Grodd & Birbaumer, 2004; Critchley, 
2002; Critchley, Elliott, Mathias & Dolan, 2000). One of the first studies that investigated 
the neural contribution to somatic states was conducted by Tranel and Damasio (1994). In
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this study, the SCRs of 36 patients with well-characterized lesions in various regions of 
the cerebral hemispheres were recorded while they viewed emotional materials (e.g., 
pictures of nudes and mutilated bodies). Result showed that several lesion loci were 
associated with defective electrodermal responding: the ventromedial frontal region, the 
right inferior parietal region and the anterior cingulate gyrus. Tranel and Damasio found a 
crucial role of the amygdala in mediating the development of SCRs, further confirming 
outcomes from fear conditioning studies in lesioned monkeys (Aggleton, 1992; Zola- 
Morgan, Squire, Alvarez-Royo & Clower, 1991) and aversive Pavlovian conditioning 
studies (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, Adolphs, Rockland & Damasio, 1995; LaBar, 
LeDoux, Spencer & Phelps, 1995; LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, & Phelps, 1998).
Following Tranel and Damasio’s (1994) observation of emotional deficits in VM 
patients, Bechara et al. (1994) conducted the first study using the IGT and measuring 
SCRs. In this study, SCRs were recorded prior (i.e., anticipatory) and after (i.e., 
appraisal) every card selection in a group of healthy controls and in VM patients. Results 
showed how VM patients, compared to healthy controls, failed to develop anticipatory 
SCRs prior to risky selections (i.e., those involving punishment).
In a further study, Bechara et al. (1999) measured SCRs associated with the IGT 
performance in a group of patients with amygdala lesions, a group presenting VMPFC 
lesions and in healthy control participants. Findings pointed at the importance of the 
amygdala as the eliciting structure for SCRs; amygdala damaged patients were unable, in 
fact, to produce any SCRs once exposed to the task. On the contrary, VMPFC patients 
did produce appraisal SCRs but failed to develop anticipatory responses to 
disadvantageous selections compared to controls. Taken together, the results of these
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studies advance the role of the amygdala as a structure responsible for producing the 
somatic activation (i.e., the feeling of emotion) but suggest the VMPFC as the delegate 
structure to process this signal effectively in order to reach an advantageous decision­
making strategy. Further studies measuring SCRs were undertaken to substantiate the role 
o f the amygdala, as the eliciting structure, and VMPFC, as the processing structure for 
the somatic marker signals (Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Campbell, Stout, & Finn 2004; 
Fishbein, Eldreth, Hyde, Matochik, London, Contoreggi, et al., 2005; Kleeberg, 
Bruggimann, Annoni, van Melle, Bogousslavsky & Schluep, 2004). These SCR studies 
increasingly support the role of somatic signals in predicting advantageous performance 
in the IGT. In particular, the increase in anticipatory SCRs displayed by healthy 
participants in the first part of the IGT prior to disadvantageous selections is considered 
to be the crucial biasing signal to decision-making (Bechara et al., 2002).
The formulation of the SMH stimulated a number of studies largely employing 
similar paradigms (Bechara et al., 1996; Bechara & Damasio, 2002). Interestingly, 
empirical data produced in support of the SMH were mainly gathered using behavioural 
paradigms, such as the IGT (Dunn et al., 2006). The proponents of the SMH claim that 
the IGT can be reliably used in the assessment of emotion-based learning because a 
number of studies have consistently demonstrated a relationship between impaired 
performance on the task and lack of anticipatory SCRs in people with VMPFC brain 
damage (Bechara et al., 1996; 2000a; Bechara & Damasio, 2002; Tranel et al., 1999). 
While the study of VMPFC patients’ autonomic activity was the primary focus in the 
initial years after the formulation of the SMH, recently a number of studies have 
investigated the SCR correlates of IGT performance with healthy participants (e.g., Crone
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et al., 2004a; Suzuki et al., 2003). The value of studying IGT physiological activation in 
control participants rests on the variability often noted in performance and on the fact that 
reliable normative data of either behavioural or autonomic performance are missing 
(Dunn et al., 2006). In fact, as noted by Bechara et al. (2002), not all the control 
participants learn to select from the advantageous decks over time. It was found that as 
many as the 20% of control participants showed a behavioural performance similar to the 
VMPFC patients. Underperforming controls showed great variability and unclear 
evidence of anticipatory SCR arousal before selecting the disadvantageous decks. In 
explaining these findings, Bechara et al. (2002) speculatively concluded that those who 
underperform on the IGT override the emotional signals evoked during the task with 
conscious, effortful processing.
In recent years, increasing research attention has been paid to determining the 
autonomic correlates of control group performance on the IGT. Tomb and co-authors
(2002) were the first to conduct a study solely with healthy participants. In this study, two 
groups of participants took part in two experimental conditions. The first experimental 
condition recorded SCRs during the Bechara et al., (1998) version of the IGT, while the 
second experimental condition recorded SCRs during an altered schedule version of the 
IGT. In the altered IGT version, the card outcomes were changed so that good decks were 
associated with a higher overall magnitude of punishment and reward than bad decks.
This change was made in order to clarify the effect of magnitude of reward and 
punishment (i.e., money at stake for each card choice) on autonomic activation. In 
particular the authors wanted to test the hypothesis that the amount of money involved in 
the selection would affect SCRs levels more that the value of the decks. Results indicated
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that autonomic activation prior to each card selection was driven by the magnitude of the 
immediate anticipated reward and not by the long-term consequences, as stated by the 
SMH. In other words, according to Tomb et al. (2002), SCR correlates of IGT 
performance are dependent on the relative expected magnitude of reward and 
punishment. Damasio, Bechara and Damasio (2002) suggested that the modification of 
the task made by Tomb et al., (2002) might have inverted the somatic marker signal. 
According to the SMH, in fact, autonomic arousal precedes both decisions with a 
prospective positive or negative outcome; under conditions of conflict and uncertainty 
somatic markers help reject or endorse an option or action (Damasio et al., 2002).
Another recent study by Suzuki et al., (2003) recorded SCRs prior to (i.e., 
anticipatory) and after (i.e., appraisal) each selection, analyzed trials with and without 
punishment and considered the effect of selection in early and late stages of the task. The 
procedure used for this study closely resembles the computerized task used by Bechara et 
al., (1999) although some modifications were adopted. The most substantial 
modifications were the shortening of the task to 80 trials (this was justified by the fact 
that, generally, control participants achieve a stable performance by the 80th trial) and a 
verbal response instead of a key press. Findings showed larger magnitude appraisal 
SCRs following disadvantageous selections from both advantageous and disadvantageous 
decks followed by punishment. This latter finding confirms that the SCR emotional 
response is sensitive to negative values (Fowles, 1980). Furthermore, Suzuki et al. (2003) 
found an inverse correlation between appraisal SCRs in early trials and disadvantageous 
selections in late trials, suggesting the importance of appraisal activity in advantageous 
performance. Findings were less clear for anticipatory responses. The authors found, in
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line with Bechara et al., (1999; 1996), higher anticipatory SCR values for 
disadvantageous selections but failed to find evidence for the temporal pattern described 
by the SMH; where anticipatory SCRs for disadvantageous decks gradually develops 
after the first few trials with punishment. The lack of clear findings in relation to 
anticipatory responses extends to the fact that no relationship was found between 
anticipatory activation prior to selections from the disadvantageous decks and IGT 
performance, suggesting relative independence between the two aspects.
Finally, a study by Crone et al. (2004a) investigated SCR and heart rate correlates 
of controls participants’ performance on another modified version of the IGT. The task 
was originally modified to conduct research with children (Crone et al., 2005). 
Modifications involved changes to the visual presentation (i.e., help a hungry donkey to 
collect apples) and to the reward type (i.e., food for the donkey). For the analysis, 
participants were divided according to their behavioural performance into three groups: 
poor, moderate and good performers. The mean numbers of advantageous selections per 
groups were 35 for the poor group, 48 for the moderate group and 58 for the good group. 
Results showed a slowing of the anticipatory heart rate measure and greater anticipatory 
SCRs before disadvantageous relative to advantageous choices, but only for good 
performers. In contrast, all of the groups equally showed decreased heart rate and 
increased levels of SCRs following loss relative to reward outcomes. The authors 
interpreted the findings suggesting that decision-making impairment is dependent upon a 
weak anticipatory activation to risky stimuli rather than an appraisal response to reward 
and punishment.
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These reviewed studies conducted with control participants have shown that 
anticipatory activation prior to disadvantageous deck selections correlates with an overall 
good decision-making strategy. Although this appears to be a common finding, the 
question of variability in control participants’ performance seems to have unclear and 
unexplained physiological correlates (Crone at al., 2004a). The temporal pattern of SCR 
development is poorly described (Suzuki et al., 2003) and it is not clear whether the 
magnitude of reward and punishment equally affects the somatic markers (Tomb et al., 
2002).
The issue of subjective awareness also appears relevant to investigation of SCR 
correlates of IGT performance, particularly as the SMH places great emphasis on the 
suggested preconscious nature of the somatic biasing signal. Not surprisingly, the 
creators of the task remark that the IGT schedule is opaque to probabilistic reasoning and 
that participants’ performance is largely dependent on emotional bias (Damasio et al., 
2003). As outlined in Chapter 1, this claim has been challenged by several authors 
suggesting that participants are more aware of the nature of the cards schedule than 
suggested by the Damasio and co-workers (Bowman et al., 2005; Maia & McClelland, 
2004; 2005; Turnbull et al., 2003). Until now, only one study has investigated 
participants’ awareness of the task contingencies in conjunction with autonomic 
correlates of the IGT (Bechara et al., 1997). In this study, participant’s awareness of the 
contingencies of the decks employed in the task was assessed through a verbal question 
(i.e., “Tell me all you know about what is going on in this game") asked every 20 
selections. On the basis of the responses given to the question, the authors concluded that 
advantageous performance was driven by anticipatory activation prior to bad deck
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selections in a phase where participants were not aware of the nature of the decks. This 
led Bechara and co-workers (1997) to hypothesise that somatic markers help decision­
making before individuals become aware of the contingencies.
Taken together, the studies reviewed point to the relevance of emotional 
activation, as measured by SCRs, in guiding IGT performance. Issues such as the 
variability in participants’ autonomic performance, the role of appraisal SCRs, the 
relation between autonomic activity and awareness of task contingencies, and the time- 
course development of SCRs on trials with and without punishment are therefore 
essential to a further understanding of the factors that influence advantageous decision­
making. In addition, identifying the autonomic correlates of performance on the 
contingency shifting modified IGT can initiate debate on the role of somatic markers in a 
flexible environment. No prior research to date has explored the role of autonomic 
activation and its relevance to decision-making performance in a modifying environment. 
According to the predictions of the SMH, adaptation to fast changing contingencies 
would require a quick modification of the autonomic arousal, especially the appraisal 
arousal, in order to successfully guide behaviour. Alternatively, it is possible that other 
behaviour during the contingency shifting phase may be guided by other autonomic 
responses dependent on outcomes (i.e., appraisal response).
Experiment 4, therefore, sought to investigate the autonomic correlates of healthy 
participant’s performance on the contingency-shift variant IGT.
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Experiment 4 
Method
Participants
Twenty-five participants were recruited from Swansea University’s student 
population. Participants were reimbursed for their time with £10 at the end of the 
experiment. Fifteen females and 10 males took part in this experiment; average age was 
22.04 (SD=3.142) and mean number of years spent in education was 15.64 (SD=1.57). 
Independent t-tests did not reveal any significant differences between genders for age and 
education. Participants were self-assessed for traumatic brain injury history, mental 
health issue and drug abuse problems. One participant failed to produce psychological 
data due to a technical problem with the power supply; only behavioural data were 
acquired and used for the analysis.
Procedure
Upon arrival in the laboratory, participants were invited to read and sign the 
consent form. Once consent was obtained, participants were asked to sit in front of a 
computer screen and adjust the chair to a comfortable position. The computer mouse was 
placed on the side of the dominant hand (e.g., on the left side for left-handed) and two 
fingers of the non-dominant hand were used to record physiological activity. The non­
dominant hand rested on a pillow to maximise comfort and minimise movement during 
the experiment. Two electrodes were attached to the volar surface of the distal phalanges 
of the index and the middle finger. Participants’ electrodermal activity was then 
monitored for five minutes in order to establish the level of baseline conductivity.
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Participants were than left in the laboratory to complete the task and were watched by the 
experimenter via CCTV. Instructions, as presented on the computer screen, are presented 
in Appendix 1. At the end of the experiment participants were debriefed and paid. 
Apparatus
The IGT contingency shift version used for this investigation was adapted from 
the procedure used in Experiment 2; details of the adaptations are reported below. 
Electrodermal activity was acquired via an ADI Instruments ML116 GSR Amp® 
interfaced with a 2/25 PowerLab® unit. SCR was recorder through the use of two dry, 
bright plated bipolar electrodes with velcro straps. Electrical conductance values, the 
measure of how easy electricity flows along a certain path, were displayed in 
Microsiemens (pS). Chart® software was used to visualize and extract the data. 
Electrodermal activity recording
Following a 5-minute baseline SCR assessment phase, SCRs were measured 
throughout the task without interruption. Two breaks, one after 80 and the other after 160 
trials, were scheduled. A Visual Basic® interface provided markers for anticipatory and 
appraisal SCRs on a parallel channel to the SCR responses so that trial by trial 
physiological responses could be matched.
In order to record SCRs, the contingency shift IGT as used in Experiment 2 was 
modified to enforce delay periods between trials. Similar to the procedure employed by 
Suzuki et al. (2003), each card choice was preceded by a 10-s time period in order to 
record anticipatory responses. During the anticipatory onset time period, participants 
were presented with the four decks of card and the message “please consider your 
choice”. The current money earned balance was also presented at the bottom right of the
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screen. After the enforced 10-s anticipatory interval had elapsed the mouse pointer 
appeared on the screen together with the message “please make your choice”. During the 
selection period, participants were not under any time constraint and left free to make 
their choice. As soon as each choice was made the outcome message (e.g., you won 
£100) appeared on the screen for 10 s. Display of this outcome message re-presented the 
appraisal interval. Next, a 6-s inter-trial interval was presented and, following that, the 
next trial began (see Figure 15).
Trial
Inter-Trial Interval
--------------------------------
Anticipatory
Card choice
Appraisal
- -W
Inter-Trial Interval
6 -s 10-s Undefined 10-s 6 -s
Figure 15: Shows the time course of the phases within each trial and their length, during 
Experiment 4.
SCR analysis
Data collected were extracted with Chart® for windows version 5.0 (ADI 
instruments). Individual data were log transformed before analysis. Logarithmic 
transformation was used to stabilise the variance of the sample (Blad, 2000). As in 
Suzuki et al., (2003), anticipatory SCRs were defined as the amplitude of the largest 
SCRs in pS having onset during the 10-s anticipatory interval. Similarly, appraisal SCRs 
were defined as the amplitude of the largest SCRs in pS having onset during the 10-s 
interval following the card choice.
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The method of data extraction employed here is slightly different for the one used 
by Bechara et al (1999; 2002). They, in fact, considered the anticipatory response as the 
airea under the curve in a variable interval and divide it by the interval length, in seconds, 
to obtain the mean SCR magnitude. The methodology used by Suzuki and colleagues
(2003) and in this experiment allows for identification of a given oscillation in a standard 
recording interval, rather than an activation occurring in variable time frame to be divided 
by time. By using the maximum amplitude, intended as the maximum value within the 
interval, the experimental design and data extraction process can follow a fixed rule that 
is not dependent on the quality of each response. This standard process can be therefore 
automated and easily replicated.
Results
Mean net score
The mean net score for each block was calculated by subtracting disadvantageous 
selections from advantageous selections [(C+D)-(A-B)]. As for previous experiments 
reported in this thesis, a net score above zero indicates advantageous selections, while a 
net score below zero entails disadvantageous performance.
Figure 16 shows the mean net score for Phase 1 and Phase 2. A repeated measures 
ANOVA performed on the 5 blocks on the net score values showed a significant learning 
pattern across block, F (1,96)=20.683,/?<.001. Contrast analysis showed a significant 
improvement in performance between blocks 1 and 2, F(l,24)=14.31,/?<.0001. A 
repeated measures t-test performed on the three shifts did not show any significant 
learning pattern within each shift. By considering performance across all of Phase 2, a
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repeated measure ANOVA showed improvement across shifts with values approaching 
significance level, F(5,120)=3.83,/?=.061.
8
6
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Blocks of 20 trials
Figure 16: Mean net score for Phase 1 and 2.
IGT and Subjective Ratings
A mean net subjective rating was calculated by subtracting the ratings of the 
disadvantageous decks from the subjective ratings of the advantageous decks. Figure 17 
shows that there was a large increase in subjective ratings after the first block in Phase 1 
while awareness decreased in the three shifts of Phase 2. A repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that subjective ratings improved across the five trial blocks of Phase 1, F(l, 96) 
=8.98, p  < .0001. Contrast analysis revealed a significant improved performance block 1 
and 2, F(l,24)=17.37,p<.0001. A repeated measures ANOVA performed on Phase 2 did 
not reach statistical significance, F(5,120)=2.89,/>=.10, although contrast analysis
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showed a significant drop in the subjective rating scores between the second and the third 
shift, F (l,24)= l 1.59,p=002.
6 -|
Figure 17: Mean net subjective rating for Phase 1 and 2.
SCR analysis - Deck type
To investigate anticipatory and appraisal SCRs for advantageous and 
disadvantageous decks, A and B selections and C and D selections were grouped for 
every block of 20 selections.
Anticipatory: Phase 1
A within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the first phase of the 
IGT found no main effect of block, F(1.96, 45.07)=1.61, p = 2 \2 , no significant effect of 
deck type, F(l,23)= .17, /?=.68, and no interaction, F(1.96, 45.07)=.048,/?=.995 (see 
figure 18).
- 1
-2
-3
Blocks of 20 trials
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Phase 2
A within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the second phase of
the IGT found no main effect of block, F(2.97, 68.33)=2.57,/?=.062, no effect of deck 
type, F(l,23)=.26,/?.19, and no interaction, F(2.82, 64.88)=. 188,/?=.89 (see figure 18).
Figure 18: Anticipatory SCRs magnitude by blocks (in Phase 1 and 2) grouped by deck 
type (Good and Bad).
Appraisal: Phase 1
A within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 of the IGT 
found main effect of block, F(1.24, 9.95)=3.24,/?=.024, no significant effect of deck type, 
F(l,8)= .023,/?=.88, and no interaction, F(1.25, 10.04)=.244,p=.9l. Contrast analysis 
found significant differences between block 1 and 2, F(l,23)=-2.45,/?=.027, and block 2 
and 3, F(l,23)=-2.08,/?=.50, of the good decks and between block 1 and 2, F(l,23)=- 
2.07,/?=.014, and between block 2 and 3, F(l,23)=-2.15,/?=.044, of the bad decks (see 
figure 19).
Blocks of 20 trials
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Phase 2
A within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the second phase of 
the IGT found no main effect of block, F(3.47, 79.88)=.56, p=.56, no significant effect of 
deck type, F(l,23)= 3.71,p=.083, and no interaction, F(2.6, 59.8)=.774,/?=.44 (see figure 
19).
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Figure 19: Mean appraisal SCRs for good and bad decks in phase 1 and 2.
Punishment and reward analysis
Anticipatory and appraisal arousal SCRs were investigated for trials with and 
without money loss. Punishment trials were defined as those trials where a monetary loss 
occurred, whereas reward trials were defined as those trials where no monetary loss 
occurs. As can be expected from the IGT schedule used in the current experiments, trials 
with punishments are less numerous than the trials without punishment. As participants 
played a fixed schedule and the frequency of trials with punishment is equal in both good 
and bad decks, a ratio between trials with and without punishment can be calculated. The
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ratio between trial with and without punishment in Experiment 4 is 2.33, which means 
that, on average, a trial with punishment would occur every 2.33 selection of cards 
without punishment. This ratio also indicates that trials without punishment were more 
than two times the trials with punishment.
Anticipatory: Phase 1
A within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the first phase of the 
IGT found main effect of block, F(1.57, 36.2)=4.09,/?=.033, no significant effect of 
punishment, F(l,23)= .278,p=.6, and no interaction, F(2.59, 92)=.273,/?=.81 (see figure 
20).
Phase 2
A  within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the second phase of 
the IGT found no main effect of block, F (1.36, 28.53)=1.03,/?=.35, no significant effect 
of punishment F(l,21)= .077,/?=. 74, and no interaction, F(3.64; 76.54)=1.12,/?=.35 (see 
figure 20).
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Figure 20: Anticipatory SCRs for decks with and without punishment in phase 1 and 2. 
Appraisal: Phase 1
A within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the first phase of the 
IGT found no main effect of block, F (1.58,34.92)=3.19,/?=.062, significant effect of 
punishment, F(l,22)= 9.02,/?=.007, but no interaction, F(2.31, 50.98)=.717,/?=.51.
Follow-up paired t-test analysis found significant differences in block 2 between 
Punishment and Non-punishment, /(23)=3.04, p=.006 (see figure 21).
A within-subjects repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the second phase of 
the IGT found no main effect of block, F(1.51, 34.6)= 388,/?=.861, no significant effect 
of punishment, F(l,23)= 3.816,/?=.063, and no interaction, F(5; 115)=1.63, /?=. 157 (see 
figure 21).
Phase 2
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Figure 21: Mean appraisal SCRs for decks with and without punishment in Phase 1 and 
2 .
Learners and non-learners analysis
In order to perform this analysis the original sample was divided into Learners 
and Non-learners. Due to the relatively low performance of the overall group, the criteria 
used in Experiment 2 to define High and Low performers (i.e., High-performers as those 
with a Phase 1 performance equal or above 10) would have compromised the possibility 
to carry out statistical analysis. Therefore, a less stringent classification of Learners and 
Non-leamers was adopted for the sample division. Learners were defined as those 
individuals with an IGT mean net score performance above one, while Non-leamers were 
defined as those participants with a meant net score below -1. Participants with mean net 
score comprised between -1 and 1 were not included in the analysis. It is important to 
note that since Bechara and Damasio’s (2002) original distinction between advantageous 
and disadvantageous performance in control participants, different definitions of what is
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considered advantageous and disadvantageous have been adopted (e.g., Crone et al., 
2004; Davies et al 2007; Glickson et al., 2007) and no one method is preferred over 
another.
Eleven learners and 10 non learners were identified. Three participants had a 
score comprised between -1 and 1 and were excluded from this analysis. As previously, 
behavioural performance and subjective rating were plotted in blocks of 20 trials and 
divided in Phase 1 (5 blocks) and 2 (6 blocks) (see Figure 22).
Behavioural performance
A 5 (block) x 2 (group) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 IGT 
revealed a main effect of groups, F(l,19)=.003,/?<.0001, main effect of blocks, 
F(4,76)=13.21,/?<.001, and significant interaction, F(4,76)=5.29,/?=.001.
A 6 (block) x 2 (group) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on the shift phase of the 
IGT revealed a main effect of groups, F( 1,19)=32.19, /?<.0001, no main effect of blocks, 
F(5,95)= 1.52,/?=. 191, and significant interaction, F(5,95)=3.61,/?=.005.
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Figure 22\ Mean net score for Learners and Non-leamers during Phase 1 and 2
Subjective rating analysis
A 5 (block) x 2 (group) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on the standard IGT 
revealed a main effect of groups, F(l,19)=9.96,/?=.005, main effect of blocks, 
(F(4,76)=7.69,/?<.001, but no significant interaction, F(4,76)=1.68,/7=:.163.
A 6 (block) x 2 (group) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on the shift phase of the 
IGT revealed no main effect of groups, F(l,19)=1.23,/?=.28, main effect of blocks, 
F(2.79,53.06)=4.33,/?=.01, and significant interaction, F(2.79,53.06)=4.36,/>=.009.
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Figure 23: Mean net Subjective Rating for Learners and Non-learners during Phase 1 and 
2
Anticipatory bad decks : Phase 1
A 5 (block) x 2 (group) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on the first phase of 
IGT found main effect of block, F (2.89, 55.4)=2.85,/?=.047, no significant effect of 
group type, F(l,19)= 1.79,/?=.122, and no interaction, F(2.89, 55.4)=.85,p=.49. Follow- 
up independent t-test analysis found significant differences between learners and non- 
leamers for block 2, /,(19)=2.46,/?=.02, and block 3, r(19)=2.70,/?=.017.
Phase 2
A 6 (block) x 2 (group) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on the second phase of 
IGT found no main effect of block, F(3.8, 72.24)=.412,/?:=.79, no significant effect of 
group type, F(l;19)= .\4 2 ,p= .l\ 1, and no interaction, F(3.8, 72.24)=.109, p=.74.
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Figure 24\ Anticipatory SCR for bad decks in Learners and Non learners for Phase 1 and 
2 .
Selections with punishment: Appraisal SCRs (Phase 1)
A 5 (block) x 2 (group) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on the first phase of the 
IGT found main effect of block, F(4,76)=:2.74,/?=.034, no interaction, F(4,76)= .103, 
p=.98, and no significant effect of group type, F(l;19)=.004,/?=.94.
A 6 (block) x 2 (group) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on the first phase of the 
IGT found no main effect of block, F(5,95)=.057,/?=.98, no interaction, F(5,95)= .134, 
p=.964, and no significant effect of group type, F(l,19)=3.47,/?=.076. Follow-up 
independent t-test analysis found no approaching to statistical significant values {p 
comprised between .09 and .06) for clock 6, 7, 8, 9 10 and 11.
Phase 2
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Figure 25: Appraisal SCRs for selection with money loss for Learners and Non-leamers.
Discussion
Experiment 4 investigated SCR correlates of the contingency shifting variant IGT. 
Unlike previous studies, the current experiment did not find different levels of 
anticipatory SCR prior to card selections from the good and bad decks during Phase 1 (cf. 
Bechara et al., 1996; 1999; Crone et al. 2004; Suzuki et al., 2003). During the first five 
blocks, there was no difference in anticipatory SCR levels for good and bad cards and for 
selections with and without punishment. Similarly appraisal SCRs for Phase 1 did not 
differ between good and bad decks and punishment and non-punishment. These findings 
might appear controversial in consideration of the significant learning evidenced from the 
behavioural performance, although it should be noted that the mean score achieved by the 
group at the end of Phase 1 was rather low (i.e., 4). In previous work, Bechara and
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Damasio (2002) only classified participants with a final mean net score of 10 or above as 
advantageous performers. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the similar autonomic 
arousal between bad and good decks may be due to the relatively poor learning 
performance of the group.
As in Phase 1, Phase 2 levels of behavioural performance were quite low if 
compared to Experiment 2 and previously published data (Turnbull et al., 2006). 
Differences in levels of anticipatory and appraisal SCRs for bad and good decks and for 
trials with and without punishment were not found for Phase 2, thus replicating the 
findings of Phase 1. The considerably similar SCR values seen during the 3 contingency 
shift phases may have been influenced by the lengthy duration of the experiment and/or 
the high variability of individual behavioural performance. Indeed, a high degree of 
variance was observed during the analysis (e.g., the homogeneity of variance assumption 
was often not respected and appropriate sphericity correction applied). Steps taken to 
sub-divide the group into Learners and Non-learners were aimed at reducing this 
variance.
As expected, the behavioural performance of Learners and Non-leamers was 
significantly different during Phase 1 and 2. The subjective ratings of the two groups 
were also significantly different, further confirming the influential role of awareness on 
performance (Bowman et al., 2005; Maia & McClelland, 2004). In both groups, 
anticipatory SCRs for bad decks increased across the blocks of Phase 1 providing support 
for the hypothesis of gradual sensitization at first and habituation later to risky selections. 
Although there was a general trend for improvement in anticipatory physiological activity 
for both Learners and Non-leamers, it is important to note how the two patterns differed.
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The difference between Learners and Non-leamers was particularly evident in the second 
and the third blocks of Phase 1 suggesting that high anticipatory SCRs to bad decks are 
helpful only in the early stages of the task. Learners, in fact, appeared to develop 
anticipatory activity more rapidly that Non-leamers. It also needs to be noted that the rise 
in anticipatory levels in Non-leamers during the fourth and fifth blocks did not 
correspond to an improvement in performance. It has previously been argued that the IGT 
might evaluate two distinct types of decision-making processes, namely decision under 
ambiguity and decision under risk (Brand et al., 2007). The findings of Experiment 4 
seem to suggest that anticipatory markers to risky selections are particularly helpful in the 
decision under ambiguity stage rather than in the decision under risk stage. In addition, 
the results seem to suggest that a particular feature of Non-leamers’ performance is the 
later development of anticipatory activation. Previous work has found undifferentiated 
anticipatory activation for good and bad decks in underperforming healthy controls 
(Bechara & Damasio, 2002). The results of Experiment 4 point at the possibility that low 
performance on the IGT might be related to the late development of somatic markers and 
their relative ineffectiveness in influencing the IGT performance. One possible 
explanation to the late inefficacy of anticipatory responses may be found in the reliance 
that participants seem to have on different resources across the task (Brand et al., 2007).
It is possible that in later stages, when exposure to the contingencies has been maximal, 
participants’ decisions are based on less intuitive processes and draw more resources 
from executive functions (Brand et al. 2006; 2007).
Anticipatory differences during Phase 2 were attenuated and the two groups 
appeared to have a similar level of performance. Anticipatory responses for the two
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groups remained high and showed little sign of change both across the three shifts and 
between groups. Again, this may signify that Phase 2 relies less on intuitive mechanisms 
and more on reward sensitivity. To test this hypothesis, appraisal SCR levels for decks 
with punishment were investigated. It was found that Learner and Non-learners had 
comparable performance during Phase 1 but showed a trend approaching significance in 
favour of Learners during Phase 2. However, the framing of findings from Phase 2 is 
slightly more complicated due to the novelty of the contingency shift modification and 
the insufficient number of publications to compare with the present results. The appraisal 
results for trials with punishment seem to suggest that Learners present a higher 
sensitivity to negative outcomes compared to Non-leamers. This finding might also 
suggest, although this is speculative, that performance on Phase 2 correlates with the 
ability to elicit appropriate SCRs following punishment and therefore sensitivity to 
punishment. Previous studies indicate that reward and punishment sensitivity mediate the 
psychophysiological response to wins and losses (Goudriaan et al., 2005; Knyazeva, 
Slobodskayaa & Wilson, 2002; Kilzieh & Cloninger, 1993; Suzuki et al., 2003). Also, it 
has been argued that decision-making and set-shifting ability is dependent on reward 
sensitivity (Blair, Peters & Granger, 2004; Franken, & Muris, 2005; Shur & Tsanadis, 
2007). SCR correlates with appraisal in trials with punishment implies a relative higher 
sensitivity to punishment in Learners compared to Non-leamers and, therefore, might 
suggest sensitivity to punishment as an important factor influencing Phase 2 performance. 
The findings of the Learners group support the SMH, but this is tempered somewhat by 
the fact that roughly half of the sample failed to perform above chance on the IGT. In 
other words, if the anticipatory somatic marker signal occurring early in Phase 1 can be
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claimed as responsible for the Learners good performance, the issue of what impairs the 
Non-leamers somatic markers remains unknown.
Two are the major achievements of Experiment 4. First, the findings confirm that 
Learners and Non-leamers have different psychophysiological correlates of decision­
making. In addition to Crone et al. (2004a), Experiment 4 showed that Non-leamers fail 
to develop adequate anticipatory responses to bad decks in the early stages of the task. 
The study of different psychophysiological levels prior to and following decisions might 
help to understand the reasons behind the variability seen in controls participants’ 
performance during the IGT and cast further light on factors influencing decision­
making. The second major contribution of this study is the exploration of the SCRs 
correlates of the contingency shift phases and the characterization of the punishment 
sensitive nature of advantageous performance.
Nevertheless a number of limitations needs to be considered. First, the length of 
the study was approximately 90 minutes, which may have influenced participants’ level 
of attention and motivation. Second, the limited number of participants might have 
curtailed the strength of some trends that approached significance. Finally, the variability 
in participants’ performance coupled with the high variance normally seen in SCRs data 
is unhelpful for statistical analysis, especially parametric statistical methods. In line with 
previous research measuring SCRs activation during the IGT the choice of parametric 
testing was preferred to non-parametric (Bechara et al. 1994). Due to the sometime non­
normal distribution of the scores significance values were appropriately corrected (i.e. 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction). It is debatable whether the use of non-parametric 
statistic would have proven beneficial for the analysis. As a matter of fact, parametric
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statistic provide a more powerful approach to data analysis but more conservative (Field, 
2000), therefore the approaching significance levels observed in the results presented 
could have been significant with a different analysis strategy. The analysis choice made 
for Experiment 4 was based on previous similar reports with comparable number of 
participants and variance in the attempt to help the comparability o f the findings.
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Chapter 5
Flexible emotion-based learning andpsychopathological traits
Chapters 3 and 4 have evidenced a degree of variability in IGT participants’ 
performance across different experiments. Those participants with low levels of 
performance present a learning profile that has been described as similar to those of VM 
patients (Bechara et al., 2002). Deficits in emotion-based learning are also implicated in 
several psychiatric disorders and appear related to a wide range of symptoms (Pinkham, 
Penn, Perkins, & Lieberman, 2003). Extending the use of the contingency shifting IGT to 
the domain of psychopathology may shed further light on the nature of performance 
impairment in various clinical groups. However, before so doing it may be salutary to 
first investigate performance as a function of sub-clinical characteristics. In Chapter 5 the 
dimensionality of psychopathology approach (Claridge, 1997), as it relates to schizotypal 
and depressive features, was applied to contingency shifting IGT performance.
The findings of clinical research have shown impaired emotional decision-making 
in individuals with several psychiatric disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(Lawrence et al., 2006), substance addiction (Verdejo-Garcia & Bechara, 2009), 
depression (Must et al., 2006) and schizophrenia (Martino et al., 2007). Dysfunction in 
structures such as the VMPFC and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is evident in schizophrenia 
(e.g., Pantelis et al., 2003; Quintana et al., 2003) and, accordingly, patients with 
schizophrenia have been shown to perform more poorly than healthy volunteers on OFC- 
sensitive decision-making tasks (e.g., Hutton, Murphy, Joyce, Rogers, Cuthbert, Barnes 
et al., 2002). The evidence from studies employing the IGT is, however, largely 
inconclusive (Sevy et al., 2007). Some studies (Evans et al., 2005; Ritter et al., 2004)
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have shown that patients with schizophrenia perform at levels comparable to healthy 
participants. Other studies (Lee et al., 2007; Martino et al., 2007; Shurman et al., 2005) 
have shown that patients with schizophrenia engage in disadvantageous decision-making 
compared to healthy controls, which suggests a pronounced impairment in emotion-based 
learning. The interpretation of these inconclusive findings needs to acknowledge the 
contribution of factors such as the relatively small sample sizes, the influence of 
medication, comorbid diagnoses, and the heterogeneity of symptoms within the diagnosis 
o f schizophrenia itself (Dunn et al., 2006; Sevy et al., 2007).
Turnbull et al. (2006) suggested that people with schizophrenia might not show 
consistent deficits on the IGT because the original task does not adequately tap flexibility 
in emotion-based learning. Flexible adjustment to the affective consequences of reward 
and punishment is a defining feature of advantageous performance on the IGT as 
participants initially choose cards from all of the decks before showing, around halfway 
through the task, a choice preference for the advantageous decks (Dunn et al., 2006). The 
inconclusive findings from research with people with schizophrenia suggests that 
measures of emotion-based learning such as the IGT may not be sufficiently sensitive to 
assess the ability of such individuals to modify or regulate these emotion-based 
processes.
The investigation of flexible emotion based components in decision-making has 
relied on the interpretation of set-shifting and reversal learning tasks. A number of studies 
have shown that people with schizophrenia perform relatively poorly on such tasks 
(Pantelis et al., 1999; Waltz & Gold, 2007). These deficits may be the outcome of 
dysfunction in various prefrontal cortex sub-regions including the VMPFC and OFC.
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Recently, Rodriguez-Sanchez et al. (2005) reported that first episode schizophrenia 
patients have unimpaired IGT performance, yet have impaired performance on one of the 
most widely used measures of executive functioning and set shifting ability: the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; see also Prentice, Gold & Buchanan, 2008). These 
authors also found that performance on the IGT was not correlated with WCST 
performance. In another recent study with people with schizophrenia, Lee et al. (2007) 
reported impaired IGT performance, and, similar to Rodriguez-Sanchez et al. (2005), an 
absence of correlations between WCST ability and IGT performance. Lee et al. (2007) 
also found that performance on the Simple Reversal Learning Task (SRLT; Fellows & 
Farah, 2003) was impaired in people with schizophrenia, relative to healthy controls, but 
was not associated with performance on the IGT in either of the groups. Both the 
Rodriguez-Sanchez et al. (2005) and Lee et al. (2007) studies failed to find correlations 
between set-shifting ability, as measured by the WCST, and reversal learning ability, as 
measured with the SRLT, and IGT performance. This suggests that the standard version 
of the IGT employed in these and other studies may not be sufficiently sensitive to assess 
the flexible recruitment of emotion-based resources.
To overcome the lack of tasks assessing flexibility in emotion based learning, 
Turnbull et al. (2006) developed a contingency shifting variant IGT. This task has been 
previously described in the present thesis and research conducted with it in several 
contexts so far. However, it is important to emphasise that Turnbull et al. (2006) first 
applied the contingency shifting IGT to study individuals with schizophrenia in order to 
clarify whether or not this group would display a specific impairment in the part of the 
task that required more flexibility in the adaptation to advantageous contingencies. The
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modified version of the task used by Turnbull et al. (2006) was similar to the task used in 
Experiment 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis. In other words, the reinforcement contingencies of 
the card decks were shifted following initial exposure to the standard IGT trials. Over 
three successive contingency shift periods, card decks that had previously been 
advantageous became disadvantageous, and vice versa. Thus, the contingency-shifting 
variant IGT was designed to tests the ability of participants to flexibly deal with changing 
reinforcement contingencies across a more extended period of time than that allowed by 
the original IGT. As a point of departure from the task used in Turnbull et al. (2006), the 
contingency shifting IGT used in the Experiments 2, 3 and 4 did not signal the onset of 
the shifting phase. In their analyses, Turnbull et al. (2006) compared the performance of a 
group of patients with schizophrenia who were classified as either high or low in positive 
and negative symptomatology with that of a healthy control group. Results showed that 
patients high in positive and negative symptoms initially learned at levels comparable to 
the healthy controls during the standard version of the IGT, supporting some previous 
studies (e.g., Rodriguez-Sanchez et al., 2005; Ritter et al., 2004). During the contingency 
shift phase of the task, however, those patients with schizophrenia high in negative 
symptoms exhibited markedly poorer performance in adjusting to the changing 
contingencies relative to both healthy controls and those patients high in positive 
symptoms. The findings of Turnbull et al. (2006) suggest that deficits associated with 
schizophrenia are specific to the shift phase of the contingency-shifting variant IGT. As 
previously noted, this is consistent with research showing deficits in set-shifting ability in 
schizophrenia (Pantelis et al., 1999; Waltz & Gold, 2007).
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Emotion-based learning deficits may reflect core pathological processes in 
schizophrenia and appears important to further clarify the impact of symptomatology on 
the reported behavioural deficits in order to shade light on the cognitive determinants of 
psychopathology. An intriguing means of addressing this question is to examine flexible 
emotion-based learning with the contingency-shifting variant IGT in non-clinical samples 
that have elevated psychosis proneness or high schizotypal features (Johns & van Os, 
2001; Verdoux & van Os, 2002). Hallucination- and delusion-proneness are two of the 
most prominent features of psychosis-proneness that appear to be dimensionally 
distributed across the general population (Johns & van Os, 2001; Verdoux, Maurice- 
Tison, Gay, van Os, Salamon, et al., 1998). The concept of the dimesionality of psychotic 
features has proven to be a useful research concept to investigate psychosis as well as a 
valuable clinical notion to inform prevention strategy (Claridge, 1997). People with high 
psychotic proneness scores are in fact at much higher risk to develop psychosis than the 
general population; recent research has estimated that this risk can be up to 60 folds 
higher (Hanssen, Bak, Bijl, Vollebergh & van Os, 2005).
Previous studies have investigated how psychometric measures of psychosis- 
proneness and schizotypy relate to putative measures of set-shifting, such as the WCST. 
In clinical samples, poor WCST performance has been more often associated with 
negative symptoms of schizophrenia (Nieuwenstein, Aleman & de Haan, 2001). In non- 
clinical samples, findings have been mixed with deficits in WCST performance being 
related to negative symptoms (e.g., Suhr & Spitznagel, 2001), positive symptoms (e.g., 
Suhr, 1997) or both (e.g., Gooding, Kwapil, & Tallent, 1999). It should be noted that 
performance on the set-shifting IGT and WCST is likely to be reliant on a number of
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relatively diverse cognitive processes, such as working memory, attention and response 
inhibition. Some caution is therefore necessary when assuming that previous findings 
with the WCST will be relevant to the contingency-shifting IGT. Indeed, Turnbull et al. 
(2006) found low correlations between performance on the contingency-shifting IGT and 
other set-shifting measures, including the WCST (cf. Lee et al., 2007). Nonetheless, 
based on previous research, it seems plausible to suggest impairment in IGT contingency- 
shifting performance in individuals high on schizotypal traits, such as hallucination and 
delusion proneness.
The aim of Experiment 5, therefore, is to extend the findings of Turnbull et al. 
(2006) with the contingency-shifting variant IGT by examining the performance of non- 
clinical groups high on hallucination and delusion proneness scores.
Experiment 5 
Method
Participants
There were two stages to participant recruitment for Experiment 5. First, a large 
cohort of students was screened in order to comprise the participant groups. Second, 
those participants invited for further study were tested in a laboratory and were 
compensated with £5.00. This study was reviewed and approved by the Department of 
Psychology, Swansea University Ethics Committee. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants before their entry in the study.
Two hundred and fifty-three Swansea University students were administered the 
Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981; Laroi, Marczewski &
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van der Linden, 2004) and Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters, Joseph & Garety, 
1999; Peters, Joseph, Day & Garety, 2004). One hundred and seventy seven of these 
participants were female and 73 were male (3 participants did not record their gender). 
The mean age of this sample was 20.13 years (SD = 3.27). Scores on the LSHS and PDI 
served as the basis for inclusion in the study. Participants in the top and bottom 15% of 
the total score distribution for the PDI and LSHS were placed in to high and low groups 
for these scales, respectively. These individuals were then invited to participate in a 
further experimental session comprising administration of the contingency-shifting 
variant IGT. Seventy-four of the 92 invited participants agreed to complete the second 
session, yielding a final sample of 28 high- and 27 low-LSHS participants and 27 high- 
and 26 low-PDI participants. None of the participants involved in the second session 
reported substance abuse problem, brain injury or mental health condition. The mean 
total scale scores for each group were as follows: High-LSHS (M =  34.07, SD = 6.29), 
Low-LSHS (M=  4.52, SD = 2.38), High-PDI (M=  102.81, SD = 33.54) and Low-PDI 
(M = 9.23, SD = 5.39). There were 10 males and 18 females in the High-LSHS group, 12 
males and 15 females in the low-LSHS group, 7 males and 20 females in the High-PDI 
group and 11 males and 15 females in the Low-PDI group.
Psychosis-proneness Measures
Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981; Laroi et al., 
2004): Hallucination proneness was assessed using a modified version of the LSHS 
(Laroi et al., 2004). The scale is composed of 16 items, scored on a 5-point Likert scale, 
where 0 = “certainly does not apply to me”, 1 = “possibly does not apply to me”, 2 = 
“unsure”, 3 = “possibly applies to me”, 4 = “certainly applies to me”. Participants are
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asked explicitly not to report any experiences that occurred under the influence of drugs, 
alcohol or any psychotropic substance. Total LSHS score is the sum of all the item scores 
and can range form 0 to 54. This scale has been widely used with non-clinical 
populations (Cronbach’s a=  0.78; Laroi et al., 2004).
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999): Delusion proneness 
was assessed with the revised 21-item PDI (Peters et al., 2004). The 21-item scale 
explores life-time prevalence of delusional ideation, using the introductory expression, 
“Do you ever feel as if [some people are not what they seem to be]T’ Questions are 
answered on a yes-or-no basis. When a “Yes” is checked, three additional 5-point rating 
scales measure distress, preoccupation and conviction associated with the experience. 
Each “Yes” checked assigns 1 point contributing to a frequency score of reported unusual 
experiences (range: 0-21). All of the items checked “Yes” also contribute to distress, 
preoccupation and conviction scores. The final score is the sum of the selection endorsed 
in the rating subscales. Each subscale can range from 0 to 105. Every “No” answer on the 
PDI leads automatically to a 0 score for each subscale. Finally, a total PDI score is 
obtained by adding the frequency of “yes” checked to all the subscales total scores. The 
21-item scale has been used reliably in a large body of research and has high internal 
validity (Cronbach’s a=  0.82) and test-retest reliability (Spearman’s r = 0.78; Peters et 
al., 1999).
Measure o f Emotion-Based Learning
Flexible emotion based learning was measure with the Contingency-Shifting 
Variant IGT  as employed in Chapter 3, Experiment 2. The same task and instructions 
were administered to all participants.
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Results
Table 5 displays the mean PDI and LSHS scores for the initial large sample, as 
well as for the high and low PDI and LSHS sub-groups. Reliability scores as established 
by Cronbach’s alphas were .88 for the LSHS, .94 for PDI total, .84 for PDI distress, .84 
for PDI preoccupation and .79 for PDI conviction. In the total sample, the PDI and LSHS 
total scores were positively and significantly correlated (r = 0.53,/? < .001). As expected, 
a t-test performed on the PDI and LSHS total scores between high and low groups 
revealed significant differences (bothp  <.01).
Group Male/Female Age 
(SD)
Mean
PDITot
Mean
PDIdis
Mean
PDIPre
Mean
PDICon
Mean
LSHS
PDI All 73/177 20.13 45.95 12.8 12.55 15.4 16.92
(rc=253) (3.27) (30.42) (9.27) (9.14) (10.16) (10.54)
High 7/20 20.04 102.81 30.33 28.52 33.59 27.52
(«=27) (2.05) (33.54) (10.59) (11.77) (10.15) (11.32)
Low 11/15 21.73 9.23 2.46 2.54 3.12 9.08
(«=26) (4) (5.39) (1.55) (2.1) (1.86) (7.31)
LSHS All 73/177 20.13 45.95 12.8 12.55 15.4 16.92
(>7=253) (3.27) (30.42) (9.27) (9.14) (10.16) (10.54)
High 10/18 19.68 79.32 23.14 22.29 26.11 34.07
(«=28) (1.33) (44.52) (13.93) (14.19) (14.03) (6.29)
Low 12/15 21.96 24.33 6.70 6.56 8.31 4.52
(>7=27) (4.01) (28.69) (8.06) (7.98) (9.03) (2.38)
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Table 5: Gender ratio, mean age and mean values for LSHS and PDI subscales for high 
and low groups. Note: PDITot = total PDI score, PDIdis = PDI distress subscale score, 
PDIPre = PDI preoccupation subscale score, PDICon = PDI conviction subscale score, 
and LSHS = total LSHS score.
Figures 26 and 27 show Phase 1 and 2 mean net score performance for the high 
and low PDI and LSHS groups, respectively. In Phase 1 of the IGT, both high and low 
PDI groups showed a positive learning pattern, but there were no significant between- 
group differences on performance. A 2 (group) x 5 (block) mixed factor ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of block, F(4, 204) = 11.70, p  <.001. However, there was no 
significant group main effect, / ’(I, 51) = 1.98,/?=0.17 or block by group interaction, F(4, 
204) = 1.73,/?=0.15. A similar pattern of results was shown for the high and low LSHS 
groups. In Phase 1 of the IGT, both groups showed a general increase in performance 
across blocks, but there were no significant group differences. A 2 (group) x 5 (block) 
mixed factor ANOVA revealed a main effect of block, F(3.2, 173.32) = 6.25, p  <.001. 
Again, there was no significant group main effect, 7^(1,53) = 0.01, p=0.92, or block by 
group interaction, F(3.2, 173.32) = 0.82,/?=0.49.
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Figure 26: The mean net score performance for the high- and low-LSHS groups for the 
five 20-trial blocks in Phase 1 and the six 20-trial blocks in Phase 2.
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Figure 27: The mean net score performance for the high- and low-PDI groups for the five 
20-trial blocks in Phase 1 and the six 20-trial blocks in Phase 2.
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Figures 26 and 27 show that across Phase 2, performance between the low and 
high groups on the PDI and LSHS began to diverge. A 2 (group) x 6 (block) mixed factor 
ANOVA performed on the shift phase for high and low PDI groups showed a significant 
main effect for group, F{ 1, 49) = 15.24,/? <.001, but no significant main effect for block, 
F(3.7, 181.32)= 1.193 /?=0.2 nor a significant interaction F(3.7, 181.32) = .759,/?=0.58. 
Post hoc t-tests showed that the high and low PDI groups significantly differed in mean 
net score across each of the six blocks (all p  < .05). A similar set of analyses conducted 
for the LSHS high and low groups revealed a main effect for group, F(l,52) = 7.7, p  
=0.008, but no significant main effect for block, F(4.1, 213.43) = .49,/?=0.75, nor 
significant interaction, F(4.1, 213.43) = 1.73,/?=0.14. Post hoc t-tests showed that the 
high and low LSHS groups significantly differed in mean net score across blocks 2, 3, 4, 
and 6 (p < .05).
Investigating response perseveration during contingency-shift phases
Performance in Phase 2 was further investigated by examining the selection of 
decks that from advantageous became disadvantageous from phase 1 to phase 2 and 
during the contingency shifts of Phase 2 in both LSHS and PDI sub-groups (see Figures 
28 & 29). A mixed factor 2 (group) x 3 (shift) ANOVA conducted on the LSHS sample 
showed a main effect of group, F (l, 53) = 7.212,/? = .005, but no significant effect of 
shift period F(2, 106)=0.96,/?=0.39,nor interaction F(2, 106)=0.24,/?=0.79. Post-hoc tests 
showed that high-LSHS participants made significantly more good-now-bad selections in
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the second, t(53)=-2.35,p=0.02, and in the third shift periods, t(53)=-2.01,/?=0.05, but 
not in the first shift period, t(53)=-1.61,/?=0.11.
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Figure 28: The mean number of previously-good-now-bad selections by the high- and 
low-LSHS groups during each of the three shift periods of Phase 2. Error bars represent 
two standard errors.
A mixed factor 2 (group)x3 (shift) ANOVA conducted on the PDI sample 
showed a main effect of group, F(l, 51)=6.41,/?<0.0001, but no significant effect of shift 
period, F(2, 102)=1.10,/?=0.34, nor interaction, F(2, 102)=0.02,/?=0.98. Post-hoc tests 
showed that high-PDI participants made significantly more good-now-bad selections in 
the third shift period, t(51)=-1.99,/?=0.05, with trends towards significantly more good- 
now-bad selections in the first, t(51)=-1.92,/?=0.06, and second, t(51)=-1.87,p=0.07, 
shift periods.
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Figure 29: The mean number of previously-good-now-bad selections by the high- and 
low-PDI groups during each of the three shift periods of Phase 2. Error bars represent two 
standard errors.
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Discussion
The findings of Experiment 5 revealed no significant differences between the 
performance of individuals classified as high and low in delusion- and hallucination- 
proneness during the standard IGT phase (i.e., Phase 1). Differences in performance only 
emerged between the groups following the onset of the contingency shift phases (i.e., 
Phase 2): individuals high in delusion- and hallucination-proneness had impaired 
emotion-based learning performance, as measured by mean net score, during all three 
contingency shift sub-phases, compared with low delusion- and hallucination-prone 
individuals. Indeed, during the shift phases, high delusion- and hallucination-prone 
individuals showed a general impairment in their IGT performance as evidenced by 
consistent disadvantageous decision strategy (i.e., mean net score below zero).
It is remarkable, in the context of previous experiments showing variability in 
participants (e.g. Experiment 2), that high- and low-psychosis proneness individuals 
display a within group homogeneous performance both in Phase 1 and 2. This may 
suggest that variability in controls participants could be dependent from a predisposition 
to certain traits and psychosis proneness could be a relevant aspect to control for in future 
studies. It is possible that a variety of traits may affect IGT performance and create the 
variability in performance. Clearly, more research is needed to investigate the relevance 
of personality and psychopathological traits in decision-making performance.
The IGT contingency shift impairment observed in high delusion- and 
hallucination-prone individuals may be compared with the results obtained from previous 
studies that investigated emotion-based learning in schizophrenia patients classified on 
the basis of negative (i.e., symptoms relating to the absence of normal functioning) or
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positive symptoms (i.e., symptoms relating to the presence of abnormal experiences). 
Ritter et al. (2004) found impaired performance during standard IGT trials in patients 
with schizophrenia compared to a group of healthy controls, and observed that WCST 
performance was impaired in both groups. This study also failed to find any correlations 
between IGT scores and measures of negative symptom whereas measures of positive 
symptoms were not reported. In the other previous study that examined the relationship 
between positive and negative symptomatology and IGT performance, Turnbull et al. 
(2006) employed the set-shifting variant IGT and found that patients with high scores on 
measures of positive symptoms showed Phase 1 and Phase 2 learning at levels 
comparable to that of controls. Differently patients with high scores on measures of 
negative symptoms performed well during Phase 1 but showed below-chance level 
performance in the contingency-shifting Phase 2. Thus, it would appear that the findings 
of Experiment 5 are at odds with those of Turnbull et al. for patients high in positive 
symptoms as participants with high hallucination- and delusion proneness showed 
unimpaired performance in Phase 1 and below-chance performance in Phase 2. On a 
more general level, however, the findings demonstrate that impairments associated with 
hallucination and delusion proneness are specific to the shift phase of the contingency 
shifting variant IGT, which supports Turnbull et al.’s findings with patients with 
schizophrenia.
Similar to a number of previous studies conducted with patients with 
schizophrenia, the results suggest that features of psychosis might not alter performance 
on the standard version of the IGT during Phase 1 (Evans et al., 2005; Rodriguez- 
Sanchez et al., 2005). An alternative explanation for the similar performance during the
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standard IGT trials might be the fact that psychosis proneness, as measured by the 
instruments employed, is an indicator of psychopathological propensity, rather than 
actual psychopathological symptomatology. It follows that the intensity of the traits 
expressed by the participants in this study can be considered of lower intensity than those 
of patients with schizophrenia. Therefore, symptom severity and symptomatological 
composition should be taken into consideration by future studies investigating emotional 
decision-making in psychosis.
The effect of confounding factors such as medication, institutionalization, 
substance abuse, and illness length cannot be ruled out in explaining the results of the 
studies showing schizophrenic deficits on the standard IGT (Sevy et al., 2007). Such 
potential confounds make comparisons between the present findings and those from 
research conducted with patients with schizophrenia difficult. For instance, of the twenty 
participants in Ritter et al’s (2004) study, 3 participants were prescribed typical anti­
psychotic medication, while the majority (n=  17) were prescribed atypical medication, 
and the average illness duration was 25.8 years. It has been suggested that patients on 
typical anti-psychotics are more impaired on the IGT than on the WCST compared with 
patients on atypical anti-psychotics (Beninger et al., 2003; but see Martino et al., 2007). 
Clearly, medication-type or duration of illness, or both, may have contributed to the 
results obtained in previous studies. The current study can rule out the effect of 
medication and clinical history and provides some insight into their importance in 
affecting IGT performance. Nevertheless, further research is indeed necessary to 
disentangle the effects of different medication-types and illness duration on emotion- 
based learning abilities in schizophrenia.
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A number of studies have advanced the importance of different prodromal factors 
in the development of psychosis (e.g., Celia, Cooper, Dymond & Reed, 2008; Dean, 
Bramon, & Murray, 2003; Seeber, & Cadenhead, 2005). The present findings suggest 
that that emotion-based learning impairments generally, and the contingency-shift variant 
IGT specifically, may have potential implications as experimental indicators of psychosis 
risk. In particular, the extended version comprising the contingency-shift phase seems to 
be particularly sensitive to features of schizophrenia-proneness (Fusar-Poli, Perez, 
Broome, Borgwardt, Placentino, Caverzasi, et al., 2007). Advantages of using an 
emotion-based learning paradigm in sub-clinical and clinical research are: the 
neuropsychological background upon which the task was developed (Bechara 2004), the 
finding that impaired performance in tasks such as the IGT has been shown to be related 
to PFC and VMPFC damage (Bechara et al., 1994; 2005), that research has identified 
brain abnormalities in the PFC in people at risk of psychosis (Fusar-Poli et al., 2007), and 
that poor performance on the task has been shown to correlate highly with social and 
functional impairment in people with PFC damage (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & 
Levkovitz, 2007).
The result of Experiment 5 may have relevance to the literature on response 
perseveration in schizophrenia (Brazo, Delamillieure, Morello, Halbecq, Marie &
Dollfus, 2005). Findings showed that during the contingency-shift phases, hallucination- 
and delusion-prone participants were more likely to continue to select the previously- 
good-now-bad decks, indicating a persistence of previously learned reinforcement 
contingencies and an impaired ability to adapt to the changing outcomes (i.e., 
perseverative errors). Response perseveration of this kind has typically been observed
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with tasks requiring repeated reversals of reinforcement contingencies, such as the WCST 
(Haut et al., 1996). Compared to the WCST, the contingency-shift variant IGT allows for 
a more extended analysis of the effects of progressive modifications to the underlying 
reward/punishment contingencies on choices from each of the four decks. In this way, the 
contingency-shift variant IGT may offer promise as an alternative means of investigating 
response perseveration with an ecologically-valid emotional decision-making task.
In conclusion, this study examined the effect of hallucination and delusion 
proneness on the contingency shifting modification of the IGT. The results showed there 
were no significant differences between those classified as high and low on hallucination 
and delusion proneness on the standard phase of the IGT while difference in performance 
emerged during the contingency shifting modification. Several limitations should, 
however, be noted when considering the data. Firstly, no other behavioural measures of 
contingency-shifting, reversal learning or executive functions were administered, making 
it difficult to generalise the findings to previous studies that have used such measures 
(e.g., Lee et al., 2007; Turnbull et al., 2006). Secondly, only university students were 
included in the sample, which may not be representative of the general population and 
due to their young age are at higher risk of developing psychosis (Hafner, & an der 
Heiden, 1997). This was however consistent with the recruitment of previous experiment 
in this thesis and helpful in order to compare the results across experiments. Finally, 
hallucination and delusion proneness, although highly prodromic, only represent two 
particular facets of psychosis proneness. This limits the potential applicability of these 
findings to research using clinical schizophrenic groups. Despite these limitations, this 
study has extended previous research by demonstrating that the impairment in flexible
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emotion-based learning in patients with schizophrenia is also observed in sub-clinical 
groups with elevated scores on measures of hallucination and delusion proneness.
Experim ent 6
The syndrome of depression is characterised by cognitive impairment including 
problem solving, attentional set-shifting, planning and inhibition process (Elliott, 
Sahakian, McKay, Herrod, Robbins & Paykel, 1996; Harvey, Le Bastard, Pochon, Levy, 
Allilaire, Dubois et al., 2004). Evidence from neurofunctional and neurostructural studies 
on depression disorders suggests that several areas are implicated with particular 
reference to the prefrontal cortex (Drevets, 2000a,b; 2003; Kanner, 2004). The PFC has 
been acknowledged as the anatomical structure largely responsible for executive 
functions and complex behaviours such as decision-making (Krawczyk, 2002). Decision­
making and emotional difficulties are often seen at clinical level in patients with 
depression and represents landmark symptoms of the disorder (Mansell, Colom, & Scott, 
2005; Shenal, Harrison & Demaree, 2003). Research evidence suggests that depression’s 
decision-making ability could be biased by altered sensitivity to reward and punishment 
(Elliott et al., 1996; Henriques et al., 1994).
Must et al. (2006) investigated the issue of reward sensitivity and emotion based 
learning in depression using the IGT. By assessing patients with the ABCD and the 
EFGH version of the IGT (Bechara et al., 2000a, see also Chapter 1 and 3) the authors 
found altered sensitivity to reward and punishment in depressed patients compared to 
controls. Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) patients showed high sensitivity to
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immediate large reward leading to long-term losses and relative low sensitivity to low 
frequency high punishment. This pattern of selection lead MDD patients to a sub-optimal 
performance compared to controls further supporting the findings that depressive features 
might alter decision-making. Nevertheless the results of Must et al. (2006) are difficult to 
compare to similar studies investigating reward sensitivity in depression with the IGT.
Dalgleish et al. (2004) explored the effect of a specific psychosurgery procedure 
for depression (Stereotactic Subcaudate Tractotomy) to reward sensitivity. In this study 
the IGT performance was tested in 4 groups: patients recovered from depression after 
psychosurgery, patients not recovered from depression after psycho surgery, patients 
recovered from depression after drug treatment and healthy controls. Results showed that 
only patients recovered from depression after psychosurgery presented impaired 
performance. The psychosurgery group pattern of selection across blocks also suggested 
altered sensitivity to negative feedback compared to the other three groups. Interestingly 
the IGT performance of depressed patients did not differ from those of controls, unlike in 
Must et al. (2006), where depressive features per se do not alter IGT performance. 
Sensitivity to reward and punishment in depression, as measured by the IGT, has been 
further investigated in a recent study by Smoski et al. (2008). The authors found a rather 
paradoxical effect in depressed patients who displayed a better performance at the IGT 
compared to controls. In attempting to explain the unusual findings the authors advance 
the hypothesis that depressed participants were less likely to choose from risky decks due 
to a more effective risk aversive strategy rather than being better learners. Such an 
interpretation of the finding stresses the possibility that the IGT performance could be 
affected by factors others than the one outlined by the SMH (Naqvi et al., 2006).
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Although the issue of reward and punishment sensitivity in relation to the IGT 
schedules have been studied in previous research (e.g., Bechara et al.2000a; Tomb et al., 
2002) it is not clear how a possible altered sensitivity to reward and punishment, such the 
one advanced for depression, would interact with the task. A possible way of analysing 
the issue of depression reward and punishment sensitivity in the context of decision­
making is to systematically modify contingencies and investigate how patients and 
matched controls adjust. Set shifting ability as measured by the WCST has produced 
inconclusive finding with some studies suggesting impairment related with MDD and 
bipolar symptoms (Elliott et al., 1996; Martin et al., 1991; Rogers et al., 2004) and other 
showing no bearing of depressive symptoms (Must et al., 2006). The contingency shift 
variant IGT used in Experiment 2 could prove useful to investigate both reward and 
punishment sensitivity issue and assess decision-making ability. Results from Experiment 
2 showed how shifting components can further discriminate between controls participants 
ability to perform the standard IGT proving that performance on phase 2 tap on relatively 
different resources. The results of Experiment 4 further suggest that the autonomic 
activations profiles during the contingency shifting phase were different from the 
standard IGT; with anticipatory activation guiding performance on the standard IGT and 
appraisal correlating with good performance during the shift.
Borkowska and Rybakowski (2001) suggested that WCST performance of people 
affected by mood disorders can be influenced by symptom severity. Symptom severity 
and heterogeneity of presentation within the same diagnostic label could greatly affect the 
results of specific clinical groups and the comparability across similar studies (Chen, 
Eaton, Gallo & Nestadt, 2000). Similarly, the use of different medications and comorbid
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diagnosis are often under-considered aspects that could influence the results. An 
interesting way to control for symptom severity and account for medication history would 
be to investigate reward sensitivity and decision-making ability in the depressive features 
o f the general population. Mood, unlike psychotic experiences has for long been thought 
of as a dimensional and fluctuating aspect present in the general population (Lucht, 
Schaub, Meyer, Hapke, Rumpf, Bartels, et al., 2003; Karasz, 2008). Rating instruments, 
such as the Beck Depression Inventory, have been used to screen for depressive features 
and to assess intervention improvement (Beck et al., 1996). It is, therefore, possible to 
distinguish high and low level depression at the non-clinical level and compare the 
extreme of non-clinical distributions. Similarly to Experiment 5 this was the approach 
used in Experiment 6. Depression features were screened in a population of healthy 
students and the extremes of the distribution obtained were invited to take part in an 
experimental session evaluating decision-making through the use of the contingency shift 
variant IGT.
Method
Participants
There were two stages of participants’ recruitment for Experiment 6. First, a large 
cohort of students was screened in order to comprise the participant groups. Second, 
those participants invited for further study were tested in a laboratory and were 
compensated with £5.00. This study was reviewed and approved by the Department of
160
Chapter 5
Psychology, Swansea University Ethics Committee. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants before their entry in the study.
Two hundred and twenty seven Swansea University students were administered 
the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck et al., 1996), Launay-Slade Hallucination 
Scale (LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981; Laroi et al., 2004) and Peters Delusions Inventory 
(PDI; Peters et al., 1999, 2004). Psychosis proneness measures were administered due to 
the effect shown on the contingency-shift phase in experiment 5. One hundred and fifty 
three of these participants were female and 74 were male. The mean age of this sample 
was years 21.11 (SD = 4.75). Scores on the BDI served as the basis for inclusion in the 
study. Participants in the top and bottom 15% of the total score distribution BDI were 
placed in to high and low groups for these scales, respectively. These individuals were 
then invited to participate in a further experimental session comprising administration of 
the contingency-shifting variant IGT. Fifty of the 64 invited participants agreed to 
complete the second session, yielding a final sample of 25 High- and 25 Low-BDI. None 
of the participants involved in the second session reported substance abuse problem, 
brain injury or mental health condition.
Measures: Depression
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et a l, 1996) is a self-report measure for 
depression widely used in clinical and research settings. The BDI is a 21-item 
questionnaire asking about feelings over the past week. The score is a simple sum of the 
positive answers; each items’ score can range form 0 to 3. Total BDI score can range 
between 0 and 63. Scores are generally interpreted according to four indicative ranges: 0 - 
9 non-depressed, 10-15 not likely to meet diagnostic criteria (dysphoric), 16-23 likely to
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meet diagnostic criteria (mild, moderate depression), 24 or above very likely to meet 
diagnostic criteria (severe depression, MDD) (Kendall & Flannery-Schroeder, 1995). For 
non clinical young adult population BDI internal consistency scores range form 0.80 to 
0.90 with a mean a=0.86 (Canals, Blade, Carbajo & Domenech-Llaberia, 2001; Dozois, 
Dobson & Ahnberg, 1998) and has a test re-test reliability coefficient of 0.67 reported at 
1 month interval (Roberts, Lewinsohn & Seeley, 1991).
Measures: Psychosis proneness
Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS; Launay & Slade, 1981; Laroi et al., 
2004): Hallucination proneness was assessed using a modified version of the LSHS 
(Laroi et al., 2004). The scale is composed of 16 items, scored on a 5-point Likert scale, 
where 0 = “certainly does not apply to me”, 1 = “possibly does not apply to me”, 2 = 
“unsure”, 3 = “possibly applies to me”, 4 = “certainly applies to me”. Participants’ total 
LSHS score is the sum of all the item scores and ranges from 0 to 54.
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters et al., 1999): Delusion proneness 
was assessed with the revised 21-item PDI (Peters et al., 2004). The 21-item scale 
explores life-time prevalence of delusional ideation, using the introductory expression, 
“Do you ever feel as if  [some people are not what they seem to be]T’ Questions are 
answered on a yes-or-no basis. When a “Yes” is checked, three additional 5-point rating 
scales measure distress, preoccupation and conviction associated with the experience. 
Each “Yes” checked assigns 1 point contributing to a frequency score of reported unusual 
experiences (range: 0-21). All of the items checked “Yes” also contribute to distress, 
preoccupation and conviction scores. The final score is the sum of the selection endorsed 
in the rating subscales. Each subscale can range from 0 to 105. Every “No” answer on the
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PDI leads automatically to a 0 score for each subscale. Finally, a total PDI score is 
obtained by adding the frequency of “yes” checked to all the subscales total scores. The 
21-item scale has been used reliably in a large body of research and has high internal 
validity (Cronbach’s a=  0.82) and test-retest reliability (Spearman’s r = 0.78; Peters et 
al., 1999).
Emotion Based learning measure
Flexible emotion based learning was measure with the Contingency-Shifting 
Variant IGT  as employed in Experiment 2. The same task and instructions was 
administered to all participants.
Results
Table 6 presents mean BDI, LSHS and PDI values for the large sample and the 
high and low groups. There were 10 females and 15 males in the High BDI group and 10 
females and 15 males in the Low BDI group. Reliability scores as assessed by 
Cronbach’s alpha were .84 for the LSHS, .92 for the PDItot, .89 for PDIdis, .85 for the 
PDIpre, .82 for the PDIcon and .89 for the BDI. Positive correlations were observed 
between the BDI and LSHS (r=.32, p=0.02) and PDIdis (r=.31, p=0.03).
The High and the Low BDI group were not different in term of age, f(48)=-.194, /?=.847. 
T-tests conducted between High and Low BDI group revealed no significant difference in 
all the PDI scales (allp> .05) and in LSHS score, /(48)=-1.69,/?=.097. As expected the 
high and low BDI group were significantly different on BDI scores, /(48)=-20.48, 
/ ? < .0 0 0 1 .
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Group M/F Age Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Ratio (SD) BDI PDI PDI PDI PDI LSHS
Tot Dis Pre Con
All 74/153 21.11 9.22 43.16 11.95 11.73 14.72 16.34
(n=227) (4.75) (4.67) (29.51) (8.88) (8.96) (10.32) (10.2)
High 10/15 20.48 17.9 62.2 18.16 17.52 21.56 17.9
BDI (n=25) (2.01) (2.99) (31.88) (10.32) (9.44) (12.29) (2.99)
Low 10/15 20.36 1.18 43.76 12.4 11.68 14.52 14.18
("=25) (2.18) (.99) (38.87) (12.51) (13.21) (13.67) (10.67)
Table 6: Shows genders ratio, mean age, and mean score (standard deviation) for BDI, 
PDI total, PDI distress, PDI preoccupation, PDI convinction and LSHS in all participants 
and in the subsequent High and Low BDI grouping.
Mean net score
Figure 30 shows Phase 1 and 2 mean net score performance for the High and Low 
BDI groups. In Phase 1 of the IGT, both High and Low BDI groups showed a positive 
learning pattern, but there were no significant between-group differences on performance. 
A 2 (group) x 5 (block) mixed factor ANOVA revealed a main effect of block, F(4, 192) 
= 6.01,/? <.0001. However, there was no significant main effect of group, F(4, 192) =
1.16,/?=.33, or block by group interaction, F (l, 48) = .96,/?=.75.
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Figures 30 shows that across Phase 2, performance between the Low and High 
groups on the BDI began to diverge. A 2 (group) x 6 (block) mixed factor ANOVA 
performed on the shift phase for High and Low BDI groups showed a significant main 
effect for group, F (l, 48) = 5.27,/? =.026, but no significant main effect for block, 
F(3.87, 185.6) = 1.49,/? =.21 nor a significant interaction, F(3.87, 185.6) = .829,/? =.53. 
Post hoc t-tests showed that the High and Low BDI groups significantly differed in mean 
net score in blocks 9, 10 and 11 (all p  < .05).
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Figure 30: Mean net score performance for the High- and Low-BDI groups for the five 
20-trial blocks in Phase 1 and the six 20-trial blocks in Phase 2.
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Mean subjective rating
Figure 31 shows Phase 1 and 2 mean subjective rating scores for High and Low 
BDI groups. In Phase 1 both groups show a similar pattern of awareness increasing 
substantially from the first to the second block but Low BDI participants display 
consistently higher scores. A 2 (group) x 5 (block) mixed factor ANOVA revealed a 
main effect of block, F{3.2, 153.98) = 3.86,/? =.005 and group, F(l,48)=10.93, p=.002, 
however, there was no significant block by group interaction (p >.05).
During Phase 2 subjective ratings were somehow similar for the two groups. 
Repeater measure ANOVA showed no effect of block, group or interaction (all p  >.05).
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Figure 31: Mean net subjective rating performance for the High- and Low-BDI groups 
for the five 20-trial blocks in Phase 1 and the six 20-trial blocks in Phase 2.
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Investigating sensitivity to reward and punishment in Phase 2
A set of analysis was conducted in order to investigate adaptation to reward and 
punishment changing scheduled in High and Low BDI scores’ group. In particular the 
current analysis wants to explore how previous contingency history can influence future 
selections. In order to perform this analysis, levels of Previously Good-Now-Bad 
selections (PGNB) and Previously Bad-Now-Good (PBNG) were calculated. PGNB 
selections were those from decks of card that were advantageous in the previous shift or 
phase and become disadvantageous (i.e. deck C for shift 1, deck D for shift 2 and deck A 
for shift 3). Reversely PBNG selections were those from decks of card that were 
disadvantageous in the previous shift or phase and become advantageous (i.e. deck A for 
shift 1, deck B for shift 2 and deck C for shift 3).
A 2 (group) x 3 (shift) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on levels of PGNB 
revealed a main effect of shift, F(2,96)=5.29,/?=.007, and group, i r(l,48)=6.79,/?=.013 
but no interaction, F(2,96)=.34,/?=.71. Follow-up t-test conducted on PGNB selections 
across the three shifts revealed that the Low BDI score group sampled more from PGNB 
in shift 1, ^(48)=-l .988, />=.05, and shift 2, /(48)=-2.23, /?=.023.
The same analysis conducted on levels of PBNG did not reveal a main effect of 
shift, group or an interaction but independent t-test showed a significant difference, 
?(48)=2.26, p=.028, between High and Low BDI group in the third shift.
167
Chapter 5
Sh ift 1 Shift 2  Shift 3
12
11
i«
I  9 8 
s “ 8
7
6
PGNB PBNG
13
CD 12
I
s 8
7
6
PBNG
H
13
£
£  12
2■5 11
*  10 w
1  9
2
8
7
6
PGNB PBNG
Low-BOI Hgll-BU
Figure 32: Mean number of Previously Good-Now-Bad selections (PGNB) and 
Previously Bad-Now-Good (PBNG) in the Low and the High BDI groups across the three 
shifts.
Discussion
Experiment 6 investigated the influence of depressive features on flexible 
emotion-based learning in a general population of young adult non-clinical sample. 
Participants, grouped according to High and Low BDI scores, showed similar 
performance during Phase 1 of the IGT. Differently during the contingency shifting 
phase, the performance of the two groups progressively diverged with the Low BDI 
group exhibiting a progressive learning pattern and the High BDI group showing 
performance worsening across the three shifts. Further analysis conducted to investigate 
difference in performance during Phase 2 showed different PGNB selections across the 
three shifts for the two groups. In particular High BDI participants selected more from 
the PGNB decks, compared to the Low BDI participants, in the first and in the second 
shift. This difference in PGNB selection could be interpreted as a lack of flexibility
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displayed by participants with high depressive features. Similarly to the finding gathered 
with WCST, the ability to adjust to IGT changing contingency might be altered in 
depression (Martin et al., 1991; Rogers et al. 2004). It is interesting to note the relative 
stability of levels of PGNB selections in the High BDI group across the three shifts. This 
might suggest that shifting ability from rewarding to punishing contingencies might be a 
factor implicated in depression. The temporal trend of PGNB selections is also pointing 
at the lack of adaptation displayed by High BDI participants. Inflexibility has for long 
been proposed as an important feature in depressive disorders (Channon, 1996). The 
results of the current experiment suggest that the altered sensitivity to reward and 
punishment seen in people with high depressive features may relay on altered emotional 
based learning process.
The findings of the PBNG are also proving to be interesting. While the PGNB 
performance seems to be little adjusted across the three shifts for both groups, the PBNG 
performance is relatively stable for the High BDI group but changes substantially in the 
Low BDI group. Participants with Low BDI score show, by the third shift, a significantly 
higher number of selections from the PBNG decks compared to the High BDI group.
This might be interpreted as a finer sensitivity to rewarding choices and the ability to 
apply less stable negative values to shifting contingencies. The difficulty in detaching 
from previous learnt negative consequences might be also inferred by the progressive 
worsening seen in the High BDI group during Phase 2. The findings confirm that 
depressive features are more sensitive to good-bad shifting rather than bad-good and 
further advance the role of relative higher sensitivity to negative punishment in 
depression and/or diminish responsiveness to reward (Dalgleish et al., 2004; Henriques et
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al., 1994; Shankman, Klein, Tenke & Bruder, 2007). What it is new to this investigation 
is the notion that depressive features may compromise the ability to perceive unrewarding 
contingencies becoming rewarding in a changing environment.
Together with the results of Experiment 2 and 5, the results of Experiment 6 show 
that dissociation is possible between Phase 1 and 2 of the new contingency modified IGT. 
Participants can perform well during the standard 100 trials of the task and then be 
affected by the sudden shifting of contingencies during Phase 2. This further suggests that 
the two phases of the newly modified task may preferentially tap into dissimilar functions 
and be differentially affected by psychopathological traits.
Subjective rating findings showed the High BDI group display higher levels 
during Phase 1 compared to the Low BDI group. This finding could be potentially 
challenging to explain given that previous experiments in this thesis found positive 
correlations between IGT subjective ratings and performance (e.g., Experiments 2 and 3). 
Where the relative difference in subjective rating between the two experimental groups 
might be dependent on depressive features it remains difficult to explain the lack of 
influence on IGT behavioural performance. One possibility is that the subjective rating of 
the Low BDI is sufficient to aid the behavioural choice. It is in fact noticeable that the 
mean subjective rating levels of the Low BDI group across Phase 1 is largely positive and 
with a similar trend to the High BDI group. It is plausible that subjective awareness 
would require a minimum level in order to assist behavioural performance or that above a 
certain level there is no perceived benefit. Alternatively it can be hypothesised that 
depressive features have little reliance on overt subjective judgment. Subjective 
awareness levels during Phase 2 proved to be undifferentiated and perhaps lead support
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to the hypothesis that subjective ratings might not be an important biasing aspect in 
individuals with depressive features. Depressed and prone to depression individuals are 
known, in fact, to be incline to discount their opinion as little accurate or not worth of 
consideration (Clark, 2001).
The use of non-clinical population, although permit to infer some important 
process that may relate to depression, does not allow to translate the finding to clinical 
depression. The finding of the current study might serve as a useful platform for future 
examination on clinical population. The current results can inform subsequent research 
on clinical depression regarding the role of medication and long-term clinical history of 
depression. It is also possible, given the self-assessed nature of the depression screening 
that some of the participants in the High BDI group were undiagnosed cases of 
depression. The average BDI value for the High BDI group fell into the moderate 
depression range therefore it is plausible that some of the High BDI participants could be 
on the pathway to depression. In this respect the result could contribute to the 
understanding the role of potential prodromal features related to the development of 
clinical depression.
Taken together the findings confirm the role of high sensitivity of depression to 
punishment and support the notion that people with depression have difficulties in 
adapting to a changing environment (Channon, 1996; Rogers et al., 2004). Previous work 
conducted on emotion-based learning and depression showed that depressed patients 
could not perform as well as controls on the IGT (Must et al., 2006). The current findings 
partially disconfirm this claim showing that depressive features in non-clinical population 
do not affect IGT performance. It is therefore possible that only exacerbation of symptom
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is responsible for the impaired performance observed by Must et al. (2006) or that other 
factor specific to the their sample composition might have produced the effect. In line 
with Somski et al. (2008) and Dalgleish et al. (2004) in this study it was found that 
depressive features do not impair the IGT performance. Further, this study analyse the 
role of depressive features during the contingency shift variant IGT finding participants 
with High BDI scores showing altered sensitivity and difficulties to adapt to reward and 
punishment contingency changes.
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Chapter 6
Flexible emotion-based learning in schizophrenia
Chapter 5 investigated the influence of dimensional features of psychopathology 
using the contingency-shifting modification IGT. The results showed individuals with 
higher psychopathological features performing sub-optimally during the shifting phase. 
Individuals with high delusion- and hallucination-proneness, in Experiment 5, showed 
dissociation during their performance on the Phase 1 and 2 suggesting that proneness to 
positive symptoms of psychosis negatively influence decision-making in a changing 
environment. The current Chapter 6 sought to extend the sub-clinical findings to the 
clinical research domain by recruiting patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and 
administering the contingency shifting IGT. This design also allows for a timely 
replication of Turnbull et al’s (2006) study with patients with schizophrenia using a fully 
automated task.
Patients with schizophrenia have been shown to perform badly on the rule- 
shifting task such as the one indexed by the WCST (Prentice et al., 2008; Stratta et al., 
2004). At the cortical level performance on rule shifting task has been associated with the 
PFC and in particular the dorsolateral portions of the PFC (Miller, 2000). Several studies 
have employed the WCST together with the IGT in the assessment of PFC functions in 
people with schizophrenia. The large majority of the studies found that schizophrenic 
patients would complete fewer categories and made more preseverative errors on the 
WCST irrespectively of the IGT performance (e.g., Lee et al. 2007; Martino et al., 2007). 
In other words where the notion of impaired WCST in schizophrenia appears to gather 
consensus across investigations the IGT findings remain unclear. No study to date has
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showed a positive correlation between impaired performance on the WCST and the IGT 
in schizophrenia, although Brand et al. (2007) found a positive correlation between the 
last trials of the IGT and the WCST score in a sample of healthy university students.
Areas associated with rule shifting and decision-making have for long been 
implicated in etiopathological models of schizophrenia (Frith & Dolan, 1996; Nakamura 
et al., 2008). Cognitive functions anatomically related to the PFC such as working 
memory, executive functions and social cognition have reliably shown to be impaired in 
schizophrenia (Bowie & Harvey, 2005; Chan, Chen, Cheung & Cheung, 2004; Lee & 
Park 2005). Notwithstanding, the prefrontal cortex encompasses numerous sub-regions 
and larger number of cognitive functions has been hypothesised to have a strong reliance 
on these regions. In recent years much interest has been gathered by schizophrenia 
abnormalities in the OFC and VMPFC with a number of studies showing structural and 
functional abnormalities and neurophatological evidence of impairment (Antonova et al., 
2004; Crespo-Facorro, et al., 2000; Pantelis et al., 2003).
The OFC and VMPFC have been indicated to play a critical role in complex 
decision-making (Krawczyk, 2002). Evidence from this claim comes from a series of 
studies conducted on patients with acquired VM brain injury exhibiting distinct deficits in 
real life decision-making especially in situation where social and emotional aspects form 
integral part of the decision-making process (Bechara, 2004). These studies, as it has 
been seen in the introduction, were conducted with the IGT. This is why the IGT took a 
prominent role in the study of decision-making in schizophrenia (see Sevy et al., 2007 for 
a review).
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Although a considerable number of studies have used the same experimental 
paradigm results are far from consistent. Of the studies that have investigated decision­
making performance with the IGT some showed schizophrenic patients underperforming 
on the task (e.g., Ritter et al., 2004) and some others found schizophrenic patients 
showing a comparable performance to healthy controls (e.g. Wilder et al., 1998). In the 
attempt to disentangle possible aspects responsible for the low mean net scores observed 
in patients with schizophrenia subsequent studies have focussed on various aspects such 
as different medications (Beninger et al., 2003), co-occurring substance abuse (Sevy et 
al., 2007), symptoms severity (Rodriguez-Sanchez et al., 2005) and specific symptoms 
such as catatonia (Bark et al., 2005). Although investigations have spanned a broad 
range, results do not have a common frame of interpretation and are largely inconclusive 
(Sevy et al., 2007).
It is remarkable that despite being both PFC related tasks, the IGT and the WCST 
have showed somehow dissociation in findings. Unlike the WCST, in fact, the IGT has 
not been found consistently impaired in schizophrenia, hinting at the fact that different 
process or clinical presentation may influence selectively performance on the IGT. Where 
both tasks are likely to use a basic number of cognitive resources such as attention, 
working memory and information processing, the IGT, according to its original 
formulation it is claimed to require the assistance of an emotional biasing signal (Naqvi et 
al., 2006). On the other hand the WCST does not account for the biasing influence of 
emotion and presents frequent variations in the reward schedule across trials. The 
systematic modification of the contingencies has proven to be highly ecologically valid 
and problematic in individuals with schizophrenia. Turnbull et al. (2006) suggested that
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the variability observed in people with schizophrenia might be dependent on the relative 
low degree of flexibility implicated in the IGT. Gradual, flexible adjustment to the 
affective consequences of reward and punishment is a defining feature of performance on 
the IGT as participants initially choose cards from all of the decks before showing, 
around halfway through the task, a choice preference for the advantageous decks (Dunn 
et al., 2006).
In order to test flexibility in the frame of the IGT this thesis has developed, based 
on Turnbull et al. (2006), a contingency shifting version of the IGT. As described in 
Experiment 2 the contingency shifting IGT progressively alter the reinforcement 
contingencies of the card decks following initial exposure to the standard IGT. Over three 
successive contingency shift periods, card decks that had previously been advantageous 
became disadvantageous, and vice versa. Thus, the contingency-shifting variant IGT tests 
the ability of participants to flexibly deal with changing reinforcement contingencies 
learnt via EBL. Turnbull et al. (2006) compared the performance of a group of patients 
with schizophrenia classified according to their symptoms (high or low in positive and 
negative symptomatology) with that of a healthy control group. Results showed 
comparable learning levels in patients with high positive and negative symptoms and 
healthy controls during the standard version of the IGT, supporting some previous studies 
(e.g., Rodriguez-Sanchez et al., 2005; Ritter et al., 2004). During the contingency shift 
phase of the task, however, patients with schizophrenia high in negative symptoms 
exhibited markedly poorer performance in adjusting to the changing contingencies 
relative to both healthy controls and patients high in positive symptoms. The findings of 
Turnbull et al. (2006) suggest that deficits associated with schizophrenia are specific to
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the contingency-shifting phase of the IGT. In addition the results of Experiment 5 seem 
to support this claim suggesting that high schizoptypal features may impair flexible 
emotion based learning. In particular positive rather than negative features, in non- 
clinical populations, account for disadvantageous performance during Phase 2.
In the attempt to consolidate and further expand the findings of Experiment 5, 
Experiment 7 was conducted to investigate the performance of an outpatient 
schizophrenic group on the contingency shifting variant IGT. Patients were assessed for 
positive and negative symptoms, medication, clinical history and demographic 
information and variables. It is expected that the schizophrenia groups will be 
outperformed during the contingency shifting phase by the controls but it is difficult to 
advance any predictions in term of positive or negative symptoms. The study also 
recorded subjective ratings and explored its potential relevance in interpreting the results.
Experiment 7 
Method
Participants
Twenty-five outpatients with schizophrenia and 24 healthy controls were 
recruited for this experiment. Patients were recruited in the Swansea NHS trust area 
throughout different Community Mental Health Teams (CMHT) and the local NHS 
psychiatric hospital. The diagnosis of schizophrenia and schizo-affective disorder was 
established by the centre psychiatrist on the basis of a structured clinical interview 
(SCID; First et al., 1996); a comprehensive review of medical records was also
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conducted. Patients with a history o f neurological disorders or medical conditions known 
to influence cognition were excluded. Patients with a co-morbid diagnosis of substance 
abuse were excluded; patients presenting minor addiction issues during the clinical 
interview were included and addiction type and severity recorded on a scale from 0 to 
100. Addiction problem and severity was clarified with the care stuff and clinical notes. 
All patients were medicated with stable dosage of atypical antipsychotics (risperidone, 
clozapine, olanzapine or aripiprazole) with no less than a month from the last medication 
change. All patients recruited stated that medication compliance had been optimal in the 
two weeks prior to testing. More than half of the patients (n=15) received additional 
psychotropic medication, most frequently benzodiazepine.
The healthy control group was selected in the local community based on age, 
gender and education. All normal controls were psychotropic medication free and did not 
have any history mental illness as assessed by a brief interview. Similar to the patient 
group, controls did not have history of neurological or medical condition known to affect 
cognition.
After receiving a detailed description of the research protocol both patients and 
control participants provided written consent. Swansea NHS trust ethic committee 
approved this study (REC number: 07/WMW02/31).
Procedure
All the participants with schizophrenia underwent clinical interview aiming to 
confirm and clarify unclear aspects of the case as appraised from consultation with the 
care stuff and personal record search. Symptom assessment was undertaken using the
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PSYRAT and SANS. The contingency shift modified version of the IGT, as used in 
Experiment 2 was employed to assess emotion based learning.
Materials
Psychotic Symptom Rating Scale (Haddock et al.,1999): The Psychotic Symptom 
Rating Scale (PSYRATS) is a 17-item scale assessing the multidimensional features of 
delusions and auditory hallucination in schizophrenic patients (Haddock, McCarron, 
Tarrier & Faragher, 1999). The scale is administered via an interview; the rater’s task is 
to select the option that best described patient’s account. Every item was on a 5 point 
likert scale (0-4) and provided rating options with increasing severity (e.g. 0= voice not 
present and 4=voices occur continuously). The scale is designed to rate the 
multidimensionality of symptoms’ severity over the course of the last week providing an 
accurate account of recent positive symptomatology. The PSYRATS provides two 
scores: Auditory Hallucinations (11 items) and Delusion Scale (6 items), in addition to 
this score patients are asked about the presence of other forms of hallucinations. Each of 
the two scales provides a separate set of multidimensional attributes. The dimensions of 
the Auditory Hallucination scale are: frequency, duration, location, loudness, beliefs 
about the origin, negative content, intensity of negative content, amount of distress, 
intensity of distress, disruption of life and control. The dimensions of the Delusion scale 
are: amount of preoccupation, duration of preoccupation, conviction, amount of distress, 
intensity of distress and disruption of life. Total score for Auditory Hallucination scale 
can range from 0 to 44 whilst total score for the delusion scale can range from 0 to 24.
Scale fo r  the Assessment o f Negative Symptom (Andreasen, 1982, 1983): The 
Scale fo r  the Assessment o f Negative Symptom (SANS) is a 20-item scale assessing
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negative symptoms associate with schizophrenia. The items of the scale are grouped in 5 
complexes: affective flattering (7 items), alogia (4 items), avolition-apathy (3 items), 
anehdonia-asociality (4items) and attentional impairment (2 items). Each item is rated on 
a 6 point scale ranging from 0 (absence of the feature) to 5 (severe presence). A global 
rating score item and a subjective rating score item (both ranging from 0 to 5) are 
included in each complex and accounted in the total score. Total score can range from 0 
to 150. The scale is administered via an interview but also draws on subjective 
observation from care staff and family members.
Contingency Shifting Variant IGT
Phase 1 & Phase 2: The Contingency-Shifting Variant IGT  as employed in 
Experiment 2, with the same decks contingencies and instructions, was administered to 
all participants. In addition to the version used in previous experiments the version 
employed in this study played tones after each card selection. Two types of tones were 
included in this task, one following trials with positive outcome (i.e. no money loss) and 
another following trials with punishment. This additional feature was according to the 
Bechara et al. (1999) IGT computer version. Patients were given few mock trials in order 
to provide familiarization with the computer and the requirements of the task.
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Results
Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics
Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of the schizophrenia and the control 
group are presented in table 7. There were no differences between the groups for age, 
t(41)= \A \,p  =166, gender distributions, '^(\)= .2 \4 ,p= .ll, ethnicity x2(l)=1.06,^=.47 
and marital status '£{Y)=4.\9,p=.\2 (Yates’ corrected), but a significant difference was 
detected for years of education, /(47)=-3.53,/?=.002 and employment status x2(l)=45.99, 
p <.0001 (Yates’ corrected).
Table 8 shows PSYRATS and SANS mean (standard deviation) scores for the 
clinical group. As suggested by Steel, Garety, Freeman et al. (2007) PSYRATS items are 
presented separately. Values of the SANS and PSYRATS are comparable to previous 
investigation (Drake et al., 2007; Klimidis, Stuart, Minas, Copolov & Singh, 1993).
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Schizophrenia
(N=25)
Controls
(N=24
tor x1
Age 39.24 (10.54) 35(10.51) r(47)=1.41 p= 166
Gender (M/F) 15/9 11/14 X2(l)=.214p=.432
Education (yrs) 13.4 (2.12) 15.38 (1.76) f(47)=-3.53 p=.001
Ethnicity
White 25 23 X2(l)=1.06 p=47
Black 0 1
Employment
Unemployed 23 0 X2(l)=45.99 p<.0001
Working 0 20
Student 2 3
Retired 0 1
Cigarette per day 13.01 (2.59) 4.84 (.99) f(47)=5.42 pc.0001
Substance abuse problem (number) 13 0
Substance abuse severity (from o to ioo) 14.2 (21.6)
Last hospitalization (weeks) 75.36 (75.38)
Age of onset 23.04 (6.33)
Illness duration (yrs) 16.44 (8.96)
Psychiatric hospitalization 5.12(4.88)
CBT for psychosis 16/25
Table 7: Demographic and clinical information for the schizophrenia and the control 
groups. Difference was tested with t-test or chi square test as appropriate, p values are 
reported.
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Mean (SD)
Frequency 1 .12(1 .2)
Duration 1 .36(1 .44)
Location 1.64(1 .7 )
Loudness 2 .12 (1 .01 )
PSY R A TS B eliefs about origin 2 .04 (1 .09 )
H allucination Amount o f  negative content 1 .44(1 .66)
Intensity negative content 1.28 (1.51)
Amount o f  distress 1.52 (1.66)
Intensity o f  distress 1 .32(1 .41)
Life disruption 1 .16(1 .28)
Control 1.32 (1.55)
Total Auditory Hallucination 16.16(13.4)
Amount o f  preoccupation 1.08 (.95)
Duration o f  preoccupation 1 .2(1 .04)
PSYR ATS Conviction 1 .52(1 .04)
Delusion Amount o f  distress 1.56 (1.32)
Intensity o f  distress 1.24(1 .2 )
Life disruption 1 .32(1 .14)
Total delusion 7.52 (6.31)
A ffective flattering 9.08 (9.05)
Alogia 3.44 (5.12)
Avolition-apathy 2.84 (3.43)
SANS Anehdonia-asociality 6.7 (4.88)
Attentional impairment 4.32 (3.55)
Global rating 4 .16 (4 .1 7 )
Total SA N S 30.52 (25.99)
Table 8: PSYRATS and SANS mean (standard deviation) scores for the clinical group.
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Table 9 shows the correlations between positive and negative symptoms 
dimensions and history of mental illness variables. In this case both positive and negative 
symptoms correlate negatively with the length of time elapsed (in weeks) since the last 
psychiatric hospitalization.
PSYRATS
Hallucination
PSYRATS
Delusion
PANS
Last -.27* -.526** -477*
Hospitalization
Illness -.04 .15 .224
Duration
Number o f Hospitalization .34 .27 .35
*p<0.01 **p<.001
Table 9: Correlations between PSYRATS delusion, PSYRATS hallucination and SANS 
with history of mental illness variables.
IGT Performance
Figure 33 shows mean net score performance of the schizophrenia and the control 
group during Phase 1 and Phase 2. A quite distinct pattern of learning can be observed, 
with the controls displaying improvement across the first 5 blocks whilst the 
schizophrenia group displays a constantly below chance pattern. A 2 (group) x 5 (block) 
mixed factor ANOVA conducted on phase 1 revealed a main effect of block F(2.9,
138.39)=8.87,p<.0001, group F(l, 47)=18.84,/?<.0001 and interaction F(2.9,
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138.39)=9.41,/?<.0001. Within group contrast analysis showed a significant decrease 
between block 2 and 3 in the schizophrenia group, F(l,24)=4.41,/?=.046, and a 
significant increase in the control group between block 1 and 2, F(l,23)=24.9,/?<.0001. 
Follow-up between group ANOVA showed a significant higher performance of the 
control group for block 3, 4 and 5 (all /?<.05).
A similar analysis was conducted for phase two. A 2 (group) x 6 (block) mixed 
factor ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group, F(l,47)=25.82,/?<.0001, but 
no significant main interaction, F(3.47, 163,09)=.249,/>=.88, or block, F(3.47, 
163,09)=.1.84,/>=.13. Post-hoc independent t-test conducted on each block of the phase 
two revealed a significant difference in all the comparisons ranging from p<.0001 of 
block 9 and 10 to p =.006 of block 7. Repeated measure t-test conducted within the 
schizophrenia groups did not show any significant performance improvement in any of 
the three contingency shifts. Similarly for the control participants a significant 
improvement between the first and the second block of each shift was not observed.
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Figure 33: Mean net score performance for schizophrenic patients and control group 
during the five 20-trial blocks of Phase 1 and the six 20-trial blocks of Phase 2.
IGT Subjective Rating
Figure 34 shows mean net subjective rating for the two groups during Phase 1 and 
2. A 2 (group) x 5 (block) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 revealed a main 
effect of block, F(3.37, 158.6)=10.05,/?<.0001, group, F(l, 47)= 13.34,/?=.001, and 
interaction, F(3.37, 158.6)=13.04,/?=.009. Within group contrast analysis showed a 
significant improvement in subjective rating between block 1 and 2, F(l,23)=4.33, 
p=.049, and block 2 and 3, F(l,23)= 11.78,/?=.002, for the control participants and 
between block 1 and 2 for the schizophrenia group, F(l,24)= 7.01,/?=.014. Follow-up 
between group ANOVA showed significantly higher performance of the control group 
for block 3, 4 and 5 (/? values between .04 and <.0001).
A 2 (group) x 6 (block) mixed factor ANOVA was conducted to investigate 
groups subjective rating on Phase 2 revealing a significant main effect of block, F(3.76,
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176.62)= 4.83,p<.001, but failing to show any significant main effect for group, F(l,47)= 
3.67, p  =.061, or any interaction, F(3.76, 176.62)= 1.36,/?=. 241. Post-hoc independent 
t-test conducted on each block of Phase 2 revealed a significant difference in block 6, 
f(47)=-3.19,/?=.003, but failed to show any significant difference in the remaining blocks. 
Repeated measure t-test conducted on the schizophrenia groups showed significant 
subjective rating improvement during the first contingency shift, /(24)= -3.41,/?=.002. 
Differently significant improvement in subjective rating during Phase 2 was noted for the 
control group in the second shift, /(23)= -2.31,/?=.03.
CD
Blocks of 20 trials
Schizophrenia
Control
Figure 34: Mean net subjective rating for schizophrenic patients and control group during 
the five 20-trial blocks of Phase 1 and the six 20-trial blocks of Phase 2.
Investigating schizophrenia failure
The previous analysis showed schizophrenic patients underperforming in both 
Phase 1 and 2 compared to controls. To clarify the contribution of different symptoms to 
the task a further set of analysis was conducted. For the purpose of the analysis the 
schizophrenic groups was subdivided in high (n= ll) and low (n=14) delusional ideation
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(cut-off score =10), high (n=12) and low (n=13) hallucinations (cut-off score =15) on the 
basis of the PSYRATS scores and in high (n=13) and low (n=12) negative symptom (cut­
off score =20) on the basis of the SANS scores.
A 2 (group) x 5 (block) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 for the high 
and low delusion groups did not reveal a significant effect of block, F(2.69,62)=l, 
p=.412, group, F(l,23)=.13,/?=.719, or interaction, F(2.69,62)=2.19,/?=.076. A 2 (group) 
x 5 (block) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 for the high and low 
hallucination groups did not reveal a significant effect of block, F(2.48, 57.19)=.83, 
p=.464, group, F(l,23)=.3.39,/?=.08, or interaction, F(2.48,57.19)=3.43,/?=.76. A 2 
(group) x 5 (block) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 for the high and low 
negative symptoms groups did not reveal a significant effect of block, F(2.51,57.85)=.81, 
/?=.47, group, F(l,23)=.72, p=.4, or interaction, F(2.51,57.85)=.23,/?=.84.
Similar set of analysis was performed on phase two. A 2 (group) x 6 (block) 
mixed factor ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 for the high and low delusion groups did not 
reveal a significant effect of block, F(2.8,64.2)=.93,/?=.46, group, F(l,23)=2.41, p=.134, 
or interaction, F(2.8,64.2)=.93,/?=.88. A 2 (group) x 6 (block) mixed factor ANOVA 
conducted on Phase 1 for the high and low hallucination groups did not reveal a 
significant effect of block, F(2.89, 66.44)=.93,/?=.43, group, F(l,23)=.088,/?=.77, or 
interaction, F(2.89, 66.44)= 1.22,/?=.30. A 2 (group) x 6 (block) mixed factor ANOVA 
conducted on Phase 1 for the high and low delusion group did not reveal a significant 
effect of block, F(2.74, 63.1)=.99,/?=.423, group, F(l,23)=.038,/?=.85, or interaction, 
F(2.74, 63.1)=.69,/?=.62.
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To further explore the contribution of the clinical scales to other variables 
implicated in schizophrenia poor performance in the both Phase 1 and 2, two stepwise 
multiple regression models were performed on the clinical group IGT results. Variables 
were included and excluded from the final model on the basis of significant values of 
partial correlation (p in .05 and p  out .10, respectively). The first model investigated 
predictors of total Phase 1 IGT mean net scores. Independent variables as entered in the 
model were: PSYRATS delusion, PSYRATS hallucination, SANS total, years of 
education, last hospitalization (weeks), number of hospitalization, flattening affect, 
alogia, avolition, anhedonia, attention and total subjective rating of Phase 1. Result 
yielded subjective rating as the only significant predictor of Phase 1 performance 
(Standardized b= .728 p=.015). Similar analysis was conducted for Phase 2 except from 
the fact that the dependent variable was the total Phase 2 mean net score and Phase 2 total 
subjective rating was added to the list of independent variables. Regression model 
showed two variables significantly contributing to explain performance in Phase 2: the 
subjective rating of phase 1 (standardized b= 1.38 p=.01) and number of hospitalization 
(standardized b= -.75 p=.034). Correlation analysis confirmed the positive and significant 
relation between subjective rating and mean net score in both Phase 1 and 2 with values 
ranging between .407 to .741 (all p<.05).
Finding subjective rating of decks’ goodness as a reliable predictor of both phases 
of the task’s performance is not surprising, as it has been shown that good awareness of 
the nature of the task is usually achieved by the last blocks. In the attempt to clarify the 
contribution of positive and negative symptoms to subjective awareness two stepwise 
multiple regression models were performed. The first regression model had subjective
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rating during Phase 1 IGT as a dependent variable and SANS score, PSYRATS delusion 
and hallucination score as independent variables. PSYRATS hallucinations scale was 
found to be the only significant predictor (standardized b= -.592, p=.002). Differently the 
same set of independent variables used as predictors for Phase 2 did not reveal any 
significant predictor.
Discussion
Experiment 7 investigated flexible emotion based learning in schizophrenia using 
the contingency shifting variant IGT. Compared to controls, patients with schizophrenia 
displayed significantly poorer performance in both Phase 1 and 2. Although the gap in 
performance persisted until the end of Phase 2, differences in mean net score appear 
statistically stronger in Phase 1; it is therefore possible that difference in Phase 2 may 
result as a consequence of the initial poor learning. The onset of the shifts, in fact, 
produced a marked decrease in the control group while only marginally influence the 
performance schizophrenia group. This may be due to the fact that initial learning was 
not achieved by patient with schizophrenia and therefore the onset of the contingency 
shift had little to disrupt.
Subjective experience ratings during the task were similarly different during 
Phase 1 but not in Phase 2. Although the role of subjective experience in clinical IGT 
performance is still controversial (e.g., Evans et al., 2005), the results of this study 
suggest awareness of the relative “goodness” and “badness” of the decks may be an 
important contributor to the behavioural performance. The present findings are in contrast 
with Evans et al. (2005) where both patients with schizophrenia and control participants
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showed advantageous performance and comparably high rates of subjective awareness. 
Evans et al. concluded that subjective awareness is of substantial assistance to the IGT 
performance but that it is not impaired in patients with schizophrenia. The result of 
Experiment 6 supports the claims of the positive correlation between subjective 
awareness and IGT performance but showed that people with schizophrenia have 
difficulties both in selecting and identifying advantageous decks. This finding is also 
supported by previous research that has suggested that awareness of the nature of 
emotional experience and decision-making ability is impaired in schizophrenia (Bar-on et 
al., 2003; Koren, Seidman, Poyurovsky, Goldsmith, Viksman, Zichel et al., 2004; Lane & 
Schwartz, 1987).
Regression results in the schizophrenia group further strength the influence of 
subjective experience on performance even over symptom severity. The findings suggest 
the possible role of subjective awareness as a moderator between positive symptoms and 
IGT performance. For both phases subjective rating resulted as the most reliable predictor 
of IGT performance and its levels were affected by symptoms severity (i.e. 
hallucinations).
Symptom severity is known to be one of the factors with the greatest influence on 
IGT performance (Martino et al., 2007; Rodriguez-Sanchez et al., 2005; Turnbull et al., 
2006). Yet, the current study did not find an effect of symptomatology or symptom 
severity on IGT selections per se. Both the regression analysis and the between group 
comparisons showed no direct but mediated influence through subjective experience. 
Notwithstanding the role of subjective experience there are several possible factors that 
may have contributed to the lack of a direct influence between symptom severity and
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decision-making performance. First, the small number of participants employed. All the 
studies employing the IGT in the context of schizophrenia typically recruited 20 to 30 
individuals. This number would allow a straightforward comparison between controls 
and patients but would fall short of statistical power if further subdivided by symptom 
typologies or severity. As in this thesis, many investigations have advanced claims on the 
bases of small between group comparison that would benefit from replication in larger 
samples. Second, the large standard deviation observed in the PSYRATS and SANS 
instruments might have affected the results. Future research should aim to characterize 
emotion based learning in more homogeneous groups of patients presenting similar 
severity and symptoms by, for instance, selecting individuals with similar 
sympotmatological profile (e.g., auditory hallucination with paranoid theme). Clinical 
group homogeneity will enhance the accuracy of the analysis and will provide more clear 
indication to which aspect impairs decision- making ability within the schizophrenia 
spectrum. It is also possible that the disadvantageous performance seen in the clinical 
group was not dependent on one factor (e.g., positive, negative, disorganized) but could 
result from the interaction between different factors. In larger samples this can be 
investigated by comparing the characteristics of those failing at the task with those 
having a less disadvantageous performance or an advantageous performance. 
Alternatively regression model could be applied to relatively large samples of patients.
Interestingly, and despite the limitation in the sample composition noted above, a 
negative association was found between subjective awareness and hallucinations. This 
novel finding shows how hallucination severity may play a directly negative influence on 
awareness of the deck contingencies. Perhaps one possible explanation to the largely
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inconclusive findings seen in IGT research with people with schizophrenia could be that 
symptomatology has a direct influence on mediating factors, such as subjective 
awareness, in the decision-making process. Emotion-based learning has often been 
described as a process sourcing different cognitive ability to be deployed effectively and 
dependent on various neuroanatomical structures (LeDoux, 1996; Turnbull et al., 2003). 
Positive and negative symptoms therefore might influence only a subset of the resources 
mediating the deployment of EBL. The results of Experiment 5 showed proneness to 
delusion and hallucination producing a negative effect on performance in Phase 2. In the 
present experiment, patients with schizophrenia underperformed, compared to healthy 
controls, from Phase 1. The severity of symptoms, again, may influence performance at 
various levels with clinical chronic features presenting a bearing on performance form the 
outset. It also needs to be noticed that disadvantageous performance on Phase 1 is 
unlikely to result in an advantageous performance on Phase 2 as the contingency shift 
phase adds further complexity to an already poorly understood task. This was indeed the 
case for the IGT performance but not, largely, for the subjective rating given by the 
clinical group. Patient with schizophrenia showed a level of improvement in their 
subjective ratings during Phase 2. This finding result somehow difficult to explain but 
could reflect the first step into the understanding of the contingency changing schedules. 
Speculatively it can be argued that the low performance and subjective rating in the first 
part of the task suggest that schizophrenic patient do not benefit form emotional biasing 
signal in order to adjust their behaviour but would need conscious knowledge in order to 
master a changing environment. It is ascertained by both previous research and the 
findings of Experiment 5 that positive symptoms affect the experience of reality in
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schizophrenia (Sass & Pamas, 2003). The rise in subjective ratings during later stages of 
Phase 2 could reflect a slow rise in awareness due to habituation to the task.
Although the methodology employed was similar, the findings of Experiment 7 
appear in contrast with those of Turnbull et al. (2006). Firstly, in this investigation people 
with schizophrenia were found to perform significantly worst than control groups in both 
Phase 1 and 2 of the IGT. On the contrary, Turnbull et al. (2006) found that only a 
particular sub-group of patients with high negative symptoms underperformed during the 
contingency shift phase. In contrast with Experiment 6, the between group comparisons 
performed by Turnbull et al. (2006) included the control group (i.e. control group, high 
negative symptoms group and low negative symptom group). The analysis presented 
showed a main effect of group, but in the absence of a post-hoc test the claim that 
negative symptoms affect contingency-shifting can not be accurately supported. At first 
sight, the groups reported in the current Chapter could have been used in a similar fashion 
although a more conservative statistical analysis (i.e., compare high and low symptoms in 
clinical population sub-groups) discounted a direct bearing of symptoms on performance. 
In Experiment 7, direct comparisons between high and low symptom sub-groups did not 
reveal any difference in performance. Turnbull et al. (2006) claimed that negative 
symptoms are implicated in flexible emotion based learning ability rest only on a 
approaching significance value (p=.077) of a regression model having IGT Phase 2 as a 
dependent variable and negative symptoms as independent variable. The results of 
Turnbull et al, (2006) do not provide strong evidence in support of detrimental influence 
of negative symptoms on Phase 2 within the schizophrenia group. Similarly, the findings
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of Experiment 7 do not provide support to a direct implication of symptom severity, as 
measured by PSYRATS and SANS, on IGT performance in schizophrenia.
A number of limitations need to be noted in the interpretation of the current 
findings. First, the average number of years of education was significantly different 
between the clinical and control group. Although having more years of education is 
regarded to have a positive effect on neuropsychological tests this has been showed to 
have a negative correlation with the IGT performance (Evans et al., 2004). Second, as 
suggested by Sevy et al. (2007), the large variance in clinical and control groups 
performance coupled with a relative low number of subjects in each group could affect 
results. Third, more than half of the clinical sample received adjuvant psychotropic 
medication. The effect of this add on medication was difficult to control in the analysis 
given that patients were prescribed with different medications and dosage. Future studies 
should devote effort to control for clinical heterogeneity and attempt to clarify emotion- 
based learning performance in well-defined clinical groups.
In conclusion, Experiment 7 found that patients with schizophrenia showed 
impaired performance during the contingency shifting variant IGT and showed no 
adjustment during the shift phases. Subjective experience in the group with schizophrenia 
was lower than controls and had a significant bearing on performance. The hallucination 
subscale of the PSYRATS was the only symptom dimension that predicted subjective 
awareness.
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Chapter 7
Flexible emotion-based learning in depression 
Chapter 6 showed that clinically relevant psychopathological features can 
substantially impair the decision-making performance on the contingency shifting IGT. 
The results of Experiment 6 suggested the relevance of depressive features to emotion- 
based learning in the general population. In particular, Experiment 6 showed that people 
with high depressive features failed in performing advantageously during the course of 
Phase 2 of the contingency shifting IGT, demonstrating that depressive features can 
compromise shifting ability. Findings gathered with non-clinical populations, as in 
Experiment 5 and 6, may help to inform subsequent studies conducted on clinical 
populations and clarify the effect of symptom severity and medication on decision­
making performance in depression. The current Chapter 7 sought to extend the sub- 
clinical findings on depressive features to patients diagnosed with clinical depression.
A large number of cognitive impairments are characteristic of clinical depression 
including set-shifting and decision-making ability (Elliott, et al., 1996; Harvey et al., 
2004). At the cortical level, the contribution of the prefrontal cortex has often been 
claimed to be crucial from the ethiopathogenesis of depressive traits and especially for 
executive functions impairment (Drevets, 2000a,b; 2003; Kanner, 2004). The wide 
emotional disturbance seen in depressive patients in conjunction with cognitive and 
neurofunctional deficits leads to the hypothesis that the decision-making impairment seen 
in depressive patients could be due to a deficit in the emotion-based learning system 
(Must et al., 2006). In particular, the abnormalities observed in emotional arousal 
following reward and punishment have been proposed as the main dysfunctional
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mechanism accounting for the poor decision-making observed in people with mental 
illness (Dunn et al., 2006). The results of Experiment 6 showed that during Phase 1 of the 
IGT individuals with high depressive features did not differ in their decision-making 
performance compared to participants with low depressive features. However, during 
Phase 2 high depressive features compromised flexible emotion based learning and the 
ability to adapt to changing contingencies. According to this result it is possible to expect 
that those diagnosed with clinical depression will display similar impairment during 
Phase 2. Unlike Phase 2, it is difficult to predict the performance of depressive patients 
on Phase 1. Previous investigations have showed mixed performance of depressed 
patients on the standard IGT, with one study showing impairment of clinically depressed 
patients (Must et al., 2006), another study showing similar performance between 
depressed and control participants (Dalgleish et al., 2004) and a more recent study 
showing depressive patients outperforming control participants (Smoski et al., 2008). 
Although these studies had similar research questions, they present several potentially 
critical differences that might have affected the results. Firstly, in the study by Smoski et 
al., (2008), depressed patients were identified only on the basis of Hamilton depression 
scale (HAM-D, Miller, Bishop, Norman & Maddever, 1985) scores of 13 or higher. Even 
if highly prodromic, high scores on this scale does not represent a sole criterion for 
clinical diagnosis for depression. Further, in the same study, participants were not 
recruited through clinical settings but recruited from the normal population through a 
newspaper advertisement. The lack of help seeking behaviour and the missing 
information about co-morbid diagnosis might make Smoski et al.’s depressed sample 
different from the participants recruited in the other two studies conducted by Must et al.
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(2006) and Dalgleish et al. (2004). Secondly, medication was sparsely accounted 
throughout the three studies; Smoski et al. (2008) did not record medication history, Must 
et al. (2006) detailed various different medications taken by the depressed patients, while 
Dalgleish et al. (2004) only recorded that one of the clinical groups tested took 
antidepressant medication and recovered. Thirdly, Dalgleish et al., (2004) compared four 
small groups of patients (i.e., ten or less) and some patients in these groups had a 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Clark et al. (2001) have shown that manic features have a 
particular effect on IGT performance. Manic patients tend, in fact, to select more often 
from disadvantageous decks than controls but overall they select more cards from the 
advantageous decks. The presence of bipolar patients in the depressed group, therefore 
may have influenced the findings of Dalgleish et al.
Experiment 8 sought to investigate the performance of depressed patients on the 
contingency shifting IGT. The potential advantage of this study would be to contrast the 
findings with the results of Experiment 6 and clarify whether symptom severity affects 
the performance on the IGT and if depressed patients would show a comparable 
performance to healthy controls during Phase 1.
Experiment 8 
Method
Participants
Nineteen outpatients with major depressive disorder (MDD) and 20 healthy 
controls were recruited for this experiment. Patients were recruited from the Swansea 
NHS trust area via several Community Mental Health Teams. Demographic characteristic
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of the participants are summarised in Table 9. The diagnosis of depression was 
established by a trained member of the mental health team (e.g., psychiatrist, 
psychologist, mental health nurse) with structured clinical interview (SCID; First et al., 
1996). A comprehensive review of medical records was also conducted. Patients with a 
history of neurological disorders or medical conditions known to influence cognition 
were excluded as well as patients with a history or presence of substance abuse. Presence 
of psychotic and maniac features was considered an exclusion criterion.
All patients were taking stable dosage of antidepressant medications 
(i.e.,venlafaxine, fluoxetine, zoloft, imipramine, duloxetine) with no less than a month 
form the last prescription change. All patients recruited stated that medication compliance 
had been optimal in the two weeks prior testing. Only two patients received adjuvant 
psychotropic medication (in both cases mood stabiliser: lithium carbonate).
The healthy control group was selected in the local community based on age, 
gender and education. All normal controls were psychotropic medication free and did not 
have any history of mental illness as assessed by a brief psychiatric interview. Similar to 
the patient group, controls did not have history of neurological or medical condition 
known to affect cognition.
After receiving a detailed description of the research protocol both patients and 
control participants provided written consent. Swansea NHS trust ethic committee 
approved this study (REC number: 07/WMW02/31).
Materials: Beck Depression Inventory, BDI-II (Beck, Steer and G.K. Brown, 1996).
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) is a self-report questionnaire 
assessing depression over the past fortnight. The scale consists of 21 items assessing
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symptoms relating to physical concerns, such as sleep disturbance and loss of weight, 
emotional state, hopelessness, sorrow, motivation, willingness to work, and cognitive 
aspects, such as concentration and self-evaluation. Each item presents 4 sentences 
ranging from neutral (0) to a maximum level of severity (3), and the subject chooses one 
according to his/her experience during the previous fortnight. The BDI total score is the 
sum of the points across the items. Indicative cutoffs scores for depression severity are 
suggested: 0-13: minimal depression; 14-19: mild depression; 20-28: moderate 
depression; and 29-63: severe depression (Richter, Werner, Heerlein et al. 1998). Higher 
total scores indicate severe depressive symptoms 
Measure o f Emotion-Based Learning
Flexible emotion based learning was measured with the Contingency-Shifting 
Variant IGT  as employed in Experiments 7. The same task and instructions were 
administered to all participants. Patients were given few mock trials in order to provide 
familiarization with the computer and the requirements of the task.
Results
Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics
Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics of the depression and the control 
groups are presented in Table 10. There were no differences between the groups for age 
f(37)=-.19,/?=.84, years of education, f(37)=-.57,/?=.57, gender distributions, ^= .24  
p=.15, ethnicity and employment status;^=6.3l,/?=.17(Yates’ corrected). Not 
surprisingly the two groups present a highly significant difference in BDI scores 
f(37)=17.96, /?<.0001.
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Depression
(N=19)
Controls
(N=20)
/ o t X j
Age 35.79 (10.65) 35.15 (9.38) /(37)=-.19 p=.84
Gender (M/F) 11/8 10/10 Y2=.24 p=. 75
Education (yrs) 14.47 (2.5) 14.9 (2.2) /(37)=-.57 p=.57
Ethnicity
White 19 20
Other 0 0
Employment
Unemployed 4 0
Working 9 15 Y2=6.31 p= 17*
Student 1 3
Retired 5 2
BDI 30.11 (7.2) 0.85 (1.08) t (37)= 17.96 p<.0001
Age of onset 25.58 (6.44)
Illness duration 10.21 (6.17)
(years)
Last hospitalization 41.63 (37.17)
(weeks)
Number of 0.68(1.06)
Hospitalization
Table 10: Demographic and clinical information for the depression and the control 
groups. Difference was tested with t-test or chi square test as appropriate, p values are 
reported. * Yates corrected
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IGT Performance
Figure 35 shows mean net score performance of the depression and the control 
groups during Phase 1 and Phase 2. Pattern of learning during Phase 1 is similar for both 
groups, although controls seem to learn at a faster pace. The mean net score of the 
depression group did not approach advantageous levels (i.e., above 0) until after the final 
block of trials in Phase 1. The onset of the shifts in Phase 2 clearly differentiates between 
the two groups. A 2 (group) x 5 (block) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 
revealed a main effect of block, F(4,148)=10.01,p<.0001, group, F(l, 37)=12.48,/?=.001, 
but no significant interaction, F(l. 148)= 1.48,/?=.21. Contrast analysis revealed a 
significant performance improvement for depressed patients and control participants 
between the first and the second block, F(l,37)=20.09,/?<.0001. A follow-up between 
groups ANOVA showed a significant higher performance for the control group for block 
2, 3, 4 and 5 (allp<.05).
A similar analysis was conducted for Phase 2. A 2 (group) x 6 (block) mixed 
factor ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of group, F( 1,37)= 11.37,/?=.002, but 
no significant main effect for interaction, F(5, 185)=2.1l,/?=.066, or block, F(l, 185)=
0.154,/?=.98. Follow-up, between groups, ANOVA conducted to investigate difference 
in levels of performance during Phase 2 revealed significant difference for blocks 7, 9, 10 
and 11 (all p<. 05).
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Figure 35: The mean net score performance for depressed patients and control group 
during the five 20-trial blocks of Phase 1 and the six 20-trial blocks of Phase 2.
IGT Subjective Rating
Figure 36 shows mean net subjective rating for the two groups during Phase 1 and 
2. A 2 (group) x 5 (block) mixed factor ANOVA conducted on Phase 1 revealed a main 
effect of block, F(3.22, 119.32)=13.83, /?<.0001, but no group, F (l, 37)=1.28,/>=.28, or 
interaction, F(3.22, 119.32)=0.59,/?=.6, effect. Contrast analysis showed a significant 
improvement in subjective rating between block 1 and 2, F(l,37)=12.43,/?=.001, and 
block 2 and 3, F(1,37)= 11.19, /?= 002.
A 2 (group) x 6 (block) mixed factor ANOVA was conducted to investigate 
groups subjective rating on Phase 2 revealing a significant main effect of block, F(3.39, 
125.46)= 5.03, p=.002, but failing to show any significant main effect for group, F(l,37)= 
ll.5,p=.57, or any interaction, F(3.39, 125.46)= 2.47,p=. 058. Post-hoc independent t-
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test conducted on the each block of the phase two did not reveal any significant 
difference between the two groups.
Figure 36\ The mean net subjective rating for depressed patients and control group 
during the five 20-trial blocks of Phase 1 and the six 20-trial blocks of Phase 2.
Deck Preferences
To investigate cause of depression lack of advantageous selections during Phase 
1, a 5 (blocks) x 2 (group) ANOVA was performed for each of the four IGT decks. 
Results revealed depressed patients showing preference for deck A over controls, 
F(l,37)=3.74,/?=.041, and control participants showing preference for deck D over 
depressed, F(l,37)=5.24,/?=.028. Levels of Previously Good-Now-Bad selections 
(PGNB) and Previously Bad-Now-Good (PBNG) were calculated to further explore the 
cause of the depressed patients’ failure during Phase 2. PGNB selections were those from 
decks of card that were advantageous in the previous shift or phase and become 
disadvantageous (i.e. deck C for shift 1, deck D for shift 2 and deck A for shift 3).
Depression
Control
-2
-3
Blocks of 20 trilas
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Reversely PBNG selections were those from decks of card that were disadvantageous in 
the previous shift or phase and become advantageous (i.e. deck A for shift 1, deck B for 
shift 2 and deck C for shift 3).
Independent t-test revealed significant difference in the mean selections of PGNB 
decks in shift 1, /(37)=2.86,/?=.007, and 3, /(37)=2.93,/?=.006, and in PBNG selections 
in shift 3, f(37)= -2.04,/?=.04, (figure 37).
PGNS PBNG
Shift 2
PGNB
S h ifts
PGNB PBNG
Figure 37: Mean previously good now bad (PGNB) and previously bad now good 
(PBNG) selection for depression and control group during the three shifts of Phase 2.
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Discussion
The results of Experiment 8 showed that depressed patients displayed lower mean 
net scores compared to healthy controls throughout Phase 1 and 2 of the contingency 
shifting IGT. Levels of subjective ratings were slightly different for both groups and 
almost never significant. The findings of Phase 1 provide support for Must et al.’s, (2006) 
investigation where depressed patients performed worse than controls. The findings of 
Experiment 8 and those of Must et al. (2006) look remarkably similar, as in both 
investigations significant differences between the two groups become evident in the third, 
fourth and fifth block of Phase 1. A main difference between the depressed patients 
performance in the two studies is the trend. In Experiment 8, depressed patients failed to 
show improvements in learning after chance level was reached, whereas in Must et al. 
(2006) depressed patients seem to have a performance involution during the last blocks of 
the IGT whereby after having reached positive levels of mean net score by the fourth 
block depressed patients performance returns under chance in the fifth block. In the 
context of the current work, the performance showed by depressed patients during the 
contingency shift variant phase resembles the pattern observed for schizophrenic patients 
seen in Experiment 7. Even if both clinical populations failed to perform advantageously 
during Phase 1 and 2, the subjective rating of the two clinical groups showed some 
differences. Experiment 7 has shown that in schizophrenia patients a low level of 
subjective awareness may be partially responsible for the low performance in the IGT. 
This cannot be said for depressed patients, as comparable levels of subjective awareness 
were displayed by the depressed and control groups but in the absence of advantageous
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performance. Consistent with Experiment 6, this study found depressed patients showing 
little or no sensitivity to decks that were disadvantageous and became advantageous.
Although some level of similarity can be found with one of the few studies 
conducted on depressed people’s decision-making ability’s (Must et al., 2006), the results 
of the current experiment appear controversial in respect to other investigations.
Dalgleish et al. (2004) and Smoski et al. (2008), for example, presented results showing 
depressed patients performed at the same or better levels than controls, respectively, on 
the IGT. As mentioned in the introduction, there are several possible relevant differences 
between these studies that might have contributed to the heterogeneous findings.
The argument of altered sensitivity to reward and punishment in depression has 
been used both ways to explain advantageous and disadvantageous performance in 
depressed patients compared to controls. The results of the current investigation seem to 
support the view that altered sensitivity could be responsible for the low performance of 
patients and propose a somehow different picture from Dalgleish et al. (2004) hypothesis 
lhat learning on the task could be achieved only by paying attention to the punishing 
components. The current study found depressed patients selected more from 
disadvantageous decks with higher frequency punishment of relative lower magnitude 
than controls (i.e., deck A). This pattern of preference lends partial support to Dalgleish 
et al.’s hypothesis that only high magnitude punishments are avoided by depressed 
patients whereas lower magnitude punishments are not perceived as disadvantageous. On 
ihe contrary, control participants tended to prefer advantageous decks with low frequency 
but relatively high magnitude punishment (i.e., deck D). This finding does not support the 
high magnitude punishment avoidance in depression and suggest how focussing only on
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certain aspects of the task (e.g., avoid large punishments) may not be sufficient to achieve 
advantageous performance. Avoiding large punishments without paying attention to 
rewards is most likely the strategy that depressed people used during Phase 1. The nature 
of the IGT implicates that participants have to attend to all the components of their 
selections and it can be advanced that failing to produce substantive emotional biasing 
signals for rewards can alter the background of punishment perception.
Must et al. (2006) found that depressed patients with lower HAM-D (i.e.
Hamilton depression scale) score more frequently neglected high punishment than did 
depressed patients with higher HAM-D score. In addition, the results of Experiment 6 
provide a further account of the severity of depressive features on decision-making 
performance in Phase 1. This effect can be related to a selective influence of medication 
on reward and punishment sensitivity. As advanced by Dalgleish et al. (2004) 
antidepressants may enhance sensitivity to negative outcomes in order that they can be 
perceived and avoided. While enhanced sensitivity to reward and punishment is a crucial 
target of antidepressant medications, the results presented in this experiment suggest that 
in real life environments a sufficient integration between the sensitivity to positive and 
negative outcomes is necessary to achieve advantageous decision-making. This is 
perhaps why Experiment 6 showed a difference between high and low BDI scores only in 
more challenging environments such as the one that occurred in Phase 2.
During Phase 2, depressed patients showed a lack of ability to adjust to the 
changing shifting contingences. Interestingly, and similarly to the results of Experiment 
6, there was a worsening trend within each shift. The depressed group in this respect 
present a performance that tend to worsen in the second block of each shift in opposition
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to the improvement seen in the same block for the control group. If improvement in the 
second block can, for the controls, be interpreted as an insight or a correct behavioural 
adjustment to the changed contingencies; the decline in performance seen in depression 
can perhaps be interpreted as not only a lack of adjustment but as the pursuit of an 
ineffective strategy.
PGNB selections showed the depressed group being more attached to the 
affective consequences of previous positive contingencies and displaying less flexible 
behaviour to adapt to changing positive pattern. For both controls and depressed 
participants, there seem to be little adjustment in PGNB throughout the three contingency 
shifts. Controls showed a better ability to detach themselves from previous good 
contingency when they become bad. On the contrary the ability to shift from bad to good 
contingences appears to improve quite substantially in control participants but does not 
change in depression. In that respect controls and depressed patients create by the third 
shift a clear example of a double dissociation where controls shows low PGNB and high 
PBNG levels of selections and depressed patient shows high PGNB and low PBNG 
levels.
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C hapter 8
General Discussion 
The work contained in this thesis has explored the concept of emotion-based 
learning in experimental and clinical settings. Across each of the 8 experiments, the 
current thesis investigated a range of issues with relevance for understanding the affective 
components of the decision-making process using the original and contingency shifting 
variant IGT. This final chapter will attempt to summarise and discuss the main themes 
that have arisen. The first part of this chapter will summarise and review the findings 
from each of the experiments presented, while the second part will discuss the 
overarching topics that have emerged from the empirical studies and the contributions 
made by the thesis to the broader research literature.
Chapter 1: Emotion based learning overview and critical issues
Chapter 1 presented an overview of the research conducted in the area of 
emotion-based learning from experimental, clinical and neuroscience perspectives. The 
term “emotion-based learning” was used to refer to a specific class of learning that occurs 
in uncertain situations and that is achieved via a substantial contribution of the emotion 
system (Turnbull et al., 2005). This process aids uncertain decisions by activating 
previously learnt emotional reactions attached to the outcomes of a similar scenario such 
as when individuals are required to make rapid decisions in the absence of a clear 
understanding, or when advantageous outcomes of a decision do not result in an 
immediate gain (Damasio, 1996; LeDoux, 1996).
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The VMPFC was described as the key brain region involved in emotion based 
learning and the processing of emotional situations in social contexts (Bechara et al., 
1999). Further support for the role played by the VMPFC and in general the role of the 
OFC in emotion-based decision-making comes from clinical studies with brain injured 
patients. These findings contributed to Damasio’s formulation of the Somatic Marker 
Hypothesis (SMH; Damasio, 1994). The SMH postulates that visceral responses to events 
in the environment are used to “mark” (positively or negatively) the consequence of 
actions. In this framework, the VMPFC plays a key role as the structure capable of 
eliciting visceral responses that reflect the anticipated value of choices (Naqui et al.,
2006).
The IGT was developed as an experimental paradigm to test the SMH (Dunn et 
al., 2006) by measuring decision-making in a way that simulates real world complexity. 
Initially used to investigate decision-making deficits in people with acquired brain 
injury,the IGT has more recently become an accepted means of measuring complex 
decision-making performance in a wide range of participant groups. Chapter 1 described 
the IGT as requiring participants to select 100 cards (although some studies have 
employed fewer trials: e.g., Suzuki et al., 2003), one at time, from up to four concurrently 
available decks of identical physical appearance. Every card selection results in a variable 
monetary reward or a combination of reward and loss. Over the course of the 100 card 
choices, neurologically normal participants tend to learn that in order to win money, 
decks with immediate lower reward but overall positive balance have to be preferred to 
higher immediate reward decks with overall negative balance. This pattern of selection 
adjustment is not observed in VM patients (Bechara et al., 1994). Performance on the
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IGT is generally defined by an aggregate score of positive minus negative selections 
called the mean net score. A positive mean net score is indicative of advantageous 
performance while a negative mean net score corresponds to disadvantageous 
performance. A number of studies showed an association between VM patients overall 
negative mean net score on the IGT and lack of anticipatory autonomic activation for 
negative decks (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994)
In Chapter 1, several issues were advanced as relevant to the interpretation of the 
burgeoning IGT research findings. First, variability in control participants’ performance 
has been observed in several studies, raising the question of what factors might influence 
IGT performance in the healthy population. This issue is particularly pertinent given the 
important comparison role played by healthy control groups in interpreting performance 
deficits in clinical groups. Second, the cognitive penetrability of the task, a term used to 
describe the intelligibility of the schedule of wins and losses, has been advanced as a 
potential problem for the SMH. The creators’ claim that the underling reward and 
punishment schedule of the IGT is impenetrable via conscious cognitive awareness and 
rests upon the assumption that performance is instead guided by the influence of somatic 
markers. In this way the cognitive penetrability of the task it is not necessary for learning 
to occur (Bechara et al., 2005.). A penetrable schedule, measured via concurrent 
awareness rating or post experimental questioning, would rule out the unconscious 
influence of emotional activation or at least represent a significant challenge to the 
theoretical status of the SMH (Dunn et al., 2006; Maia & McClelland, 2004). Finally, the 
role of reversal learning, the ability to reverse a learned contingency, has also been 
claimed to have a bearing on decision-making performance as measured by the IGT
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(Fellows & Farah, 2005). This argument has been stressed to the point that the VMPFC 
deficits observed on the IGT have been hypothesised to be entirely dependent on a lack 
of prior reversal learning ability (Rolls, 2005). The relationship between the IGT and 
reversal learning ability was highlighted as an empirical testable hypothesis that may 
further illustrate the interaction between emotional and cognitive factors in determining 
IGT performance.
Despite these and other potential confounding issues related to the task, the IGT 
has been extensively used to explore a variety of research questions in many different 
populations. Chapter 1 described prominent examples of the applications of the IGT in 
psychopathology (Dunn et al., 2006). Perhaps unsurprisingly, a conspicuous number of 
studies found that patients with a range of psychopathological disorders display sub- 
optimal learning profiles on the IGT. Patients with schizophrenia, depression, substance 
misuse, anorexia and OCD, for instance, displayed, if not consistently, a similar degree of 
impairment on the IGT compared to the unimpaired learning of control participants (e.g. 
Cavedini et al., 2002a; 2004a; Dalgleish et al., 2004; Sevy et al., 2007; Verdejo-Garcia 
& Bechara, 2009). In this way, the variability observed within some clinical groups 
resembles that seen in some healthy control groups studied using the same task.
Of the clinical disorders mentioned above, research on schizophrenia has gathered 
perhaps the most inconclusive findings, with a proportion of the studies showing that 
patients are impaired at the IGT compared to controls and other studies showing identical 
performance between controls and patients. These inconsistent findings have sparked the 
hypothesis that particular features (e.g., symptomatology, medication or illness length, 
concomitant substance abuse) may moderate the decision-making performance within
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schizophrenia. In a similar fashion, although with fewer published studies, the research 
picture on depression looks as inconclusive as the one on schizophrenia, with one study 
showing patients with depression underperform on the IGT compared to controls (Must et 
al. 2006), another study showing similar performance (Dalgleish et al., 2004) and a third 
report showing depressed patients exhibiting superior performance (Smoski et al., 2008).
From the topics reviewed in the first Chapter 1, a number of worthwhile research 
questions were identified and subsequently investigated in the experimental chapters.
Two broad areas of investigation formed the empirical focus of the subsequent chapters: 
experimental psychology and experimental psychopathology. In particular, the role of 
variability in control group IGT performance was systematically studied, and findings 
lead to the development of a novel variant IGT that was deployed with several healthy, 
sub-clinical and clinical groups.
Chapter 2: The role o f  time constraints on decision-making
Chapter 2 explored the role of decision-making time constraints on IGT 
performance (Celia, Dymond, Cooper & Turnbull, 2007). In Experiment 1 the critical 
decision-making interval was experimentally manipulated in order to study one of the 
potential factors that may disrupt learning. The research hypothesis was that a shorter 
available time to make a decision would negatively impact on decision-making 
performance as measured by the IGT (Bowman et al, 2005). In Experiment 1, the 
influence of time constraints on decision-making was explored by comparing the 
performance of health volunteers playing two modified version of the IGT with time 
constraints (2 s and 4 s, respectively) with a control group playing the original, no time
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constraint 100-trial version of the IGT. In addition to selections, the automated procedure 
systematically measured participants’ subjective experience of the decks. Every twenty 
trials, subjective ratings of the relative “goodness” and “badness” of each of the decks 
were provided. This measure was introduced to clarify the contribution of overt 
knowledge on performance and how this may mediate the more intuitive components 
claimed to shape the decision-making strategy (Turnbull et al., 2005).
Findings showed that reducing the time available during the critical decision­
making phase can significantly decrease the number of advantageous selections. Learning 
profiles were shown to decrease linearly as a function of the time constraint imposed. 
Therefore, being subjected to time constraints negatively affects decision-making 
performance. Experiment 1 also showed that participants in each of the experimental 
conditions had a higher level of subjective awareness ratings than that suggested by 
previous research (Bechara et al., 1997), hinting at the possibility that covert knowledge 
of the task contingencies could be an important and under-considered factor in explaining 
overt IGT performance.
Chapter 3: Flexible emotion based learning
Chapter 3 introduced the contingency shifting modified version of the IGT. The 
experiments reported in this chapter explored the effect of contingency changes on 
decision-making performance and how quickly normal participants can adapt to sudden 
modification of a learned pattern of reward and punishment.
In recent years, the role of reversal learning has increasingly been considered 
essential to perform well on the IGT (Fellows, 2007). This argument is based on the
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claim that for some decks, such as deck B that presents one high magnitude punishment 
every 10 trials, initial selections result in high temporary rewards, followed by 
punishment after several selections. The paradigm tested in Chapter 3 introduced a 
contingency shift phase to the standard 100 trial IGT in which the wins and losses of 
decks are progressively shifted. Immediately after Phase 1, three contingency-shift 
phases, each consisting of two blocks of 20 trials, were introduced. The onset of each 
shift phase involved a systematic modification of the reward and punishment 
contingencies. In order to perform advantageously, participants need to progressively 
adapt their behaviour to the changing environment.
In the two experiments described in Chapter 3 (Experiment 2 and 3), the potential 
usefulness of the contingency shifting IGT in assessing emotion based learning profiles 
of healthy control participants was investigated. Experiment 2 trialled the modified task 
on a large sample (n= 208) of university students (Dymond, Celia, Cooper & Turnbull, 
2009). Learning profiles showed that the onset of each contingency shift produced a 
disruption in learning rates and that participants progressively adapted to the shifting 
environment by taking less time to recognise and select advantageous decks. Experiment 
2 also supported the findings of Experiment 1 on subjective awareness by showing that 
early levels of awareness can support or complement performance. Unlike Experiment 1, 
Experiment 2 showed considerable variability in control participants’ performance. It was 
surprising to find that roughly only one third of the participants reached the advantageous 
mean net score of plus 10, previously used by Bechara et al. (2002), to classify 
advantageous performance. The variability in participants’ performance observed 
prompted the distinction between two sub-groups of healthy controls; Learners and Non-
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Learners. This classification helped describing two typologies of control participants by 
exploring their choice selection profiles, subjective ratings and flexible emotion-based 
learning performance.
In order to determine whether the variability in control participants performance 
observed in Experiment 2 could be overcome by providing additional learning 
experience, Experiment 3 exposed another group of participants to the contingency 
shifting IGT in a second learning session. The findings of the contrast analysis revealed 
that, in the first block of the second exposure, participants showed immediate positive 
mean net scores demonstrating that learning was retained from the first exposure. 
Retention of emotionally learned information has been advanced by the SMH but rarely 
tested (Bechara et al., 1994; Femie & Tunney, 2005). The results of Experiment 3 
suggested that decision-making performance on the contingency shifting IGT benefits 
from good level of retention and would need minimal reappraisal.
Chapter 4: Psychophysiological correlates o f flexible emotion based learning
Chapter 4 explored, for the first time, the psychophysiological correlates of the 
contingency shifting IGT. This chapter sought to confirm the role of anticipatory 
responses in the original 100-trial IGT and clarify the contribution of 
psychophysiological arousal to learning during the contingency shifting phases.
As in Bechara’s studies (1994), the psychophysiological correlates of IGT 
performance were measured via SCRs. Experiment 4 used a fully automated procedure to 
record anticipatory and appraisal SCRs responses in a group of healthy individuals. 
Similar to Experiment 2, the findings of Experiment 4 revealed a large degree of
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variability in control participants’ behavioural performance. Because of this variability, 
the psychophysiological data were analysed by contrasting two sub-groups of participants 
defined by their performance: Learners and Non-learners. This between-group analysis 
proved useful and showed higher anticipatory SCRs for disadvantageous selections in 
Learners compared to Non-learners during the standard IGT phases (i.e. Phase 1). Later 
in the task, during the contingency shift phases, Learners showed higher levels of 
appraisal SCRs for selections with punishment. The findings suggest that different 
emotional processes may influence IGT performance in Phase 1 and 2, at least in groups 
defined on the basis of their behavioural performance. It was argued that anticipatory 
SCRs may help decision-making in uncertain scenarios while appraisal SCRs sustain 
decision-making in a changing environment by pairing outcome values with 
psychophysiological modification.
Chapter 5: Flexible emotion based learning and the dimensionality o f  psychopathology
In Chapter 5, the relevance of clinical features to flexible emotion based learning 
was investigated. This chapter explored the usefulness of dimensional features of 
psychopathology to study decision-making in people with depression and schizophrenia. 
The conceptual background to the studies contained in Chapter 5 was that milder and 
non-pathological expression of psychopathological traits as postulated by the dimensional 
view of psychopathology may influence complex decision-making (Helzer, Kraemer, 
Krueger, 2006; Linney, Peters & Ayton, 1998).
In Chapter 5, the concept of dimensionality was used to study decision-making 
processes in the schizophrenia and depression continuum (Johns & van Os, 2001). Two
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large samples of young adults were screened for depression, hallucination- and delusion- 
proneness. The extremes of the distribution obtained were than tested with the 
contingency-shift variant IGT and their performance compared.
Experiment 5 showed the influence of schizotypal features on the contingency 
shifting learning profiles. Participant with high delusion and hallucination prone scores 
(as measured by the PDI-21 and the LSHS) displayed lower levels of advantageous 
selections during Phase 2 compared to participants with lower scores on the same scales.
Experiment 6 showed that Phase 2 performance was significantly different 
between putatively healthy participants with high and low depressive features (as 
measured by the BDI). Participants with high BDI scores found it difficult to learn and 
adapt to the shifting contingencies of Phase 2.
Taken together, the findings suggest that depression and schizotypal features 
affect decision-making only when the contingencies start to shift and in general when an 
increased level of difficulty is added to the environment. People prone to depression and 
schizotypal individuals do not, per se, have difficulties in dealing with uncertain 
scenarios but shifted contingencies may alter their ability to deploy emotional signals in 
order to assist learning.
Chapter 6: Flexible emotion based learning in schizophrenia
Chapter 6 progressed the investigation of how psychotic features may influence 
decision-making performance. In this chapter, the contingency shifting performance of a 
group of clinical individuals affected with schizophrenia was examined. Previous 
research has shown inconsistent findings in relation to schizophrenic performance on the
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original and variant IGT with a number of studies showing schizophrenic with impaired 
learning profile while other showing patient having similar learning profiles to controls 
(e.g., Beninger et al., 2003; Martino et al., 2007).
In Experiment 7, a sample of outpatients with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and 
sample of healthy controls were recruited and tested with the contingency shifting IGT. 
Patients were screened for positive and negative symptoms with the PSYRATS and the 
SANS (Andreasen, 1983; Haddock et al., 1999). Patients with schizophrenia showed a 
marked preference for disadvantageous decks throughout Phase 1 and 2, compared to 
healthy controls. Findings suggest that symptom-severity may impair not only the more 
complex shifting part of the task but also the initial learning process. When analysed 
within the patient group, none of the symptom dimensions measured (i.e., positive and 
negative) were found to have a direct bearing on IGT performance, but it was found that 
hallucination severity significantly influenced the patients’ subjective experience (as 
measured via subjective ratings). As for most of the previous experiments, subjective 
experience was found to be a significant predictor of IGT performance. It was postulated 
that high positive symptom-severity may have negatively influenced IGT performance 
indirectly by compromising subjective experience.
The results of Experiment 7 support some of the research conducted with the IGT 
in the context of psychosis and suggest that patients with schizophrenia have impaired 
emotion-based learning abilities and display difficulties in flexible environments 
(Martino et al., 2007; Turnbull et al., 2006). It was concluded that inconsistent findings in 
this area may be due to the unaccounted role of a number of important factors such as 
medication, diagnostic heterogeneity and co-morbid diagnosis (Sevy et al., 2007).
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Chapter 7: Flexible emotion based learning in depression
Chapter 7 investigated flexible emotion based learning in depression. The topic of 
decision-making ability in depression has been largely debated around the theme of 
altered sensitivity to reward and punishment (Dalgleish et al., 2004). Experiment 8 
recruited patients referred for depression to an outpatient mental health clinic and were 
administered the contingency shifting variant IGT. Results from the depressed outpatients 
showed a below-chance learning profile during both Phase 1 and 2, compared to healthy 
controls. Similar to those participants in Chapter 6 (Experiment 6) who were prone to 
depression, the depressed participants’ low level of performance during Phase 2 was 
associated with decreased sensitivity to select from decks shifting form disadvantageous 
to advantageous.
Key Findings
The following sections of this final chapter will attempt to discuss the findings of 
the thesis grouped by topic. Reference to the experimental chapters will be made across 
the themes extracted in the following sections as different experiments in the course of 
this thesis have provided evidence for a particular topic.
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The use o f  the IG T as a research tool
This thesis employed the IGT in various settings (i.e., laboratory and applied) and 
in modified formats (i.e., time constrained original and contingency shifting variant). The 
findings support the view that the IGT is a complex and multifaceted task capable of 
providing insight into many aspects related to decision-making such as variability in 
performance, sensibility to environmental constraint and emotional influence. The task 
proved to be reliable for both clinical and experimental applications and sensitive to a 
range of individual differences. Studies with large samples, such as Experiment 2, often 
showed a considerable degree of variability. In the course of the thesis, participants’ 
variability in performance was investigated through potential contributions made by 
individual differences (Experiments 6 and 7) and by experimental manipulation of the 
task related parameters (Experiment 1).
The large pool of variables affecting IGT performance gives credit to the creators’ 
of the task claim that the IGT mimics real life decision-making scenarios (Bechara et al., 
1994; 1996; Damasio, 1994). In the real world, it is difficult to predict human decision­
making due to the large number of variables present in the environment. In this respect, 
the IGT may function as a task capable of summing the environmental complexity and 
contrast effectively the performance of individuals showing less proficiency in social 
contexts, such as people with psychopathology, compared to healthy individuals.
Although the sensitivity of the IGT to a wide range of factors constitutes a 
measure of its ecological validity, it renders comparison between studies difficult due to 
the lack of normative data. A large proportion of the published studies have compared 
IGT performance with a between-groups experimental design, defining impaired
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performance in relative terms (e.g., clinical vs control group). Unlike other 
neuropsychological tests (e.g., WAIS, BADS), the IGT does not have normative scores 
that define normal or advantageous performance (Dunn et al., 2006). This thesis has used 
the IGT both in between-group comparisons (e.g., Experiments 1 & 7) and in a large 
single group study (Experiment 2). Although the between-group design has shown, in the 
experiments presented in this thesis and previous published material, several noteworthy 
findings, clinical applications of the task to individual participants can only be achieved 
with validated instruments with clear normative scores. In this respect, the present thesis 
includes one of the first large sample studies to be conducted with the IGT on putatively 
healthy individuals (Experiment 2). As such, the data contained within the present thesis 
may help to provide a profile of normative performance that may help clarify the nature 
of the impairment often seen in clinical groups.
Subjective awareness
All the experiments described in this thesis employed a measure of subjective 
awareness Based upon Bowman et al. (2005), the method of assessing awareness used in 
this thesis required participants to provide a quantitative rating of goodness or badness 
for each deck of cards, every block of 20 trials. The automated, Likert-style ratings 
allowed in depth evaluation of the levels of awareness across the course of the task and 
removed the social constraint of providing a verbal a post-experimental self-report to an 
experimenter (Bechara et al., 1997; 2000a). The systematic and standardised recording of 
subjective experience allowed the current thesis to accumulate a large body of data
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around the topic of awareness, its importance in decision-making and what factors might 
influence it.
Across all of the experiments, it was reliably found that healthy participants 
consistently rated advantageous decks better than disadvantageous from a very early 
stage in the task. In contrast with Bechara et al.’s (2000a) claim that awareness of the task 
contingencies is reached after two thirds of the game (i.e., by block 60), this work 
showed that participants’ awareness significantly improves after the second block to 
stabilise around the third block until the end of the task. The subjective experience data 
suggest that participants are more aware of the task contingencies than previously thought 
(Bowman et al., 2005; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Turnbull et al., 2005). Such findings 
ought to prompt a re-thinking of the potential role played by subjective awareness during 
the IGT and, in general, in decision-making.
However, the role of subjective awareness remains controversial especially in its 
relation to performance; this can be exemplified using the findings of Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 7. Experiment 2 showed no difference in subjective awareness between 
Learners and Non-leamers suggesting that high degree of awareness might not be 
necessarily related to good performance. The performance of schizophrenic patients, in 
Experiment 7, revealed a different picture where learning rates, as well as levels of 
subjective awareness, were substantially compromised in the clinical group compared to 
controls. In summary, subjective awareness, in the course of this thesis, has been found to 
contribute to, and dissociate from, IGT performance. It is possible that for IGT 
performance, a number of factors can moderate or mediate subjective awareness (such as 
hallucination severity in schizophrenia). Based on the data presented in this thesis, it is
225
Chapter 8
plausible to advance that subjective awareness may be an important aspect that 
contributes to IGT performance, although it may not be necessary. This notwithstanding, 
the early awareness showed by participants across the experiments suggests that emotion- 
based learning interacts with conscious processing from an early stage of the task 
(Bowman et al. 2005; Evans et al., 2005; Maia & McClelland, 2004).
Variability in control performance
In the last fifteen years, a number of research papers have raised the issue of 
variability in control participants’ performance during the course of the IGT (e.g.,
Bechara et al., 2002; Dunn et al., 2006; Glicksohn et al., 2007). That is, a significant 
number of IGT participants present a learning profile similar to those obtained with the 
orginial VMPFC patient groups (Bechara et al., 1994). The term “variability” is used here 
to refer to the relatively high variance observed in control participants’ performance. This 
is defined by a large standard deviation and a consequent high variance in the control’s 
group total mean net score obtained at the end of Phase 1.
In the experiments presented in this thesis variability was often observed, 
particularly in Experiment 2. Accounting for a substantial proportion of control 
participants that fail to perform advantageously on the task is not easy, particularly as few 
studies have tried to study the phenomenon directly (cf. Caroselli et al., 2006; Crone et 
al., 2004; Dunn et al., 2006; Glickson et al 2007). Nevertheless, the empirical data 
presented throughout the thesis showed that variability is indeed often present.
The direct study of behavioural variability (Sidman, 1961) was not in the remit of 
this thesis and therefore limited material can be used in order to clarify this issue. The
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distinction between Learners and Non-learners, adopted in Experiment 2 and 3, proved to 
characterise well the two sub-groups of healthy participants. The proportion of Non- 
learners varied between experiments and showed slightly lower levels of subjective 
awareness. It is also worth noting that the clinical control groups recruited for Experiment 
7 and 8 did not include individuals with impaired learning profiles. The university student 
samples that showed higher levels of variability were generally younger and more 
educated than the matched controls groups used in the clinical studies. Previous research 
has shown that both of these factors, young age (Caroselli et al., 2006; Glicksohn et al.,
2007) and years spent in higher education (Evans, Kemish, & Turnbull, 2004) are 
associated with lower learning levels on the IGT. It is possible, therefore, that either of 
these factors individually, or in combination, may have influenced control groups 
performance in the present thesis. This area is clearly understudied and warrants further 
attention by researchers interested in the determinants of behavioural variability.
Clearly, complex decision-making, as indexed by the IGT, it is likely to rest on a 
multitude of influences. While the SMH seeks to account for a broad and overarching 
process capable of explaining decision-making, other factors might have a bearing on 
sub-components of decision-making. For instance, attention to the task contingencies 
could be affected by high trait anxiety, and have a bearing on learning potentials of the 
individual (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). Similarly, heavy loading of cognitive functions, 
such as working memory, could have a detrimental effect on the IGT performance 
suggesting that emotion-based learning is unlikely to be a “stand-alone” process (Hinson 
et al., 2002; 2003; Pecchinenda et al., 2006; Turnbull et al., 2005). Nevertheless, a finer
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grade understanding of what influences decision-making, such as personality, aging, 
cognitive impairment, and psychopathology is needed.
The contingency shifting variant IGT
As Bechara et al. (1994; 1997; 2000a) pointed out, the main feature of the IGT is 
the ability to detect real life decision-making problems in neurological patients with 
seemingly intact neuropsychological profile but profound decision-making impairment. 
Although the IGT represented a considerably novel form of neuropsychological testing, 
and one that has been enormously successful, it did not capture a considerable 
characteristic of a dynamic environment: variability. Real life situations, in fact, also 
require attention to change and consequent behavioural adjustment (Goldfried, & 
Davison, 1994).
In the first attempt to encompass this feature, this thesis adapted the contingency 
shifting modification of the IGT proposed by Turnbull et al. (2006). The contingency 
shifting modification of the IGT involved three subsequent modifications of the deck 
contingencies following the original 100-trial IGT. The relevance of this modification, 
both to the understanding of possible reversal learning components associated with 
performance on the original IGT and in exploring flexible behaviour, has been a central 
theme of the current thesis. Experiment 2 introduced the contingency shifting IGT and 
explored its usage with a large sample of young adults. Performance on the shift phases 
was partially dissociable from the performance in the standard/original IGT; this was 
shown by the fact that some participants with advantageous performance showed a poor 
performance profile during the contingency shifting phase. The partial dissociation
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observed in healthy participant groups hints very strongly that performance during Phase 
2 is influenced by several different aspects and that various resources might come into 
play in governing performance. As a confirmation of the fact that different components 
might influence performance on Phase 2, Experiment 5 and 6 showed how sub-clinical 
characteristics of depression and schizophrenia can disrupt learning during Phase 2 but 
not during Phase 1. This is a finding of particular interest as it shows dissociation in 
performance between Phase 1 and 2 and suggests how the contingency shifting 
modification may tap on partially different functions compared to the standard IGT.
The findings of the current thesis illustrate that it has proven very challenging for 
some groups of patients, as well as for some control participants, to perform 
advantageously on the contingency shifting phase, showing how complex deciding 
advantageously and adjusting to new, changing contingencies can be. There is no doubt 
that the difficulty of the task coupled with the relatively short time available to leam, 
required a higher order cognitive functions to achieve advantageous performance. Future 
investigation of flexibility in the emotion based learning environment should focus on 
factors like sensitivity to reward and punishment (e.g., Must et al., 2006), ability to 
detach from previously learnt contingencies (e.g., Turnbull et al., 2007) and how history 
of past emotions modify emotion-based learning (e.g., Turnbull et al., 2007).
Physiological correlates o f  emotion-based learning
In Chapter 4, if considered as a single homogeneous sample, anticipatory SCR 
arousal during the standard IGT phase did not follow the predictions advanced by the 
SMH (Naqvi et al., 2006). Interestingly, an analysis of Learners and Non-leamers
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demonstrated that higher anticipatory SCR responses for bad decks developed only for 
Learners. Using a similar between group analysis in Experiment 4 further, confirmed that 
similar demographic samples holds considerable variability and that low performance on 
the task corresponded to diminished anticipatory activation during the early trials of the 
standard IGT. Advantageous performers showed higher SCR activations prior to the 
selection of bad decks but, at the same time, a substantial proportion of healthy 
participants fail to perform advantageously in the task and did not produce anticipatory 
SCRs before disadvantageous selections.
The findings of Experiment 4 neither disconfirm nor provide support for the 
SMH. The primary contribution of the data presented is in pointing to the limitations of 
the SMH framework and advocates more research in order to better describe the 
influence of emotion to human decision-making behaviour. Whether or not the SCR 
results of Phase 1 can be reconciled with the majority of the previous published literature, 
the findings concerning Phase 2 autonomic arousal are the first of their kind. The results 
of Experiment 4 showed that unlike Phase 1, Phase 2 seems to be relying more 
extensively on the appraisal responses. Learners tended to have higher appraisal SCRs 
prior to selections with punishment suggesting that emotional reaction to feedback 
governs subsequent performance rather than the initial, autonomic intuition.
It is difficult to say if the behavioural adjustment leading to advantageous 
performance in the shifting phase is only dependent on the autonomic response to 
punishment, as learners in Phase 2 are also those with an advantageous performance 
profiles in Phase 1. As shown in several experiments presented in this thesis, it is 
extremely unlikely that disadvantageous performance in Phase 1 results in an
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advantageous performance in Phase 2. Therefore, it is possible to advance that sensitivity 
to punishment, which showed a strong influence on Phase 2 performance, is related to the 
initial development of anticipatory SCR activation prior to disadvantageous selections 
(Suzuki et al., 2003).
Participants initially face a novel environment with little certainty about the 
reward and punishment contingencies embedded within it. As awareness increases and 
participants extend their experience with the task, anticipatory arousal might become less 
important in influencing decision-making. At this stage, when the experience with the 
task is high participants might prefer to base their decisions on the emotional 
consequences of their behaviour rather on a more intuitive feeling. The adaptation to 
shifting contingencies necessary to perform advantageously on Phase 2 needs to be seen 
in the context of past experience on Phase 1. In other words, the appraisal response, that 
has been showed to be related to advantageous performance in Phase 2, may be related to 
the anticipatory arousal displayed during Phase 1. The value of anticipatory responses to 
appraisal is claimed, as part of the SMH, to be a mechanism that serves to consolidate 
learning into conscious information (Damasio, 1994). The physiological data gathered in 
this thesis support and extend this claim suggesting that anticipatory responses can 
influence appraisals even if the learning environment changes.
The dimensionality o f  psychopathology and its usefulness in understanding clinical 
phenomena
Experiments 5 and 6 approached the study of IGT performance in schizophrenia 
and depression using a dimensional approach. Both studies used non-clinical participants
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screened for depression, delusional and hallucination proneness and compared high with 
low ends of the distributions. The dimensionality of psychopathology approach (i.e., 
considering clinical features as dimensions rather that dichotomous entities; Claridge, 
1997) has been increasingly used to study clinically relevant issues. This approach has 
the advantage of accessing largerer samples, allow higher level of control on confounding 
variables (e.g., medication influence) and minimal adaptation required of existing 
experimental task (e.g., Linney et al., 1998; Henry, Bailey & Rendell, 2008). In terms of 
how this approach may benefit clinical research, both Experiment 5 and 6 provided 
examples of similar and different effects between clinical and non-clinical populations 
with high proneness to certain psychopathological features. In Experiment 6, for 
example, participants with high BDI scores showed, similar to clinically depressed 
patients (Must et al., 2006), poor performance in Phase 2 evidencing the same lack of 
adjustment for previous-bad-now-good decks. Findings from Phase 1 showed that the 
learning profile of the High BDI group is different from the profile of the clinically 
depressed group.
In general, applying the dimensional approach to psychopathology permits 
researchers to study relevant features without being constrained by traditional challenges 
inherit when conducting research in clinical settings and may also allow for identification 
of potential prodromic signs towards developing clinical disorders (Claridge & Davis, 
2003). Recent research has shown that people with high levels of cognitive and emotional 
disturbances are at greater risk of developing mental illness (Hanssen et al., 2005; 
Krabbendam, Myin-Germeys, DeGraf, Vollebergh, Nolen, Iedema et al., 2004; Morrison, 
French, Lewis, Roberts, Raja, Neil et al., 2006). The notion of the dimensionality of
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psychopathology, as used in this thesis, can clarify the pre-morbid decision-making 
performance, provide useful insights with regards to what differentiates clinical and non- 
clinical population and inform on what may be prodromic the exacerbation of symptoms 
and their transition to clinical relevance.
Emotion-based learning and schizophrenia
Experiments 5 and 7 explored the theme of emotion-based learning in psychosis. 
As seen in the first chapter and in the introduction to the specific experimental chapters, 
this area of research has gathered inconclusive findings with respect to whether or not 
schizophrenia patients present impairment in emotion-based learning tasks. Some of the 
studies conducted in this area showed no difference between patients with schizophrenia 
and control participant (e.g., Cavallaro et al., 2003; Wilder et al., 1998) while other 
investigations have suggested that patients with schizophrenia present a deficit in 
emotion based learning (Lee et al., 2007; Martino et al., 2007; Shurman et al., 2005).
The findings gathered in this thesis suggest that emotion-based learning deficits in 
psychosis follow a gradient of symptom-severity and perhaps interact with medication 
(Beninger et al., 2003; Rodriguez-Sanchez, et al., 2005). Experiment 5 showed that high- 
delusion and-hallucination-prone participants presented marked decrements in decision­
making performance during the shifting phase, suggesting that shifting and reversal 
learning deficits can be seen in individuals presenting non-clinical features of 
schizophrenia (Laurent, Duly, Murry, Foussard, Boccara, Mingat, et al., 2001). Further, 
in relation to the performance of schizophrenic patients during the standard IGT phase, 
Experiment 7 showed impaired performance of patients compared to controls.
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Unsurprisingly, schizophrenic patients show impaired performance during the shifting 
phase.
The inconclusive findings of previous research gathered using the standard IGT 
may suggest that the impaired performance in emotion-based learning tasks in 
schizophrenic patients could be dependent on different factors such as concomitant 
substance misuse (Sevy et al., 2007), medication (Beninger et al., 2003) and symptom 
classification (Bark et al., 2005). The research conducted in this thesis used dimensional 
measures of symptom assessment, the PSYRATS. The PSYRATS gives a multi­
dimensional value o f delusion and hallucination severity in the two weeks prior to 
investigation (Haddock et al., 1999). The patients recruited for Experiment 7 were mainly 
actively psychotic individuals (e.g., having trouble with voices and presenting some level 
of delusional ideation) although well enough to be outpatients. The active nature of the 
symptoms is the most likely the cause of the low performance of the clinical group 
compared to controls on the IGT.
The results of Experiment 7 do not provide support to the only previous study that 
investigated flexible emotion-based learning in schizophrenia (Turnbull et al., 2007).
This could be due to the different composition of the clinical groups, a problem that 
reflects the general concern of the heterogeneity of the schizophrenia diagnosis. The 
results of the study conducted in this thesis suggests that there is no distinction between 
the IGT performance of patients with high and low positive and negative symptoms; 
positive symptom ratings were, instead, found to be predictive of awareness. Taken 
together, the result o f Experiments 5 and 7 suggested that there is a gradient in the effect
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of psychotic symptoms on the IGT and advance the role of awareness as an important 
factor in predicting performance.
Emotion-based learning and depression
Previous research on IGT performance in clinical depression has also been largely 
inconsistent, with some studies showing depressed patients have worst performance than 
controls on the IGT (Must et al., 2006) while other studies showing depressed patients 
have better performance on the IGT compared to controls (Smoski et al., 2008). Similar 
to the experimental work conducted with the schizophrenia spectrum, a dimensional 
approach was used in Experiment 6 to investigate contingency shifting IGT performance 
in putatively healthy participants with high and low BDI scores. Experiment 8 replicated 
Experiment 6 but contrasted clinically depressed outpatients with healthy controls.
The results of both experiments showed that depression and depressive features 
can substantially influence IGT performance. Experiment 6 showed that putatively 
healthy young adults with high scores on the BDI underperformed during the shifting 
phase showing little ability to adjust to shifting contingencies. In-depth analyses of 
participants’ selection patterns revealed that individuals with high BDI scores showed 
little adjustment to contingencies shifting from bad to good. Interestingly, this finding 
was replicated in Experiment 8, although, in this case clinical depressed patients 
underperformed from the start of the task.
Building upon the predictions made by SMH, the insensitivity to reward observed 
in depression could be explained as a lack of emotional activation in consequence to 
rewarding outcomes (Dalgleish et al., 2004). Although the creators of the task claim that
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attending only to punishing outcomes is not sufficient to perform advantageously on the 
IGT, the SMH does not address the importance of somatic arousal in relation to positive 
outcomes (Damasio, 1994). While depressed patients have repeatedly shown to be 
sensitive, or even oversensitive, to the outcomes of losses (Dalgleish et al., 2004), little 
research has examined sensitivity to positive outcomes. The findings presented support 
the idea of altered sensitivity to reward in depression and suggest the role of balance 
between positive and negative affect could be crucial in influencing decision-making 
performance. In other words, the biasing signal claimed to influence decision-making 
may result from a history of positive and negative emotional arousals. In the case of 
depression, an altered sensitivity to positive outcomes (i.e., very low) may create a 
sufficient unbalance to the system and compromise emotion-based learning.
By using a dimensional approach to the study of depression this thesis has been 
able to clarify the contribution of symptoms severity to decision-making in an uncertain 
and flexible environment. Clinically depressed patients showed impaired performance, 
compared to controls, in both the standard and the contingency shifting phase of the task. 
This more impaired learning profile it is likely to be related to more severe symptoms, 
history of mental illness and medication. Certain symptoms, in fact, may make decision 
strategies increasingly ineffective (Bark et al., 2005). For example, avoiding social 
activity for a long time may make social decision-making particularly hard because of a 
lack of practice and altered emotional activation. A long history of depression can also 
create regularities in biased decision-making strategy that can be more difficult to reverse 
or overcome. Finally, the influence of medication is worth taking into account as it is
236
Chapter 8
possible that various substances may act differently on each patient symptom profile and 
therefore diversely affect the decision-making process.
In a different manner to the learning plots displayed by the schizophrenic patients, 
depressed patients demonstrated more awareness for the good and bad decks. This trait 
may connote a slightly different process behind depressed patients’ low performance. The 
depressed group, by showing comparable level of awareness with respect to controls, 
further characterizes their difficulty in using emotional signals to mark behavioural 
consequences. Thus, depressed patients did not show a substantial problem in identifying 
the good and bad decks but failed to elicit appropriate levels of emotional arousal in 
response to those accurately identified contingencies.
Potential limitations o f  the present research
A number of general limitations can be pointed out for the experiments conducted 
in this thesis. First, a complete neuropsychological screening for control participants was 
not conducted. Although previous studies have already confirmed the relative 
independence between emotion-based learning, as measured by the IGT, and other 
neuropsychological functions, a complete neuropsychological assessment may have 
detected a correlation between Phase 2 performance and specific cognitive functions 
(Naqvi et al., 2006). A neuropsychological assessment would have also provided a useful 
index of concurrent validity especially with tasks such as the WCST that has been often 
used in combination with the IGT but never with the contingency shifting variant 
modification.
237
Chapter 8
A second limitation can be acknowledged in the use of a student population for 
the basic experimental studies. Students indeed constitute a limited proportion of the 
general population proving to be a difficult sample when attempting to generalise the 
findings. Yet, a substantial amount of experimental research, as a matter of convenience, 
uses university student samples. This has eventually created a common ground for 
comparison of studies. The use of college students was, however, integral to one of the 
main themes of the thesis: the role of variability in control group IGT performance.
A third limitation is the lack of an accurate screening instrument for mental health 
symptoms and diagnoses in the control participants. The small and preferential nature of 
the control participants selected to match the clinical groups was used as a first line of 
screening for mental health problem. In addition, control participants were asked about 
their mental health history and psychoactive medications. Although the brief interview 
held for eligibility to the study was structured, it was not validated and therefore it is 
impossible to exclude the possibility that all the controls participants did not experience a 
mental health problem during their life course. Future studies may benefit from adopting 
validated clinical assessments such as the SCID (First et al., 1996; 1997) or the CIS-R 
(Brugha, Bebbington, Jenkins, Meltzer, Taub, & Janaset, 1999).
A fourth aspect worth mentioning relates to the possible ecological validity 
limitations of the IGT. As seen earlier in this chapter, the real-life mimicking component 
of the task it is often claimed as one of the main advantages. In comparison with other 
neuropsychological tests, this characteristic can be truly argued to be an advantage of the 
IGT. Nevertheless, when considered in absolute terms, the ecological validity attribute of 
the task, presents a few flaws. In the first instance, a card game resembling a gambling
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scenario might not be common to many participants. Indeed, the extent to which the task 
actually mirrors any real world gambling task is itself subject to debate. Card-based 
gambling tasks that resemble the IGT present more than one deck of cards 
simultaneously with revealed “outcomes” (e.g., Texas Hold ‘Em Poker, Blackjack). 
Therefore, the real-world validity of the IGT may rest on its counterbalancing of 
uncertain reward and punishment rather that its formal similarity with gambling games. 
Secondly, decisions in real life can rely strongly on the social context. Although the 
influence of other individuals on decision is intuitive, the implementation of the social 
constraint in decision-making tasks is in its early days (Turnbull, Worsey & Bowman, 
2007). A further point with regards to the task limitation is the assumed initial emotional 
neutrality. That is none of the decks has emotional value prior to the commencement of 
the card selection due to their similar physical appearance. However, in real life situation 
people often judge on the basis of preconception and pre-existing attitudes (e.g., on the 
basis of clothes people might infer wealth).
Future research
The results of the studies presented in this thesis can suggest future interesting 
avenues of research. Several patients with schizophrenia expressed, at the end of the task, 
the impression that the subjective rating was capable of controlling the reward schedule 
embedded in the decks. Although it is reasonable to think that delusion and in particular 
idea of reference could have influenced patients perception of the task the possibility of 
altering the schedule according to the rating seems an excellent idea. People tend to 
adjust their behaviour not just according to the outcomes but also according to the
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cognition associated with it (Plassmann, O'Doherty, Shiv & Rangel, 2008). In this 
respect, it would be interesting to investigate how a schedule of rewards that changes in 
accordance or not with the subjecting rating, will impact on performance. This line of 
investigation would be particularly interesting in the context of delusional disorders and 
may help to clarify the extent to which delusional thinking can influence the decision­
making behaviour of individuals.
A second interesting development of the work conducted in this thesis would be 
to change the affective value of the stimulus presented as reward and punishment. This 
line of investigation could be exploited in several different ways and provide an 
insightful view into the affective components of decision-making. One possible way to 
characterize the extent of the emotional signal would be to try to disrupt it in the same 
fashion as Experiment 1. By presenting emotionally salient pictures in-between trials 
participants should be able to elicit emotion possibly functioning as confounders to the 
somatic marker signal. A recent theory has advanced the possibility that decisions can be 
pursued by two separate and competitive systems: the “hot” decision-making system, that 
deals with emotionally salient material, and the “cold” decision-making system, that 
deals with more neutral material and can optimize the use of cognitive resource (Weber, 
Shafir & Blais, 2004). Fidgner et al. (2009) found adolescents engaged in higher risky 
behaviours when playing a “hot” version of the Columbia Card (CCT) decision-making 
task (i.e., the CCT) compared to when they played a “cold” version of the same task. This 
suggests that emotions can generally alter the decision-making process not necessarily for 
the good.
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Another possible way of disrupting the emotional signal could be to replace the 
monetary reward and punishment with emotionally salient stimuli either visual or 
auditory. For instance, an emotionally salient modified version of the task could replace 
the monetary losses with different volumes (to resemble the different magnitude) loud 
aversive tones. Likewise, it is possible to present affectively consistent or inconsistent 
information prior to card selections by, for example, positioning affectively pleasant or 
unpleasant images from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) on the card 
decks.
A further interesting development of the work conducted in this thesis would be 
the study of IGT performance with joint functional imaging and psychophysiology 
methods (i.e., SCRs). Functional imaging studies of the IGT are currently underway and 
they will most likely clarify the cortical involvement during specific part of the task 
(Lawrence, Jollant, O'Daly, Zelaya, & Phillips, 2009; Lin, Chiu, Cheng & Hsieh, in 
press). Future investigations should consider linking functional MRI with SCR measures 
of emotional arousal. The link between information processing, emotional activation and 
neural functioning it is still largely unclear (Critchley, 2005). Decision-making, given its 
aggregate process nature resulting from a number of more basic functions, will prove to 
be difficult to investigate. Nevertheless its importance for the human behaviour will 
contribute to cast some light on more complex cognition and eventually understand the 
psychophysiological and affective underpinnings of executive functions.
Two of the ideas proposed above, the emotional manipulation and the customized 
manipulation of the schedule of reward and punishment, could be used to investigate 
clinical phenomena and findings could inform therapies approaches. For example, by
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interspersing the schedule of the IGT decks with emotionally negative stimuli (one before 
and one after the choice) might help people with depression recognise a rewarding 
outcome due to the higher relative difference between the emotional values of successive 
events.
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Appendix 1
Bechara et al. 1999 original instruction
1. In front of you on the screen, there are four decks of cards A, B, C, and D.
2 .1 want you to select one card at a time, by clicking on the card, from any deck you 
choose.
3. Each time you select a card from a deck, the color of the card turns red or black, and 
the computer will tell you that you won some money. I won't tell you how much money 
you will win. You will find out along the way. Every time you win, the green bar gets 
longer.
4. Every so often, however, when you click on a card, the computer tells you that you 
won some money, but then it says that you also lost some money. I won't tell you when 
you will lose or how much you will lose. You will find out along the way. Every time you 
lose, the green bar gets shorter.
5. You are absolutely free to switch from one deck to another any time you wish.
6. The goal of the game is to win as much money as possible and, if you find yourself 
unable to win, make sure you avoid losing money as much as possible.
7 .1 won't tell you for how long the game will continue. You must keep on playing until 
the computer stops.
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8. You will get this $2000 credit (see the green bar) to start the game. At the end, we will 
see how much you won or lost. The red bar here is a reminder of how much money you 
borrowed to play the game.
9. It is important to know that the colors of the cards are irrelevant in this game. The 
computer does not make you lose money at random. However, there is no way for you to 
figure out when the computer will make you lose. All I can say is that you may find 
yourself losing money on all of the decks, but some decks will make you lose more than 
others. You can win if you stay away from the worst decks.
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Appendix 2
Contingency shifting variant IGT instructions
In a moment, the computer will present four decks o f cards labelled A, B, C, and 
D. Your task is to select one card at a time, by clicking on the card with the computer
mouse, from any deck you choose.
Each time you select a card, the computer will tell you that you have won some 
money. The amount of money won will be immediately added to the total, which will be 
displayed in the bottom right-hand side of the screen.
Occasionally, however, when you select a card, the computer will tell you that 
you have wron some money but that you have also lost some money. The amount of 
money lost will be immediately deducted from your total.
Your task is to try and earn as much money as possible, and if you can’t win, to 
avoid losing as much money as possible.
You will be given a loan of £1000 credit to begin the task. It is important that you 
try and behave as if this were a real card game and try to win as much money as possible 
(and lose as little as possible). Treat the £1000 credit of play money, and all money 
won/lost during the task, as if it were your own real money.
No matter how much you find yourself losing, you can still win. Pay attention to 
the wins/losses.
Every so often, the computer will ask you to give each deck of cards a score, 
based on how good or bad you feel they are. Please use the slider scale to rate each of the 
decks. The computer will show you how to do this.
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The computer will not tell you when the task will end, so please keep playing 
until the tasks ends.
If you have any questions, please read through the instructions again to see if they 
answer your questions. If they do not, then ask the experimenter to explain.
Remember, your task is to try and earn as much money as possible, and if you 
can’t win, to avoid losing as much money as possible, and be sure to give each deck of 
cards a score based on how good or bad you feel they are.
Good luck!
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